Brookings: Experts - Jeffrey A. Bader

An Insider's Guide to Obama and Xi's "Shirt-Sleeves Summit"

Jeffrey A. Bader — Fri, 07 Jun 2013 00:00:00 -0400

As Barack Obama and Xi Jinping prepare for their “shirt sleeves summit” in California, the stakes in U.S. China relations have rarely been higher. Belligerence in North Korea, territorial claims in the South China Sea and cyber attacks all compete for attention at the top of the agenda. A more confident and relaxed leader than his predecessors. Mr. Xi has raised hopes that greater rapport between the two men will help cut through the differences.

Between 2009 and 2011, as senior director for East Asian affairs on the National Security Council, Jeffrey Bader was a key player in organizing summit meetings between Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao. With so much on the line, China Real Time turned to Mr. Bader, now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of “Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy,” for his thoughts on what to expect.

Watch the interview and read excerpts at blogs.wsj.com »

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Jeffrey A. Bader

Publication: The Wall Street Journal

Image Source: © Reuters Photographer / Reuters

A Conversation on President Obama’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of China

Jeffrey A. Bader, Eswar Prasad and Cheng Li — Tue, 04 Jun 2013 13:47:00 -0400

In advance of President Obama’s meeting with President Xi Jinping of China later this week in California, Brookings scholars Eswar Prasad, Jeffrey Bader and Cheng Li discuss U.S.-China relations and the top issues on the leaders’ agenda. Topics covered include: the U.S.-China economic and investment relationship, North Korea, cybersecurity, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, internal Chinese politics and politics of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, and China’s currency.

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Jeffrey Bader:

"I think three dominant issues are to be North Korea, to be the economic relationship and its various manifestations bilaterally and multilaterally, and cyber issues.”

Eswar Prasad:

“The traditional flash points between the two countries – the currency issue and trade – have sort of diminished as flash points, and they remain minor irritants in the regime because the U.S. would like China to move forward in its currency appreciation. But the real opportunity lies in the fact the U.S. and China have now a commonality of interest.”

Cheng Li::

"President Xi Jinping has had a honeymoon period during the first several months since last November when he became the top leader in the party, largely because he has enhanced the great expectations across many social-political groups in China.”

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A Conversation on President Obama’s Meeting with President Xi Jinping of China

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2013 Barnett-Oksenberg Lecture on Sino-American Relations

Jeffrey A. Bader — Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

It is a great honor for me to follow in the footsteps of a succession of outstanding diplomats and scholars in delivering the Barnett-Oksenberg Lecture. They have been people, some dear friends, with whom I’ve worked closely and from whom I have learned so much, like Stape Roy, Bob Zoellick, Carla Hills, Jon Huntsman, Ken Lieberthal, and Gary Locke.

We all appreciate the role the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the Shanghai Association of American Studies have played in creating and sustaining this event, which is becoming a major tradition in our relationship. Special appreciation goes to Paul Liu, who more than anyone deserves credit for this event. In its name it expresses the reverence we feel for two giants in the development of the modern relationship between the United States and China. Doak Barnett taught a generation of scholars and practitioners, not least the current Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai. He was a scholar of great intellect, breadth and insight, and a man of judgment, moderation, and great personal decency. He was one of the handful of brave souls who argued openly and forcefully for a changed relationship between China and the United States in the mid-1960s, at time when it was politically incorrect to do so, and who co-founded the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. I am delighted that his wife and partner, Jeanne Barnett, has flown across the Pacific to be with us here today. I had the pleasure of getting to know Mike Oksenberg, first when he worked at the National Security Council under President Carter and subsequently after he returned to academic life, where he became a good friend, guide, and mentor to me as I developed my own interest in modern

China. Mike, of course, played a key role in the U.S. government as relations were normalized and afterward in forging links between the two countries and societies. These were towering figures who helped build the bipartisan basis for support for the relationship that has been essential to its progress.

A New Type of Great Power Relationship?

In the last year, a new phrase has been used by leaders on both sides to describe the nature of the relationship the United States and China should be building. President Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao before him, and President Obama have referred to the importance of establishing “a new type of great power relationship.”

This concept has not been particularly fleshed out on either side. As best I can discern, the thinking that lies behind the phrase is the realization that the history of the rise of great powers has rarely been smooth or easy. The reaction of the dominant power to the rise of a newcomer frequently has been to see the rising power as a threat, and for the newcomer to see the dominant power as an obstacle. Conflict, including life and death struggles, has often accompanied such developments – for example, Germany’s rise in the late 19th century, Japan’s rise somewhat later, France’s conquests propelled by a revolutionary ideology in the Napoleonic years, and the Soviet Union’s rise in the 20^th century. Some analysts have made a living out of warning of the inevitability of a similar clash between the United States and China. The objective of those who have articulated the desirability of “a new type of great power relationship” is precisely to avoid such a clash between the United States and China, so we should respect and appreciate their intent.

My view is that one makes a mistake by overgeneralizing about such historic precedents.

Theory matters, but the facts matter too. Or as a Chinese statesman said, seek truth from facts. If the rising and existing power see their raison d’etre as to establish or maintain dominance, then conflict is much more likely. That was the case, for one party or the other, in the power transformations I’ve cited above. But history is contingent on decisions by leaders and peoples, not a set of Newtonian principles that tell us what will happen. The specific facts of the case also matter. One can’t simply transplant a set of past events on present and future reality and have a rational basis for prediction.

That said, we should not dismiss those warning of a descent into conflict between the United

States and China as Chicken Littles who say the sky is falling. If we study the history of U.S.-China relations over the last quarter century, we see signs of the kind of dynamic that the pessimists warn us about: high levels of suspicion of the motives of the other, attribution of aggressive or sinister intentions, a belief on the Chinese side that the U.S. side seeks to contain China or worse; a belief on the American side that China seeks to supplant the United States and corrode its global influence. There are numerous manifestations of these trends.

For an insightful study of the mutually degenerating perceptions, see the essay published by leading scholars Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China Distrust, which postulates an atmosphere of rising mutual distrust that will end badly if there are not significant course corrections. Wang Jisi, a very distinguished scholar whom I greatly respect, describes a series of beliefs he calls widespread on the Chinese side about U.S. intentions. For example, “American politicians are true believers of ‘the law of the jungle,’ and their promotion of democracy and human rights are in reality policy tools to achieve goals of power politics. This cynicism is so widespread that no one would openly affirm that the Americans truly believe in what they say about human rights concerns.” Or “the United States has sinister designs to sabotage the Communist leadership and turn China into its vassal state.

Such alleged designs are referred to as America’s ‘strategy of peaceful evolution’ against socialism. U.S. sympathies toward, and support for, anti-Communist demonstrations in Eastern Europe before the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the ‘color revolutions’ in the former Soviet states, and the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011, and support for democratic reforms in Myanmar are all manifestations of U.S. schemes to this effect.” Such views frankly seem surreal to most Americans. On the other side, there are elements in the U.S. political, economic, and military hierarchy who regularly interpret Chinese actions in ways rife with suspicion and negative presumptions, which many of my colleagues and I work hard to refute.

What can be the elements of a “new type of great power relationship” that does not lead to conflict? There are at least four broad dimensions to the U.S.-China relationship that provide major opportunities for cooperation or conflict. They are the following:

1) Bilateral economic relations and competition in third country markets. Arguably, this is the factor in the relationship that is most salient in our domestic politics, the one that most affects short-term attitudes.

2) International issues of interest to all countries and on which the United States and China have disproportionate influence because of their power, e.g. climate change, cyberintrusions, coordination of fiscal and monetary policies of major economic actors, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, global energy security, disease control, and foreign aid.

3) Political and security competition in the Asia Pacific area as Chinese military power expands and the United States rebalances its capabilities toward the region.

4) Seeking solutions to conflicts, civil disorder, rogue behavior, or instability in third countries around the world – so-called “hot spots.”

I believe the United States and China need to work creatively and persistently to solve problems in all four of these areas. Within each category, there are issues that are hugely consequential for the United States, and the outcomes will be notably better or worse depending on the degree to which the U.S. and China are on the same page. Indeed, I’m tempted to say that the relationship will only be as durable as the weakest link. If, for example, we descend into an arms race and military confrontation in the Asia Pacific, obviously whatever other areas we cooperate on will be overshadowed. Similarly, if our economic relationship is seen as unbalanced or unfavorable to one side or the other in a period of hard times, one should not expect cooperation on other matters to save the relationship from tissue damage.

That said, we have very bright and capable people, outside and inside the government, working on all these issues, and to acknowledge that they are daunting is not to suggest they are unsolvable.

I propose today to concentrate on the last of these areas, namely whether the United States and China can work together to resolve conflicts and dangerous situations in the rest of the world. We work closely with our allies on many such issues having the potential to endanger international peace and stability. If we can do so with China, that will tell us something important about the long-term compatibility of our international objectives. It also will determine in many cases whether these problems can be solved.

Origins of U.S.-China Strategic Cooperation

In the 1950’s and 1960’s, when the United States and China viewed each other as irreconcilable ideological foes, the two sides also fought actual or proxy wars in many 3rd World sites. The Korean War was the most obvious and costly. In Vietnam, the United States of course intervened massively to prevent a Communist takeover, and China provided substantial assistance, military, economic, and political, to Hanoi. Elsewhere in the world, China did what it could to support revolutionaries and their movements in, for example, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. China saw wars of national liberation as movements for justice, as well as useful instruments to decrease U.S. influence around the globe.

The United States and China first came together when Nixon was president and Mao was chairman because of shared hostility to the ambitions of the Soviet Union. This common view about the major geopolitical foe we faced led us to find overlap, though not identity, in our policies toward many of the so-called “hot spots” plaguing the world at that time. The Shanghai Communique named a number of them, notably Vietnam, Korea, India-Pakistan hostility, and Taiwan – the last, of course, a special and distinct case. At the time of Nixon’s visit, the two sides were still far apart on all of these issues, but the ensuing years led to a narrowing of differences and determined management of those that remained.

In the succeeding years, so long as the Soviet Union remained the principal foe of each of us, the cooperation or parallel action begun by Nixon and Mao grew, to the point where many referred to an unofficial alliance. The two countries worked in parallel to thwart Soviet objectives and Soviet proxies in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola. China’s position on Korea shifted from support of Pyongyang’s effort to unify the peninsula by force to one of support for stability, culminating in Deng Xiaoping’s decision to recognize South Korea over Pyongyang’s objection. In Afghanistan, the two countries cooperated covertly to support the resistance. Both of us opposed deployment of Cuban troops to Africa – notably in Angola and Ethiopia -- under Soviet sponsorship. In Cambodia, we each supported the coalition led by Prince Sihanouk resisting Vietnamese occupation, albeit in different ways. China moved away from support for extremists in the Arab world toward a more balanced position between Israel and the Arabs.

When top U.S. and Chinese officials met in the 1980’s, strategic cooperation on these developing world crises was prominent on the agenda. The underlying understanding was that our interests were parallel, to prevent expansion of Soviet influence, and to prevent instability that might hurt our interests. In most, though not all, cases, the U.S. interest and influence in such areas greatly exceeded China’s. So in the broad interest of the Sino-American relationship, which brought huge benefits to China, Beijing would defer to the U.S. policy objectives, which they didn’t necessarily feel they had a huge stake in but which they understood we did. If China could not determine outcomes, and didn’t greatly care about them, Beijing judged that deference to U.S. preferences was acceptable.

Such issues remain at the top of the U.S.-China agenda today. When Presidents Obama and Hu Jintao met during the time I was at the National Security Council, more than half the time in virtually every meeting was consumed by Iran and North Korea. At times, Afghanistan and Sudan were the subject of considerable discussion. More recently, Libya and Syria have crowded out other issues.

Global Interests and Hot Spots: The U.S. and Chinese Views

How do our two countries look at such issues today? Do we have similar perspectives, or are our differences much greater? Before discussing the particularities of individual cases, it is worth trying to understand how the United States and China generally think about areas of crisis, conflict, or instability in which they themselves are not directly involved.

First the United States.

Since World War II, the United States has viewed itself, and been viewed by others, as the chief stabilizer or balancer of the international system, the enforcer that responds to aggression or conflict that threatens to destabilize regions or upset global norms. Our judgments have not always been sound, but the sense of a responsibility for the orderly operation of the international system has been a common denominator of successive American administrations. Part of the burden of being a great power is accepting that responsibility for the systemic global order is a national interest. Examples have been the marshaling of resistance to Saddam Hussein in 1990, and to Serbian attacks in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990’s.

The United States long has sought to advance the cause of democracy and protection of human rights, and has been a leading proponent of the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations against tyranny or civil war. Since the end of the Cold War, such advocacy has impelled us into Libya, Somalia, and Haiti. It has pushed us into diplomatic, though not military, engagement to encourage democratic outcomes in central Asia during the period of the so-called “color” revolutions and into the Arab world in response to the “Arab Spring,” which doesn’t feel so much like spring any more. It was the driving force behind U.S. efforts to isolate Khartoum in response to genocide in Darfur. It also has underlain our insistence that countries broken by conflict, such as Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, South Sudan, and Kosovo, could only be reconstructed on the basis of a democratic process.

But at the same time there have been limits on U.S. action to advance democracy and human rights. It is hard to think of a single instance where the United States in fact has introduced military force for the primary purpose of creating a democratic system. And as the costs of the Iraq War became clear, that experience persuaded most Americans, if they needed such persuading, that democracy should not be imposed through the barrel of a gun. A clear present example of a case where the United States has resisted urging of some to introduce military force to encourage a democratic solution is Syria for the last two years. There are of course numerous other instances where highly repressive or military governments have imposed their will on their population and the United States has not considered military intervention, e.g., Zimbabwe, Pakistan at various stages, Myanmar until its recent reforms, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan before September 11, 2001. Other motives have consistently played a much larger role in driving U.S. intervention decisions.

The issue that has driven the United States to its most vigorous intervention in third country issues in the last two decades has been proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their acquisition, real or potential, by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. This issue has brought together America’s principal international security concerns – efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by dictatorial or repressive governments with a history of aggressive acts or threats against their neighbors, periodic support of terrorism, and hostility to peace regimes and friends or allies of the United States. American policy has included a mixture of isolation, unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and military actions or warnings.

How does China see the same landscape of issues?

As Chinese remind us, they see the period from 1839 to 1949 as a time of national humiliation, in which China was overwhelmed by imperialism, foreign occupation, and civil war. The memory of that period, hardened by a narrowly nationalist and ideological version of history that obscures the complexity of China’s interactions with the outside world during the Qing dynasty and Republic of China period, though somewhat obscured by recent achievements, has bred into China a hostility to foreign intervention, a deep-seated suspicion of Western justifications for military action, and commitment to the notion that national sovereignty is the bedrock principle of international affairs.

This view stems from a concern that China’s sovereignty might be violated in the name of some international principle, but it is not merely a self-defense doctrine. It underlies China’s approach to international issues generally, and makes it extremely reluctant to intervene in issues, like Syria and Libya, that are or were primarily civil wars.

China accepts that it bears a responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, but outside of that it does not assert or justify a particular role in maintenance of global stability. More broadly, it has been reluctant to take on global responsibilities and defense of the international system as a national interest. It describes its armed forces as a means to protect China’s sovereignty, not as an instrument to enforce stability. It does not subscribe to an ideology that it wishes to spread, through force or other means. It does not see itself as a bastion of international norms that need its military strength to defend.

China has little experience with war in the last five decades, only a conflict with India in 1962, some small-scale skirmishes with the Soviet Union in 1969, a brief but bloody war with Vietnam in 1979 and a number of small-scale incidents with rival claimants in the South China Sea. All were along its actual land or claimed maritime borders. So China does not have recent experience projecting power overseas.

Accordingly, China has not seen maintenance of stability far from its shores, or encouragement of positive change, as a useful or practical objective of national doctrine or power. It is an equal opportunity trading country, caring little for the political orientation of its partners and having a high threshold of tolerance for repression or dysfunctionality. It has sought to acquire energy and mineral resources overseas to feed its rapid industrial growth, and in doing so it has in some instances invested in countries that were international pariahs, such as Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Iran.

China consistently rejects attempts by the international community and the United States to criticize and affect the poor human rights records of countries targeted by the West. It does so out of multiple motives, including its devotion to national sovereignty, its ideological rejection of the universality of democratic values as we understand them, and an anxiety that international scrutiny can turn to China.

Finally, China does not consider that it has substantial stakes in many places in the world, certainly not to the extent that the United States does. China regards activities in many parts of the world as tangential to its vital interests, and certainly not requiring an active engagement to affect outcomes. Rather, the Chinese view, consistent with their modesty over their potential impact in faraway places, is that they can live with whatever the outcome may be in most cases and should not assume responsibility for affecting it. China feels differently about Asia Pacific security issues, which it believes impinge directly on its national security.

Cooperation, Conflict, and Change

If we just look at the contrasts in world view I’ve described, one will not be surprised that on many of the key international issues, the U.S. and Chinese perspective is different, sometimes radically so. For example, on issues like Syria, Darfur, and Zimbabwe, China does not share the U.S. and Western view that the international community needed to take exceptional measures interfering with the sovereignty of national governments to protect the population. In Libya, China resented the decision by the Western allies to utilize a UN Security Council resolution designed to protect the population of Benghazi as a tool to overthrow Qaddhafi. China vetoed U.S.-sponsored resolutions on Myanmar during the Bush administration, refusing to accept the argument that Myanmar’s internal situation constituted a threat to international peace and security and not wanting to see a friendly neighboring government destabilized.

As I suggested earlier, there are other issues, however, on which China has quietly gone along with U.S. policy, not because of support or fundamental agreement, but because they understood the issue was seen as a vital interest by Washington. The obvious examples are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which China did not support but which it also did not oppose with anything like the singlemindedness with which, for example, Russia, France, and Germany opposed U.S. intervention in Iraq. In such cases, Beijing has decided that the value and health of its ties to the United States are more important than whatever benefit they might gain from distancing themselves from U.S. policy.

I have been describing enduring features in the U.S. and Chinese world views that have often led us to different conclusions. But the world situation in which our views are formed is dynamic, not static.

So, for example, the PRC initially approached the Arab spring with a certain complacency about its potential impact on Chinese interests in the region, relying on traditional notions that China should align itself with sovereign governments facing unrest and it would not be held accountable for the outcome.

In fact, in Libya, Chinese interests suffered when Qaddhafi was ousted and the new government considered Beijing unfriendly because of arms transactions with the outgoing regime. This was a new experience for China, to be considered by foreign nationals a significant factor in a domestic situation far from its borders and to pay consequences for poor policy choices. It has led Chinese experts to argue that China needs to pay much greater attention to developments in the region and not merely assume that friendship with capitals is a sufficient basis for a successful policy.

The world also is changing in places where China traditionally did not play a role but that are now targets of interest for China. For example, China imported more oil than the United States did from the Persian Gulf in January 2013. This is a startling turnaround from a half century of U.S. reliance on the Gulf, and Chinese detachment. It does not mean that all of a sudden China will assume responsibility for security in the Persian Gulf; it does not have the capability to do so. But it does mean that it will care much more in the coming years about what is going on in the region, and about developments that could affect the free flow of oil. I think it also is safe to predict that Chinese influence relative to the United States will grow in Afghanistan in the years to come, as the U.S. withdraws the last of its combat troops and China’s proximity, and interest in a Muslim state bordering Xinjiang province, asserts itself.

Our disagreements over democracy promotion can often be muted when dealing with specific crises. There is a strong international consensus, demonstrated repeatedly in the last two decades, that the resolution of internal conflicts, civil wars, and disintegration of states requires an election process and reconciliation among competing parties, supervised by the international community through the UN Security Council. This is how the war in Cambodia ended, with Chinese support, in the 1990’s. Similarly, conflicts in Angola, Namibia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Bosnia, Kosovo, South Sudan, and East Timor were brought to a close by UN or multilateral mediation culminating in elections. China was involved in supporting many of these outcomes and did not resist any. It understands that legitimacy in such countries requires an electoral process, even if China itself does not have such a system and otherwise rejects unilateral democracy promotion as subversion.

The Big Ones: Iran and North Korea

The most important hot spot issues we face at the present are Iran and North Korea. While U.S. and Chinese policy each reflects some of the perspectives I’ve described, in fact at the same time they demonstrate our ability to work past such differences and to find common interests.

In Iran, despite China’s view that in principle Iran has the right to produce enriched uranium for a safeguarded nuclear power program, it has been clear that it does not accept Iranian attempts to become a nuclear weapons state. It has supported UN Security Council resolutions that have put in place unprecedented draconian sanctions on Iran in the last four years. It has worked with the Permanent 5 plus one countries in presenting a united front to Iran in negotiating a return to IAEA compliance. It has quietly gone along with U.S. requests to avoid expanding its energy investments in Iran as other countries have pulled out. The United States has reciprocated by waiving sanctions against Chinese companies whose actions could bring them into conflict with provisions of U.S. law.

Why does cooperation work in Iran, albeit within limits? China genuinely does not wish to see a new nuclear weapons state, both because of the impact on stability in the Persian Gulf but also because of its potential impact on the global nonproliferation regime, in which China has become a stakeholder.

If Iran, and North Korea, should become nuclear powers, what will be the impact on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which China’s neighbors, such as Japan and South Korea, have respected? This gives China pause. We Americans have argued, and China agrees, that if Iran, a country that has called for Israel to be wiped off the map and which has destabilized its neighbors, acquires nuclear weapons then China’s quest for energy security will suffer a grave setback. China also highly values its relationship with Saudi Arabia, which has made clear to Beijing that Chinese actions to strengthen Iran are contrary to Riyadh’s interest and will draw a reaction. Finally, Beijing understands that Israel’s restraint depends on its belief that the international community, including China, are imposing serious costs on Teheran. The result is that the U.S. and China do not see eye to eye on Iran strategy, but have enough common interest so that there is more cooperation than competition.

North Korea presents a very different set of variables, but the outcome is somewhat similar. Beyond the nuclear issue, where we share a strong interest in eliminating the North’s program and preventing proliferation, North Korea, as China’s neighbor, is much more of a vital interest to China than to the United States. Above all, Beijing values stability on its border with North Korea. It does not desire either instability or North Korean collapse that could lead to reunification and a U.S. ally on its border.

But at the same time, it holds the North Korean regime in disdain. Pyongyang’s provocations have led to military responses by the v United States, South Korea, and Japan that affect China’s own security. Beijing is no more pleased with loose talk about nuclear war on its border than are the United States and its allies.

Traditionally, China has tried to maintain a balance in its relations between North Korea and the United States. It dragooned North Korea into Six Party talks, and was instrumental in forcing concessions from Pyongyang in an earlier period. It has condemned Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests, and supported sanctions by the UN in response. It has warned North Korea against provocations, particularly at a time of acute tension in late 2010 after North Korea shelled a South Korean island. On the other hand, Beijing has sought to limit sanctions to avoid pushing Pyongyang into a corner, potentially precipitating either a backlash or chaos or both, and has declined to use its leverage in energy and food supplies to induce behavior change.

This long-standing balancing act may be changing. Chinese disgust over Kim Jong-un’s antics in the last few months has been unmistakable, and manifested publicly. The most obvious step was the decision of the Bank of China to close the account of the North Korean Trading Bank. The Chinese leadership does not have confidence in the new team in Pyongyang to maintain the peace, and fears that its cherished goal of stability is under assault not from the U.S. and its allies but from Pyongyang. This creates an opportunity for the U.S. and China to work more closely and effectively on an issue of vital concern to both of us.

It is hard to know how the situation in Syria will evolve in the coming weeks and months in the wake of suspicions of Syrian use of sarin gas against its population. On the one hand, China does not want to be isolated from Saudi Arabia and the Arab League, which are seeking Assad’s ouster. China also does not wish to be the last one standing in Assad’s corner when the final bell tolls for him. On the other hand, Beijing’s attitude reflects a combination of the factors I mentioned earlier: respect for sovereignty of states no matter how repugnant the government, and residual irritation at the manner in which the NATO allies used the UNSC resolution on Libya to pursue and achieve regime change.

Moreover, in deference to Moscow and in return for Moscow’s deference to it on issues like North Korea more important to China, Beijing has supported Moscow in resisting Western efforts to initiate a diplomatic process leading to Assad’s ouster. In fact, China’s bottom line seems to be that Moscow’s attitude toward Syria is more important than Beijing’s, and if Moscow moves, Beijing will as well. The recent decision by Moscow and Washington to convene a conference on Syria’s future, which I expect China to welcome, demonstrates that the key to resolving the Syria crisis lies much more in Moscow than in Beijing.

Prospects for Cooperation in the Future

I am on balance optimistic about the prospects for U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation. In recent visits to China by Secretary Kerry and General Dempsey, it was clear that the Chinese government welcomes more intensive dialogue on North Korea. They also discussed Iran and Afghanistan. Intensive discussions are not the same as cooperation, but they’re a necessary preliminary.

From the American perspective, we not only welcome but frequently need Chinese cooperation.

The Obama administration was criticized for saying this in 2009, as if by acknowledging a self-evident truth it was surrendering leverage. So I’ll say it again, and I welcome a debate with critics who think that a cool distance between our two sides serves our interests better. We need to understand that already, China has substantial interests in many such hot spots, and its influence and views can affect behavior and outcomes. But more important, in the future that influence will only grow. If the United States adopts an attitude that traditional power arrangements ensure that we will be able to continue in the future to dictate outcomes, we are in for disappointments, surprises, and setbacks.

Many Chinese analysts understand that China needs to step up constructive involvement in such issues. Chinese interests around the world, commercial and otherwise, are growing rapidly, and China cannot complacently assume that instability in faraway places will not affect it.

To reduce the complexities I’ve been discussing to basics, the following will be the most important factors in determining whether we can cooperate:

1) The particular facts of each situation and each country’s perception of its national interest. That might dictate cooperation in some instances, and not in others.

2) How much each side, particularly the Chinese, cares about the particular situation. When China doesn’t care, deference to U.S. views is the default position. But such cases are likely to diminish in the future, since Chinese interests are becoming more global.

3) The overall state of the Sino-American relationship. If Chinese leaders see ulterior motives behind U.S. policies in general, as Wang Jisi has told us they do, then there will be serious obstacles to cooperation on particular cases, even if our interests in such matters are relatively aligned.

I believe a sound U.S.-China relationship is arguably the most important foundation of peace, stability, and prosperity in the 21st century. Cooperation on strategic issues will make that more likely or the absence of cooperation will undermine it. None of us can much affect the realities on the ground in these areas of conflict and instability, sad to say. But we can affect the way opinion leaders in our countries think about the role of the other in coping with such problems. I don’t whitewash, and I don’t want you to whitewash, behavior by either side that undermines peace and stability. We need to be clear-eyed about American and Chinese conduct. But for those of us who seek to understand the perspectives of the other side, I hope we will all make a greater effort in combating pernicious notions about each other rather than merely presenting them, and in building the bridges of cooperation, not ceding the field to those who want to tear them down.

Authors

Jeffrey A. Bader

Publication: Barnett-Oksenberg Lecture

Image Source: © POOL New / Reuters

An American Perspective on Malaysia's Elections: Preserving Najib Razak's Gains

Jeffrey A. Bader and Douglas H. Paal — Wed, 01 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak has called national elections for May 5. This date is perilously close to the statutory deadline to hold the elections, suggesting he is concerned that the results may lead to his departure from office. Malaysia, the United States, and much of the world have a stake in the outcome.

The traditionally dominant party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), and its partners in the long-ruling Barisan Nasional coalition have experienced internal divisions. Ethnic preferences for Malays in government and the economy have alienated many Chinese, who are a minority (roughly 40 percent of Malaysia’s population) but economically dominant. Najib’s efforts at internal reform have threatened traditionalists associated with former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad. Younger, urban voters seem itching for change.

There is a strong challenge from an opposition coalition headed by former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim. His Pakatan Rakyat coalition includes Chinese and Islamic parties and is close enough in some polls to win outright.

But many longtime observers believe the real election is within UMNO, between old warhorses associated with Mahathir and the reformists surrounding Najib. The argument is that if Najib cannot bring in a result that preserves UMNO’s two-thirds majority and capacity to rewrite the constitution, old-line leaders, possibly current Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, would displace Najib and stem reforms.

This is where the stakes need to be clearly stated. Under Mahathir, opposition to perceived residual Western colonialism was a rallying cry and a frequent and increasingly anachronistic theme. His successor, Abdullah Badawi, was less shrill but did not move significantly away from Mahathir’s policies. Najib has fundamentally repositioned Malaysia internationally. He has moved away from the old UMNO policy seeking to divide Asia from the United States and has seen the United States as an important partner for Malaysia and ASEAN.

Najib and his top officials have been forthright in speaking about democratic values in international forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum. They have been critical of states such as North Korea and even Myanmar before reforms commenced there, something that would not have been countenanced in an earlier period when criticism was aimed solely at the West.

Najib has done all this as part of a strategy to retain domestic (Chinese) investment and attract foreign investment in order to accelerate Malaysia’s development. As a demonstration of his commitment to a more open Malaysian economy, he has joined the discussions on the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement with ten other nations.

After economic contraction in 2009, Malaysia’s GDP growth has rebounded to a robust 5 percent, led by double-digit export growth in 2010 and large FDI inflows in 2010 and 2011. Gross investment for 2012 was up 9 percent over the last year, with the fastest growth in private and domestic investment (up 22 percent and 55 percent, respectively). The current account surplus is expected to narrow in the near term, and employment growth is expected mostly in domestic-oriented sectors such as services, in line with Najib’s New Economic Model that aims to create more sustainable, equitable, high-income growth. The Asian Development Bank forecasts that Malaysia’s GDP will grow by 5.3 percent in 2013, accelerating a little to 5.5 percent next year. Malaysia’s strong performance under Najib stands in marked contrast to the ethnic preferences and frequent allegations of corruption and cronyism under Mahathir.

Domestically, Malaysia remains an impressive Muslim-majority nation with a democratic system, pluralism, and generally good standards for human rights protection. Najib has given a number of speeches in international settings denouncing terrorism in the Islamic world and indeed has preached formation of a league of moderate nations to fight terrorism.

Under Najib, Malaysia also has moved to significantly tighten its previously porous export-control system, which had made the country a transit point for shipment and financing of dual-use products going to Iran. Defense cooperation with the United States and others has been normalized, and it has not remained a forum for grandstanding against the West.

Najib has moved to dismantle one of the instruments of repression, the Internal Security Act inherited from the British when Malaysia became independent. Under his guidance the legislature has replaced the law, which provided the basis for lengthy detention without trial.

These are not just achievements for Najib’s leadership, but they are gains for Malaysia, the region, and the world.

As the election campaign unfolds, it will be interesting to see what issues UMNO and its Barisan National coalition and Anwar with his Pakatan Rakyat coalition use against each other (see the table below).

Barisan National (ruling coalition) Coalition head: Najib Razak	Pakatan Rakyat (opposition) Coalition head: Anwar Ibrahim
The Economy
Gradually increase the government’s 1Malaysia People’s Aid (BR1M) handouts to RM1,200 for qualified households and RM600 for qualified singles Enact a more broad-based tax system and gradually reduce personal and corporate tax rates	Maintain BR1M cash assistance if elected Broaden income tax band, raise the income floor for the 26 percent tax rate to RM400,000 from RM250,000
Bumiputera (Ethnic Malays and Indigenous Groups)
Promote and improve Bumiputera policies that favor ethnic Malay businesses Provide RM500 million in seed funding to the Indian community	Equally distribute economic assistance regardless of race Undertake an inclusive development platform that includes all ethnic groups
Transparent Government
Establish additional corruption courts Elevate officers of Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission to higher level	Introduce corruption elimination policy (DEBARAN) to free anticorruption institutions from political control and improve anticorruption prosecution Undertake electoral reform
Living Standards
Expand transport subsidies, education aid, food and housing assistance, public transportation, and rural infrastructure	Undertake similar populist policies, and raise minimum monthly income to RM4,000 by end of first term
Innovation
Enact the 2020 plan for high-income development based on innovation Attract RM1.3 trillion worth of investments and create 2 million new high-income jobs Channel investment to small and medium enterprises	Raise research and development expenditures to 5 percent of GDP Create a RM500 million national innovation fund Reshuffle tax incentives to give more assistance to small and medium industries
The Environment
Introduce financial incentives for renewable energy investment Voluntarily reduce emissions intensity of GDP by up to 40 percent by 2020 Pass stricter illegal logging laws	Halt work at the Lynas rare earth plant Review the implementation phases of the RAPID petrochemical project in Pengerang Reform logging regulation

Anwar has a mixed record. He earlier stood out as one of Malaysia’s leading progressive political figures and someone who creatively reconciled Islam and Western values. Since his imprisonment by Mahathir in 1998 on allegations of sodomy and a subsequent revival of similar charges in 2008 that was overturned in Malaysia’s courts, he has moved toward a closer alignment with Islamic politics. He has, for example, irritated women voters by suggesting that sharia law could be adopted by tradition-minded Malaysian states. Anwar nonetheless continues to be a strong public advocate of democracy and human rights and criticizes Najib as essentially continuing the more repressive policies of the Mahathir years.

Whether the winner is Najib or Anwar or the conservative forces within UMNO, Malaysians should consider seriously how to preserve the gains of the Najib era.

Authors

Jeffrey A. Bader
Douglas H. Paal

Image Source: © Bazuki Muhammad / Reuters

The United States, China and Maritime Asia

Mon, 17 Dec 2012 14:00:00 -0500

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December 17, 2012
2:00 PM - 5:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036

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The ascension of new leaders in China coincides with mounting tensions in the East China and South China seas, posing serious risks to the regional maritime order. Amid these disputes and uncertainties, China’s new leaders and the Obama administration are attempting to define the road ahead in Sino-American relations. The risks posed by China’s increasingly tense relations with its maritime neighbors are worrisome, and add to the complexities and potential consequences for the future of the U.S.-China relationship.

On December 17, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted a discussion on China’s maritime disputes and the future of U.S.-China relations featuring leading experts on Chinese foreign policy and maritime strategy, and an address by The Honorable Kevin Rudd, the 26th prime minister of Australia and former minister of foreign affairs.

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The United States, China and Maritime Asia

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U.S.-China Relations under Barack Obama and Xi Jinping

Thu, 29 Nov 2012 03:00:00 -0500

Event Information

November 29, 2012
3:00 AM - 4:30 AM EST

School of Public Policy and Management Auditorium
Brookings-Tsinghua Center

Beijing, China

Time: Thursday, November 29, 2012, 4:00 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. (China Standard Time)
Venue: Auditorium Hall, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University

For more information on this event, please call the Brookings-Tsinghua Center at (+8610) 6279 5601 or email btcevents@brookings.edu.

The reelection of President Barack Obama and the convening of China’s 18th National Congress marks a new era for U.S.-China relations.

On November 29, the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy hosted Jeffrey Bader for a public forum to discuss these and related issues facing the Obama and Xi administrations. Bader is the John C. Whitehead senior fellow in international diplomacy at the Brookings Institution. He served as senior director for East Asian affairs on the National Security Council during President Obama’s first term, and is the author of Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asian Strategy.

In Bader’s view, U.S.-China relations are in pretty good shape right now. Interdependence is the most important characteristic of this relationship, and a crucial aspect is that the two countries continue to maintain strategic cooperation in many fields. America’s foreign policies and strategies toward China will not change significantly under President Obama’s second term, and the key issue will be how to react properly to China’s continued rise and its increasingly important role in global society.

Meng Bo, associate director of the Brookings-Tsinghua Center, gave the opening remarks for this event. Professor Zhang Ruizhuang from Nankai University made comments and shared his insights on U.S.-China relations from the perspective of realism theory.

After the program, Bader took audience questions. The event was held in both English and Chinese with interpreters.

Read the event transcript » (Chinese PDF)

Dr. Jeffrey Bader

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Managing Transitions in Northeast Asia, the Global Economy, and Japan-U.S. Relations

Wed, 28 Nov 2012 09:00:00 -0500

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November 28, 2012
9:00 AM - 3:30 PM EST

Keidanren Conference Hall

Tokyo, Japan

Northeast Asia has seen significant leadership changes in recent months, with the election of Park Geun-hye as president of South Korea, Xi Jinping as leader of China’s ruling Communist Party, and Shinzo Abe as prime minister of Japan. As leaders of world-leading economies, these key players will no doubt bring about dynamic change in the region’s politics and economy, while balancing relations with the United States and its own newly re-elected president.

On November 28, 2012, the Center for Northeast Asian Studies (CNAPS) at Brookings, the Japan Center for Economic Research, and Nikkei held a one-day conference on “Managing Transitions in Northeast Asia, the Global Economy, and Japan-U.S. Relations.” Three panels, featuring Brookings scholars as well leading experts from across Asia, provided their views on issues of profound importance to the Northeast Asian region including leadership transitions, global economy and trade, global governance, and U.S.-Japan relations in the 21st Century.

America and China in the Aftermath of Election and Succession: Paths and Pitfalls

Mon, 19 Nov 2012 09:15:00 -0500

Event Information

November 19, 2012
9:15 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

The reelection of President Barack Obama and the convening of China’s 18th National Congress only days later highlight converging political calendars that may set the contours of U.S.-China relations and East Asian politics for years to come. However, uncertainties remain, with China’s political, economic and strategic trajectories subject to major internal and external pressures. At the same time, the United States confronts a daunting, long deferred set of fiscal challenges that could reshape U.S. foreign and security policy options.

On November 19, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted a discussion assessing possible developments in Chinese foreign and domestic affairs in light of the political transitions in both countries.

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A Time for Optimism for the U.S. and China?

Jeffrey A. Bader — Fri, 16 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

With China’s new leadership selected during the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and with President Obama about to embark on a second term, the U.S. and China must consider a path forward for their sometimes bumpy but critically important relationship. Moreover, the U.S. must understand that China has to sort through a host of domestic issues as well.

Senior Fellow Jeffrey Bader says that the U.S.-China relationship has never been an easy one, but both countries are clear on its paramount importance.

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A Time for Optimism for the U.S. and China?

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Jeffrey A. Bader

President Obama's Message to Myanmar: "We're With You and We're Watching You."

Jeffrey A. Bader — Fri, 16 Nov 2012 00:00:00 -0500

President Obama travels to Southeast Asia this month on a three day trip with stops slated for Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar. The president will use this opportunity to build trade ties and strengthen relations in the region. Notably, President Obama will be the first sitting president to visit Myanmar, an emerging democratic nation. The president’s visit to Myanmar sends a strong signal of support and encouragement to the government and the people of that country, notes Senior Fellow Jeffrey Bader.

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President Obama's Message to Myanmar: "We're With You and We're Watching You."

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Jeffrey A. Bader

Challenges for China's New Leadership

Cheng Li, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Jonathan D. Pollack and Jeffrey A. Bader — Fri, 16 Nov 2012 14:48:00 -0500

China’s new leadership will take the reins of government early next year. This new collective, led by Xi Jinping, will have a slate of critical issues to address with China’s stagnating economy topping the list. Brookings experts Cheng Li, Kenneth Lieberthal, Jonathan Pollack and Jeffrey Bader delve into the issues that await China’s leaders and the likely action the group will take.

Cheng Li:

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Prospects of Political Reforms in Myanmar

Jeffrey A. Bader — Fri, 09 Nov 2012 13:42:00 -0500

A recent trip I took to Myanmar (Burma) provided an occasion to reflect on some large and small issues in U.S. foreign policy, and to think about what works and what doesn’t. My trip came shortly before it was publicly revealed that President Obama will visit Myanmar in the second half of November, which will highlight Myanmar’s reform and opening to the West.

Questions, and tentative answers:

1) Is Myanmar seriously on the path to reform?

So it would seem. The signs were abundant on my trip. The senior officials I met spoke convincingly about their commitment to democratic reform. One Minister positively mentioned democracy heroine Aung San Suu Kyi’s participation in a recent government-sponsored workshop. Newspapers published lively debates, virtually free of the all-pervasive censorship of the last two decades. Pictures of Aung San Suu Kyi and her father Aung San, the founder of modern Burma, could be seen on the walls of village restaurants. A large U.S. official human rights delegation visited in October and met with top Myanmar officials. Ordinary people spoke of the profound change in atmosphere, and of their willingness to speak out on matters where there was fear and silence only recently. This change in mood follows a series of steps disassembling key foundations of the repressive structure of Myanmar’s military government – release of hundreds of political prisoners, legalization of the opposition political party National League for Democracy, legalization of peaceful demonstrations, and revival of talks with rebellious ethnic groups.

2) What is Aung San Suu Kyi’s role and what is she doing?

Aung San Suu Kyi remains unequivocally the most popular political figure in Myanmar. She and her party decisively won the by-elections in April 2012 after the end of her years of confinement. There is reason to believe she and her party will win national elections in 2015 and be in a position to form a government. In preparation, she is showing a strongly pragmatic streak, reaching out to officials in the government, bonding with President Thein Sein and speaking positively of them at her Congressional Gold Medal ceremony. There is grumbling in the overseas human rights community at her apparent embrace of the compromises of national politics. She is encountering the inevitable second-guessing that accompanies the decision to cease to become an icon and to become a political actor, just as Lech Walesa endured second-guessing when he worked with General Jaruzelski in Communist Poland in the early 1980’s.

3) Did anyone in the West see this coming?

Perhaps somewhere someone in the West foresaw Myanmar’s turn toward reform, but the conventional wisdom certainly did not. Asia analysts inside and outside the government, editorialists, and human rights advocates alike all scorned Myanmar’s installation of a civilian government in April 2011 and its elections last year as fraudulent, saw little political significance in Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, and projected a grim political future.

4) How did it happen?

There are many retrospective theories, none fully satisfactory. One important factor seems to have been a generalized desire to escape Myanmar’s growing dependence on China by establishing the basis for renewed relations with the West. Myanmar historically is a fiercely independent country, having for example quit the Nonaligned Movement because it felt it was too aligned. Resentment against the Chinese presence, and its enterprises dominating the extractive industries while providing little employment for Myanmar nationals, runs deep. Some Burmese experts, including Thant Myint-U, the grandson of former UN Secretary General U Thant, presciently wrote of a new mood among the younger Myanmar officer corps, who have played a central role in spurring reform. Human rights groups point to the effect of years of sanctions in persuading the leadership it needed to take a new course. Advocates of engagement credit ASEAN with helping to knock down the generals’ resistance to the international community. Within Myanmar, the aging senior generals seem to have confidence they will not be held accountable for past repressive behavior, and the officer corps generally is comfortable that its special role in Myanmar politics will be preserved under a constitution that gives them a privileged and outsized role. This sense of security among the military old guard may have made them more willing to accept the current political opening.

5) What was the role of the U.S. Government?

From 1990 to 2008, successive administrations, pushed by the Congress, piled sanction upon sanction on Myanmar – bans on new investment, bans on imports, and designation of people and companies for financial sanctions. Under George W. Bush, First Lady Laura Bush played a large role in identifying the regime as a target for further isolation. In his inauguration speech, President Obama offered to reach out a hand to adversaries “if (they) are willing to unclench (their) fist. “ That policy has produced little in the way of positive results around the world, except in the case of Myanmar. The Administration decided early to open a channel of diplomatic engagement with the Myanmar leadership, conducted on the U.S. side by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, laying out the agenda for political reform and nonproliferation by Myanmar that would induce sanctions relaxation on the U.S. side. The expressed willingness of the U.S. government on an authoritative level to offer a road map to good relations gave the Myanmar government an incentive, and confidence, to proceed. The decision of the Obama administration, in coordination with allies in Europe and Australia, to significantly ease sanctions earlier this year should provide a further spur to both desperately needed economic development and political reform.

6) Are there broader lessons with regard to sanctions as a tool to change behavior of bad actors?

Sanctions are sometimes the only effective way for the U.S., and the international community, to signal the unacceptability of a regime’s behavior. Such was the case for a long time with Myanmar. So imposition of sanctions was appropriate.

But sanctions, it must be remembered, are not an end in themselves. As the popular song goes, you’ve got to know when to hold and when to fold. There is invariably an irresistible momentum in Washington to continue on the sanctions path whether or not it gives any indication of leading to positive outcome. Human rights groups sometimes see sanctions against malefactors as the measure of sound and moral government policy, and publicize the violations of dictatorial regimes to rally public support and funding around campaigns that have sanctions as their end product. The Congress wants to show that it is doing something, whether effective or not, and sanctioning dictatorial regimes becomes seen as a way to demonstrate its virtue. This dynamic is evident, for example, in the case of Cuba. We have now had sanctions in effect for over 50 years toward Cuba, and their support among American political actors has in no way been weakened by their manifest strengthening of the Castro brothers’ hold on power. Everyone – the U.S. political class, the private advocacy groups, the Castros – seems happy with this state of affairs, with the exception of the Cuban people who are its victims. Policy toward Myanmar was developing along the Cuban model, but happily it has now diverged from that path.

7) Is the U.S. Government well structured to deal with issues like Myanmar?

Since the Carter Presidency, there has been a growing infrastructure of offices and officials with responsibilities purely for human rights issues, divorced from broader matters of foreign policy and national security. These offices have evolved into the voice of the human rights NGO community within the U.S. government, frequently serving as a megaphone for the human rights NGOs, seeking their input to State Department human rights reports, and fighting for the specific measures proposed by the NGOs. In some ways, this is not radically different from the way in which other constituencies are represented in the foreign policy apparatus, e.g. business through the State Department’s Economic and Business Bureau. But the identification of the human rights offices with their constituency tends to be more single-minded (note: The current Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Michael Posner, in fact has escaped this straitjacket and acted as a strong advocate for human rights but with a focus on practical, not symbolic, results and a nuanced awareness of broad foreign policy objectives).

When I served as Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council during the transition of U.S. policy toward Myanmar between 2009 to 2011, I chaired a number of interagency meetings (called Interagency Policy Committees) on Myanmar. Normally, meetings of this kind are attended by one senior representative of each agency, accompanied by one more junior person. In the case of Myanmar, no less than seven offices from the State Department – the East Asia Bureau, the Human Rights Bureau, the US Mission to the UN, the State Department liaison to the US Mission to the UN, the US Mission to international organizations in Geneva, the US Ambassador for War Crimes, and the Refugees Bureau – attended. Agencies at such meetings are expected to speak with one voice. With seven offices attending, all seeking to have their voices heard, it was difficult to impossible for that to happen. Some of them were aggressively seeking creation of a Commission of Inquiry to look into Myanmar regime war crimes, at precisely the moment when Aung San Suu Kyi was released from captivity and there were hints of softening of repression. Only by empowering the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific to speak for the State Department and to conduct diplomacy without a group from his building looking over his shoulder was the Administration able to pursue a coherent, and ultimately successful policy.

8) What is the best way to deal with issues involving bad actors like the Myanmar regime?

The human rights NGOs have an indispensable role in tracking human rights abuses, highlighting publicly the offenders and offenses, and mobilizing the international community to censure them. This is one of the proud features of a democratic society with a conscience, the activities of these groups of private actors with a strong commitment to justice even in obscure corners of the globe and their determination to make victims of injustice heard. Not only should we not ignore or marginalize such groups; we should celebrate them, and magnify and amplify their role.

The role of the U.S. government needs to be different. It should not ghettoize human rights issues. Nor should it encourage the creation and proliferation of offices that result in the drawing of lines between officials, all of whom should have as their top priority our national security and foreign policy success as well as a strong commitment to human rights. There should not be a small group of people anointed to express human rights concerns, acting as representatives of the NGO community, while officials with responsibility for national security and foreign policy fall into a reflexive response of marginalizing human rights in response. Our current structure frequently produces formalized battles over countries that are human rights bad actors. In such cases officials with broad national security responsibilities tend to roll over human rights when dealing with countries of major national security concern, like China, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, while deferring to the human rights offices on countries of lesser foreign policy importance, like Myanmar. This is not a framework built for success or sound policy development. Our government needs to sensitize our top national security officials to the need to build human rights issues more effectively into policy, while reminding the human rights offices that they too need to have a commitment to broad U.S. national security goals, not just the advancement of a virtuous NGO agenda.

Authors

Jeffrey A. Bader

China’s Prospects on the Eve of the 18th Party Congress

Thu, 20 Sep 2012 14:00:00 -0400

Event Information

September 20, 2012
2:00 PM - 5:15 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

This fall, most of the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party will be replaced during the 18th Party Congress. The leadership realignments will affect the most important leadership bodies of the country – the ruling Politburo and its Standing Committee, the State Council and the Party’s Central Military Commission. What social, economic and foreign policy challenges await the new generation of Chinese leaders, and how might the new leadership respond?

On September 20, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted a discussion analyzing the major issues that will confront China’s new leadership, including tensions in U.S.-China relations, the China-Japan South China Sea dispute, and the country’s future economic and military development.

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20120920_china_congress

The Fate of Chinese Dissident Chen Guangcheng: A Live Web Chat with Jeffrey Bader

Wed, 09 May 2012 12:30:00 -0400

Event Information

May 9, 2012
12:30 PM - 1:00 PM EDT

Online only
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Tensions between the United States and China are rising as the two nations struggle to find compromise over the future of prominent Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng. Two weeks after Chen escaped from house arrest and sought refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, senior American and Chinese diplomats continue to negotiate, but may be close to an agreement allowing the activist and his family to travel to the U.S.

Will the crisis involving one of China’s most high-profile dissidents permanently damage U.S.-China relations? Did the Obama administration misstep in the negotiations to secure Chen’s safety, as some critics allege? On Wednesday, May 9, Brookings expert Jeffrey Bader answered your questions during a live web chat from 12:30PM to 1:00 PM with moderator Emily Howell of POLITICO.

12:29 Emily Howell: Hi everyone, let's get started.

12:30 Comment From Roberto: Did the administration misstep when handling Chen's case? Should he have been granted asylum the second he walked through the U.S. embassy's doors? Or was this a difficult situation that the Obama administration was trying to make the best of?

12:33 Jeffrey Bader: The U.S. cannot grant asylum to a Chinese national on Chinese territory, so that was not an option. In any event, at the outset Chen was insistent that he did not wish to leave China, so the U.S. officials dealing with him had to respect that preference. He changed his mind after leaving the embassy, compelling U.S. officials to try to accommodate his wish to leave China. If he leaves, it will not be to seek asylum in the U.S., but to study here. All in all, I think U.S. officials did the best they could in a very difficult situation.

12:33 Comment From Anne: What's next for Chen? Do you think it is likely that he will be given a student visa and allowed to study in the United States?

12:34 Jeffrey Bader: Anne, at the moment, the most likely outcome is for Chen to come to the U.S. on a student visa. Of course the Chinese government first has to issue him a passport. There is good reason to believe they will do that. If all goes well, he is likely to come to the U.S. with his wife and two children.

12:35 Comment From Donald: Do you think Chen's case seriously damages U.S./China relations moving forward?

12:39 Jeffrey Bader: Donald, so far, it would appear that the episode has not significantly damaged the relationship. On the contrary, the main lesson we can take away is that the U.S.-China relationship is sufficiently resilient that it can withstand incidents of this kind. After all, the strategic and economic dialogue proceeded as planned, and Clinton and Geithner were received by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. The talks with their counterparts were on issues such as Iran, North Korea, Syria, the trade imbalance, the future of China's economic reform policies, Chinese investment in the U.S., and other issues on which U.S.-China cooperation are critical. The talks did not deal with the Chen issue. So that suggests a desire by both sides to concentrate on the big issues while handling the Chen matter in a way that is politically acceptable in both countries.

That said, the Chinese clearly are very angry over the way in which Chen found his way into the U.S. embassy and have made strong statements about that. We could hear more from them on this, but I don't think they want their irritation over that to affect the broad relationship.

12:39 Comment From Brandon: Shouldn't we be standing up more vigorously for this man? What is this doing to our international reputation as defenders of human rights?

12:43 Jeffrey Bader: Brandon, the Administration stood up very vigorously for Chen. It is very rare that someone is given sanctuary in an American embassy. This is not normal, and under international and U.S. law, it is very unusual and indeed difficult to justify. It was only because of our commitment to this man's rights that such a decision was made. The approach the Administration took in discussing the matter with the Chinese provided extraordinary protections for Chen and his family, difficult for any government to accept with regard to a citizen within its borders. And the Administration did so at a time when the Secretaries of State and Treasury were about to arrive for important talks that this matter could have derailed. I believe this demonstrates a substantial commitment to human rights and Chen's rights, which very few if any other countries would have provided in such a case.

12:43 Comment From Guest: All this vilification of Chen in the Chinese state media -- is that merely for domestic propaganda purposes -- or does it carry ominous. portent for Chen's family?

12:45 Jeffrey Bader: So far, Chinese media have been fairly quiet in talking about Chen since this episode began, though they have been sharply critical of the U.S. embassy. My hope is that Chen, his wife, and two children will be allowed to leave. I have not seen anything in the media to suggest that outcome is off track.

12:45 Comment From Ed, DC: How aware are average Chinese citizens of Chen's case. It's made international headlines, but I have a feeling the government has kept a tight lid on it internally.

12:47 Jeffrey Bader: Ed, Chen was certainly not a household name in China before this episode. There has been virtually no coverage in the Chinese media, and discussion on the internet has been blocked. But by now many millions of Chinese have found ways to read about the case. They are quite good at doing work-arounds in the face of censorship.

12:47 Comment From Matthew, R: Once Chen is in the United States, do you see him asking for permanent asylum? Or do you believe his claims that he will want to return eventually?

12:48 Jeffrey Bader: Matthew, hard to say. He continues to say he wants to return him, and that doubtless is his current view. Once he arrives here, he will encounter many Chinese, including dissidents, who have left China, and his views could evolve. But at this point, the safest conclusion is that he is not interested in asylum.

12:49 Comment From Mona: The Chinese government has asked the United States to apologize for its "interference” in Chen's case. Do you see this happening? Or did China have to ask to save face?

12:52 Jeffrey Bader: Mona, I am fairly certain the U.S. will not apologize. China's demand that the U.S. do so was to be expected, since in their view we violated Chinese and international law. What both China and the U.S. wish to do is not so much to re-adjudicate this case as to ensure that it does not become a model for future attempts to gain asylum at the U.S. embassy. That is not the function of embassies, and repetition would complicate our relationship in ways that this episode has not done.

12:53 Comment From Cheri: Do you think Chen's case reveals serious cracks in the Communist government's armor? I've heard some say his case is spreading like wildfire on social media sites in China.

12:54 Jeffrey Bader: Cheri, in terms of cracks in the system, the recent purge of Bo Xilai was a much more significant development in what it says about what is going on in China. He was a major figure likely destined for a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee that runs China. Now he is under investigation, as are some people associated with him, and the shape of the leadership to be selected this fall will change as a consequence.

12:55 Comment From Brandon: Gov. Romney has been critical of President Obama for not standing up for Chen's human rights. Do you think this criticism is valid? Or merely a campaign play?
12:57 Jeffrey Bader: Brandon, as a general matter, it is not a good practice for prominent U.S. political figures to criticize the U.S. government in the midst of a sensitive negotiation abroad where lives are at stake. I believe the outcome of this case will either justify or undercut assessments of the Administration's handling of the case. At this stage, I would predict that the Administration's handling will be justified.

12:58 Comment From Ron: Is China replacing the United States as the world's leading military and economic power?

1:02 Jeffrey Bader: Ron, while China has been growing very rapidly, its per capita GDP is still only about 10-15% of America's. Our military spending is 3 or 4 times China's by the most conservative estimates. China's economic growth is likely to slow in the next few years, probably to 7.5 to 8% as it faces huge challenges on how its state-owned enterprises adapt to a period of rising wages and shrinking markets abroad. China's military is not in a position to project power significantly beyond the western Pacific. So the common belief that China is replacing the U.S. is at worst wildly premature and probably wrong in any event. China's leaders have been insistent that they do not seek to displace or challenge the U.S. and say that they recognize that their relationship with the U.S. is the single most important one for China. So I am relatively confident about this, though we should not make assumptions based on the current situation or straight-line analyses.

1:02 Emily Howell: Thanks for the questions everyone!

Participants

Moderator

Emily Howell

Web Producer, POLITICO

Panelists

Jeffrey A. Bader

John C. Whitehead Senior Fellow in International Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center

Continuing Complex Discussions on Fate of Chinese Dissident

Jeffrey A. Bader — Thu, 03 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Since the announcement on May 2 that Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng was leaving the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and would remain in China in return for Chinese assurances about his safety and future, the deal negotiated by U.S. and Chinese officials has come unstuck. Chen spoke to his legal advisor Teng Biao while at the hospital shortly after his departure from the embassy and Teng persuaded him that Chinese promises could not be trusted. Chen then told the international media that he now wished to seek asylum in the U.S. instead. Since he had been insistent while at the embassy that he did not seek to go abroad, this ran contrary to what U.S. officials had been led to expect. As a result, Chen is now insisting that the U.S. Government achieve a result that it cannot independently produce, namely to transport a Chinese citizen under Chinese authority out of China. The U.S. Government is now seeking to ascertain what Chen really wants, and will try within the limits of the possible to accommodate his desires.

In the meantime, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue continues. The Chinese side clearly wishes to keep the Chen matter in perspective and emphasize the positive in the US-China relationship, as evidenced by the announcement that its Defense Minister will visit the United States shortly. It will be a considerable challenge for the U.S. and China to keep the relationship steady as the Chen matter oscillates from day to day. The U.S. objective remains clear – to protect Chen’s rights as much as it can while keeping focused on the major global and regional issues on which a common approach is critical. If the U.S. fails to protect Chen adequately, the relationship will come under withering fire at home. If on the other hand the U.S. makes the Chen case the central issue in U.S.-China relations, it will damage crucial global objectives. Amongst the tension and uncertainties of the moment, a balanced approach remains imperative.

Authors

Jeffrey A. Bader

Image Source: Reuters

Chen Guangcheng and the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue

Jeffrey A. Bader — Wed, 02 May 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Editor's Note: Read an update by Jeffrey Bader on Chen Guangcheng, his decision to ask for asylum, and the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

The resolution of the drama triggered by the presence of Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng in the U.S. Embassy this past week on the eve of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) removes a dark cloud from the U.S.-China relationship at a crucial time. The negotiated deal leading to the decision by Chen to leave the U.S. Embassy in Beijing on May 2, where he had sought sanctuary six days earlier, ended a brief stalemate that could have had significant negative ramifications had it not been quickly resolved.

Chen, a self-taught legal activist who has been involved in issues such as countering forced abortions and highlighting tainted blood supplies that have caused HIV/AIDS, had been under imprisonment and house arrest for years. He somehow escaped his house arrest and made his way from Shandong province to the American Embassy where he was given refuge (the U.S. government wisely refused all comment on the case in order to facilitate a positive outcome, which would have been rendered very difficult by putting a spotlight on it). The case was especially difficult for the Chinese at this moment, coming just weeks after the fall from power of the powerful former Party Secretary of Chongqing and rising star, Bo Xilai, in the wake of his ex-police commissioner seeking temporary refuge in the US Consulate-General in Chengdu.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell and Legal Counsel Harold Koh negotiated an agreement with the Chinese Foreign Ministry under which Chen chose voluntarily to leave the embassy with assurances by the Chinese to him and to the U.S. Government that he would be treated humanely, not be sent back to Shandong into house arrest, and be reunited with his family. Chen had not requested exile, so he saw this outcome as satisfactory. It was surprising how quickly the Chinese government agreed to this solution, under which the U.S. Embassy will periodically check on his status, perhaps indicating that they did not want continuing attention to this case as the S&ED took place.

While all this was going on, Secretaries Clinton and Geithner arrived in Beijing for what will be the fourth and almost certainly the last meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in which they participate. The S&ED was established in 2009 as a framework for talks by Cabinet-level officials from a slew of agencies on each side, chaired on the Chinese side by Vice Premier Wang Qishan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo, who respectively oversee the economic and foreign policy portfolios. The S&ED was not designed as a body to produce “deliverables” or solve problems, but rather more as a way of focusing on key issues, elevating attention to the U.S.-China relationship once each year, and breaking down bureaucratic stovepipes on both sides but especially on the Chinese side. It remains to be seen whether the mechanism will continue in precisely its current form under the successors to Clinton and Geithner, whether Democrat or Republican.

The U.S. delegation to the S&ED will try to focus on the large issues in the relationship on which Chinese behavior can significantly affect our interests – Iran, North Korea, the South China Sea, military and security bilateral tensions, market access, currency levels, investment flows, and factors that tilt the economic playing field. There will be a separate meeting of the Strategic Security Dialogue before the S&ED involving senior uniformed military and civilians from the defense and foreign policy establishments to discuss maritime security and cyber-issues. While the meeting will be brief, this innovation begun at last year’s meeting is an important first step toward a serious dialogue to address and contain the contentious bilateral security differences that could escalate and lead to conflict or hostility.

The S&ED comes 5 1/2 months after a trip by President Obama to Asia that was portrayed and perceived, wrongly, as a campaign to “contain” China and that has caused a certain amount of brooding on both sides about the state of the relationship. In the interim, China’s Vice President and heir apparent Xi Jinping made a generally successful visit to the U.S., and the U.S. and China have addressed the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs in more effective cooperative fashion. The two sides hope to use the S&ED to build positive momentum in the relationship. The mere fact that the S&ED is proceeding at a moment of special difficulty occasioned by the Chen case testifies to the durability of the relationship in the face of daily travails.

Authors

Jeffrey A. Bader

Image Source: Jason Lee / Reuters

North Korea’s Rocket Launch: Déjà Vu All Over Again for the United States and China

Jeffrey A. Bader — Thu, 22 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0400

Last week’s announcement that North Korea plans to launch a satellite— using a rocket with a design similar to that used in its ballistic missile program—effectively scuttles the agreement reached by the United States and North Korea on February 29 that had appeared to offer hope of a renewed process to contain and reverse North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs.

Under the February 29 agreement, the North Koreans were to undertake to freeze their uranium enrichment program and invite IAEA inspectors to their announced facility at Yongbyon to monitor the freeze; to impose a moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles for as long as there was a constructive dialogue process; to respect the Korean armistice; and to honor the 2005 Six Party joint statement that lays out the goal of denuclearization of the peninsula and normalization of relations among the parties. In response, the United States announced its intention to provide 240,000 metric tons of food aid (described as nutritional supplements aimed at vulnerable population groups, not grain, to decrease the risk of diversion to the military).

In 2009, the North Koreans launched a similar rocket with the purported goal of putting a satellite in space; the first two stages of the rocket worked, the third did not, and the satellite never went into orbit, despite North Korean claims to the contrary. The UN Security Council issued a presidential statement declaring that such satellite launches violated UN Security Council resolutions prohibiting North Korean ballistic missile tests, thus closing a loophole that the North Koreans were seeking to exploit. The North Koreans obviously continue to reject the UN Security Council resolutions and definitions, and are seeking through this test to impose their rejection on the United States and the international community.

There is very little chance the North Koreans will postpone or cancel their satellite launch, which is timed to coincide with the 100th anniversary of the birth of the state’s founder Kim Il-Sung. The Obama administration will not proceed with food aid in the wake of the launch. To do so would be to undercut the lesson that the Obama administration has been sending to Pyongyang since it came into office, namely that provocations will not produce rewards but on the contrary only further isolation.

This puts the Chinese in a difficult situation. The Obama administration has leaned hard on the Chinese to persuade the North Koreans to halt the test, and the Chinese are deeply irritated that the North Koreans have once again blown up a negotiation process that seemed to be inching forward. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has called in North Korean diplomats twice in the last week to express their annoyance. But typically in the past, when the North Koreans made clear they would not budge, the Chinese, feeling they lacked leverage over Pyongyang, have turned pressure on Washington to try to persuade it to be flexible and continue the process.

President Obama will be in Seoul this weekend and will meet with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Chinese President Hu Jintao. While Hu is likely to express both irritation at the North Koreans and the need for U.S. patience and restraint, Lee will call for Obama to stand firm against this latest North Korean maneuver, which is doubtless aimed at part in influencing South Korean public opinion against Lee’s party in the run-up to the December presidential elections to choose Lee’s successor (counterintuitively, Pyongyang judges that its provocations influence South Korean voters to favor candidates with a more benign view of North Korea by persuading them that firm policies by Seoul lead to heightened tensions).

President Obama can be expected to hew closely to Lee’s request, which is the best way to send the right message to Pyongyang. It is the proper short-term tactic. But by itself it will neither slow Pyongyang’s WMD programs nor bring it back to the table with a constructive attitude. The solution to that riddle has eluded the United States and the others in the Six Party process, and has not gotten any easier since Kim Jong-il’s death.

Authors

Jeffrey A. Bader

Inside the White House During the Japan Earthquake

Jeffrey A. Bader — Thu, 08 Mar 2012 00:00:00 -0500

On March 11, 2011, I was awakened at 1:45 am by a call from the White House Situation Room reporting that an earthquake measuring 8.9 on the Richter scale (subsequently raised to 9.0) had struck northeast Japan, and that tsunami warnings had been issued. At the time I was senior director for East Asian affairs on the National Security Council, and immediately we formed an interagency group to address the situation. First, we mobilized relief efforts, and the U.S. Pacific Command provided indispensable support for remote and isolated towns. Those operations generated few difficult policy decisions.

Within a few days, however, a threat emerged: the possibility of multiple meltdowns at the nuclear reactor site in Fukushima, 160 miles northeast of Tokyo. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant had six reactors, three of which were online when the earthquake and tsunami struck. The other three were not, but their highly toxic fuel rods were stored in spent-fuel pools on site.

Read the full article at foreignaffairs.com »

Authors

Jeffrey A. Bader

Publication: Foreign Affairs

Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider's View of America's Asia Strategy

Thu, 08 Mar 2012 16:00:00 -0500

Event Information

March 8, 2012
4:00 PM - 5:30 PM EST

Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC

Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping recently completed his first official trip to the United States and his last before his expected elevation to General-Secretary of the Communist Party this fall. His visit comes three months after a high-profile trip by President Obama to Indonesia and Australia in which the administration’s heightened attention to the Asia Pacific region was in sharp focus. Brookings Senior Fellow Jeffrey Bader served as the senior director for East Asian affairs at the National Security Council from 2009 to 2011 and was at the center of the formulation of U.S. policy toward the region. He describes what he did, what he saw and what it meant in Obama and China’s Rise (Brookings Press, 2012).

On March 8, the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings hosted the launch of Obama and China’s Rise. Bader, now the John C. Whitehead Senior Fellow for International Diplomacy at Brookings, discussed the strategy behind the Obama administration’s policy and the state of U.S.-China relations. Following his remarks, Senior Fellow Kenneth Lieberthal, director of the John L. Thornton China Center, offered commentary. Brookings President Strobe Talbott provided introductory remarks and Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, moderated the discussion.

After the program, speakers took audience questions.

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Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider's View of America's Asia Strategy

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Transcript (.pdf)

Event Materials

20120308_obama_china

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