Brookings: Experts - Julius Agbor

After 50 Years of the OAU-AU: Time to Strengthen the Conflict Intervention Framework

Julius Agbor and Tatah Mentan — Wed, 22 May 2013 16:19:00 -0400

2013 marks 50 years since the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which became the African Union (AU) in 2002. This week, as the continent’s leaders and other Africanists meet to commemorate this special occasion, it is also the appropriate time to reflect on some of the principles, successes and shortcomings of the organization. In particular, we would like to consider why the organization has been particularly slow in intervening in situations where the “responsibility to protect” is clearly mandated. The “responsibility to protect” is a United Nations (U.N.) principle endorsed by the AU (in what has come to be known as the “Ezulwini Consensus”) and represents the right to intervene in a member states’ internal affairs in situations where citizens’ welfare has been significantly undermined. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Acts of the AU state that “[T]he Union has the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the general assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” While the AU has been lauded for its multilateral peace-keeping initiatives, notably in Sudan, its ambivalent, and at best muted, response to the humanitarian crises in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and, most recently, Mali—very similar to the OAU’s inaction in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia—has drawn much criticism. On the other hand, the AU has been quick to express reservations about the intervention of Western nations in its member states’ affairs, notably, with the recent French movements in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, and NATO in Libya. This controversy about the timing of international interventions suggests the need for a fine line to be drawn between the AU’s long cherished principle of non-interference (stipulated in Article 4(g) of the Constitutive Acts) and the AU’s “responsibility to protect” framework, without which the continental body will increasingly lose its relevance. Following the AU’s inertia to respond to these situations, pundits have speculated on what would have happened to Côte d’Ivoire, Mali or Libya had France or NATO not intervened at all.

Although it is probably too early to pass judgment on the efficacy of the AU’s revised peace and security framework, the evidence over the past two decades does not suggest the pan-African body has been effective at mitigating humanitarian crisis on the continent. The reasons for the ineffectiveness of AU’s intervention are both ideological and logistic. On the ideological front, it seems that the principle of non-interference in member states’ internal affairs has had a preponderant influence on the organization’s decision-making process, and for genuine reasons. Many African states have weak governance structures, and cases of widespread human rights violations are still rampant on the continent. The evidence suggests that civil wars and most of the parameters which define a failed state are the result of poor governance. Similarly, Africa is the only continent that continues to experience famines in the 21st century, and the evidence linking famines to poor governance is compelling. Unfortunately, the AU lacks oversight over most of its member states with respect to governance, which continues to be treated as a domestic affair. As evidence, only 26 of its 54 member states have ratified the protocol establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights—the arm of the AU charged with ensuring the protection of human and peoples’ rights on the continent. This fact suggests that arriving at a consensus decision to intervene in a member state is often problematic. Thus, at the level of the AU general assembly, when it comes to voting in favor of or against an intervention to avert a humanitarian crisis, it can be expected that the overwhelming majority of governance-deficient AU member states would oppose such an intervention, even if the need is glaring. This difficulty in achieving consensus partly explains why the AU has been less proactive in mitigating conflicts and also why its response to crisis situations has been sluggish. Thus, a more proactive conflict prevention, mitigation and management strategy necessarily involves early warning monitoring, which includes the ability to identify governance failures and systematically address them. A good point of start in upholding continental best practices in governance could be by imposing on its member states the requirement that presidential term limits must not exceed two terms of a maximum of seven years each.

Logistical issues linked to inadequate resources, lack of technical know-how and poor planning have also impaired the AU’s ability to respond in a timely manner in order to avert humanitarian crises. To be able to prevent civil wars, there is need for a credible assessment of war signals. Also, a built-in system for evaluating success and failure has to be designed into the intervention process. Further, part of the problem with intervention in African conflicts is poor planning: An inadequate assessment of what it takes to succeed in each particular intervention often leads to huge casualties and resentment from member states to support future initiatives. Poor planning is also evidenced in unrealistic timetables for intervention. Sometimes, it is the lack of a critical diagnosis of the root cause of a conflict that hinders effective intervention. Considering the U.N.’s superior resources and comparative advantage in early monitoring, evaluation and conflict mitigation in general, the AU stands to gain from continued collaboration with the U.N. Sudan and the DRC are clear cases of the benefits of such collaboration. Of course, these examples do not necessarily suggest that the U.N. should take the front role in crisis prevention in Africa. Rather, the AU must be at the forefront of this prevention by stengthening the role of its regional economic communities (RECs) in transparently providing early warning signals. With proper coordination and collaboration, the RECs have proven to be an effective channel of intervention in conflicts as was seen in the recent case of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) intervention in the Central African Republic.

The case for strengthening the AU’s conflict intervention framework is further buttressed by the fact that, in Africa, transnational corporations (TNCs) compete with state institutions in the economic, political and social spheres. With increasing globalization, TNCs with more and more power and influence may be problematic for individual African states to handle in isolation. For instance, TNCs have been big players in fueling conflicts in mineral-rich African countries. Also, a recent phenomenon that is yet to be acknowledged is the potential role of big TNCs’ tax haven practices in further weakening the governance capabilities of African states, which would in turn nurture future conflicts. For instance, an investigation headed by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has concluded that the practice of tax havens by TNCs is costing Africa $38 billion a year in lost revenue. Such activities clearly undermine the quality of life of African citizens, and therefore some structured intervention by the AU is warranted given the limited ability of individual African states to effectively address them.

In conclusion, although it is difficult to envision an AU where every domestic issue would be discussed and picked apart, there are certainly areas where some structured regional intervention is mandated. For this continental body to remain relevant, it will have to transparently restructure and strengthen its intervention framework to allow it to swiftly respond to humanitarian crises as well as enable it to cope with new challenges posed by a globalizing world economy.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Tatah Mentan

Image Source: © Joe Penney / Reuters

Africa Answers: Five Questions about Sustainable Inclusive Growth in South Africa

Julius Agbor — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 16:22:00 -0400

Last week, the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings hosted an event with South African Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. The goal of the forum was to explore ways to support inclusive growth in South Africa, where unemployment stands at nearly 25 percent.

After the forum, I discussed these issues with Haroon Bhorat, director of the South African think tank the Development Policy Research Unit. Below are Haroon’s answers to my questions. The DPRU, a partner think tank of the Africa Growth Initiative, is a great resource on employment and inequality in South Africa and across the region. Read more about the DPRU on their Web site and also follow them on Facebook.

Julius Agbor: During his recent visit to Brookings, the South African Finance Minister, Honorable Pravin Gordhan, underscored the challenges of inclusive growth in South Africa. In order of importance, what are these challenges and do you think they are surmountable in the short term?

Haroon Bhorat: The key challenges revolve around an insufficiently high level of economic growth and the extreme levels of income inequality and unemployment: South Africa has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world, and, in the sample of emerging markets, possibly the highest. The Gini coefficient for South Africa is currently 0.66. Unemployment, using the International Labor Organization’s definition of joblessness, currently stands at about 25 percent for the fourth quarter of 2012. Following the Great Recession where close to 1 million jobs were lost in South Africa and in an environment where economic growth has yet to breach the 3 percent level, solving these twin distributional problems in the short run will be extremely difficult.

This new growth path would necessarily require both a signficant increase in the levels of economic growth and a sharp departure from the current growth trajectory. The current trajectory is based on a dependence on heavy manufacturing, the resources sector and foreign equity to finance the current account deficit, while the retail sector is the key provider of long-run employment. Obviously, this deficit-financed, consumption growth model is not an optimal strategy for long-run welfare gains in South Africa.

Agbor: South Africa’s current macroeconomic fundamentals and microeconomic framework leave much to be desired. For instance, the yield on a South African 10-year government bond is at a record high of 6.2 percent while the high incidence of HIV/AIDS coupled with an acute shortage of skilled man-power is seriously undermining both the productive potential of the economy and its ability to attract foreign investors. Do you think that the South African government needs to respond differently to these challenges? If so, how would you recommend it respond?

Bhorat: Foreign investors, both in equity markets and in the real economy, are concerned in part about social instability in a society borne out of high levels of crime, unemployment and inequality. In addition, a vocal, strong trade union movement viewed as politically influential as well as a signficant skills constraint have caused foreign investors to remain coy about South Africa. On the other hand, those who have invested or are invested in the economy often note South Africa’s strong rule of law, globally leading financial sector, and transport and telecommunication infrastructure which rivals that found in the West. In turn, high dividend streams with a relatively high real interest rate differential keep foreign investors interested in South Africa. In the short-run then, these strong companies and other South African endowments will keep foreign investors interested in the economy. In the long-run, however, a more creative growth trajectory and policy environment is required from government. We need a strategy and an environment that makes those difficult decisions in order to shift the economy on to a more labor-intensive and competitive growth path. Supply- and demand-side policies ranging from improving the quality of schooling to anti-trust interventions are all necessary.

Agbor: For quite a while now, low wages seem to characterize South Africa’s labor market, which is consistent with the high level of unemployment in the country. At the same time, there is no evidence of marked improvements in labor productivity and competitiveness of the South African economy. What is going on in South Africa?

Bhorat: We are in a low-level equilibrium trap of tepid growth and signficant labor disequilibrium in the factor and product markets. Certainly a more competitive wage environment, as well as more deregulated product markets, must be part of the answer. Bold industrial policy that is narrowed to very specific sectors and provides some form of infant industry protection is essential. No country has managed to build prosperity without the growth of the light manufacturing sector—and South Africa will be no different. Building a light manufacturing sector will be critical to generating the levels of employment this economy desperately requires.

Agbor: Many believe that anti-trust legislation is weakly enforced in South Africa and that corporate bodies and unions are too strong. To what extent do you think a rebound of the South African economy depends on reforms in these key areas?

Bhorat: There is a view that strong business and strong labor are able to divide the rents from growth in some semi-consensual form. That view then extends to the notion that this situation has generated a growth path built essentially on high dividends and high wages to the exclusion of the unemployed. This is obviously an undesirable outcome yet the solution does not necessarily lie in lower wages, which would generate the kind of social instability South Africa cannot afford. Rather, an acceptable outcome would come from a conscious effort by the South African government at generating creative solutions that include the unemployed and those in the informal economy into the growth process.

Presently a social compact is assured through a highly redistributive state. Hence, this government spending on social assistance constitutes 10.4 percent of total expenditure and 3.4 percent of GDP, which is high by middle-income country standards. This is not fiscally sustainable nor incentive compatible with the requirements of a competitive developing country economy. Hence, a key part of the reform package is not only more aggressive anti-trust legislation, but also interventions designed to improve the opportunities and capabilities of the informal economy as well as the unemployed. These can range from re-engineering state procurement policies to reducing the search costs of the unemployed.

Agbor: Does South Africa have a particular economic role to play in Africa? Is it a faciliator of investment in the region and beyond?

Bhorat: As Africa’s largest economy, South Africa remains central to the region and the continent’s future. That being said, Africa’s largest economy remains locked into a low-growth trap within a continent with some of the world’s fastest growing economies. South Africa’s short-run opportunity is to utilize its strong physical, financial and telecommunication infrastructure as a platform to attract foreign firms seeking a foothold in Africa. The 20 percent purchase by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China of Standard Bank of South Africa in 2008 is indicative of this type of indirect impact the growth of African economies is having on South Africa.

That being said, South African firms are dominant in retail, mining and telecommuncations on the continent. The long-run growth question is whether these companies are able to capitalize on their early mover advantage and become the dominant investors in a region where FDI flows from China, India, Malaysia and other emerging markets are expanding rapidly.

Authors

Julius Agbor

Image Source: © SIPHIWE SIBEKO / Reuters

What Future for the Central African Republic?

Julius Agbor and Michael Rettig — Sat, 06 Apr 2013 08:00:00 -0400

On March 24, 2013, a loose coalition of rebel groups known as the “séléka rebels”, ostensibly dissatisfied with the Bangui government’s implementation of the January 2013 ceasefire agreement brokered by the 10-member Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the African Union and the United Nations, seized power and named Michel Djotodia as interim president of the Central African Republic (C.A.R). While the March 24^th coup d’état in the C.A.R. was not a remarkable event on its own – power has violently changed hands at least four times in the short history of the country, including when the now-deposed President Bozizé seized power in 2003 – the coup nonetheless has some important implications for the country, the Central African region and for the international community.

For the C.A.R., a major implication of the coup is that, going forward, it is less likely that the country will experience political stability and advance towards democracy. Two broad arguments militate in favor of this prediction. First, the legacy of French colonial rule left the C.A.R. with no visionary leadership and an ill-developed institutional and physical infrastructure. The C.A.R. is a very small country– its population is comparable to the state of Alabama. Yet its huge surface area – comparable to that of the state of Texas – is richly endowed in natural resources, notably timber and diamonds, which explains the continued interest of its former colonial master and other foreign nations in the country. Since the colonial period when the C.A.R was called Oubangui-Chari, France’s colonialism (and subsequent neocolonialism) was aimed at extracting the C.A.R.’s resources at the expense of developing the country’s human resources, institutional and physical infrastructure.

For instance, right up to 1971 – almost a decade after independence from France – the C.A.R.’s gross secondary enrollment rate was barely 4 percent; less than 2 percent of the country’s total road network had been paved; and only about one physician per 50,000 people was available. The March coup, like previous ones, was anchored in economic grievances linked to an ineffective governance system inherited from colonial rule and which has been further compounded by international meddling. Furthermore, France’s strategy of super-imposing its military presence in its former colonies (in order to protect its economic interests) has greatly undermined the ability of French-speaking African states to constitute a veritable national army that is capable of defending their territories against internal as well as external aggressors. It is therefore easy to understand France’s frequent military intervention in its former colonies (as in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 or recently in Mali), but it is also easy to see why France’s nonintervention in cases like the recent C.A.R. coup is perceived as a betrayal in some quarters. Consequently, France’s colonial rule in the C.A.R., like in most other sub-Saharan African countries, has greatly undermined the development of local leadership capacity both in civilian and military affairs. It is not surprising that the C.A.R. has been home to several mercenaries – some of whom eventually ruled the country – and also to bandits and gangsters of Joseph Kony’s caliber.

The second argument predicting continued instability in the C.A.R. is that the coup leader doesn’t have sufficient incentives to lay down a solid foundation in order for the C.A.R.to transition to democracy. Already, he has dissolved the parliament and constitution and is ruling by decree, and without a strong civil society, organized opposition parties, free press and independent judiciary, there is no counterbalancing power to keep his regime in check. Experience elsewhere in countries where military coups have preceded the development of democratic institutions, notably in Nigeria and Turkey, clearly demonstrates that democracy rarely emerges without established agencies of restraint. Further, the C.A.R.’s military also has little tradition of respecting the primacy of civilian rule. The C.A.R’s first and only democratic transition in the 1990s faced an attempted coup by the ousted dictator shortly after elections, and a successful coup by the country’s military chief another two years later. Furthermore, political transitions that are unaccompanied by rapid and sustained economic growth have seldom been sustainable and often give in to successive internal counter-coups. This prediction is likely self-fulfilling in the C.A.R.’s case, where economic growth is projected to decline this year from 3.8 to 2.5 percent as a result of political instability and the decline in foreign aid and investment by key European donor countries facing austerity at home. In sum, even if Djotodia’s good motives were unquestionable, with no agencies of restraint in place and with the C.A.R.’s economic prospects in decline, it seems unlikely that the groundwork for a stable transition to democracy exists.

It is probably in anticipation of continuing socio-political upheavals in the C.A.R. that the international community, notably, the United Nations, the African Union and the ECCAS have vehemently rejected the C.A.R.’s new leadership as well as its three-year transition plan to democracy. In its last summit meeting on the C.A.R. held on April 3, 2013, the ECCAS called for Djotodia’s instant removal and the creation of a five-person executive council that would oversee an 18-month transition to democratic elections. The international community’s rejection of the Séléka coup is commendable as it sets precedence that political power can no longer be accessed through the use of force. Happily, the Séléka leadership has announced its willingness to collaborate with the transition proposals set out by ECCAS. Notwithstanding, if the claims that child soldiers were used in the Séléka rebellion are true, then the Séléka rebel leaders must face trial for violating international conventions. Given the important ramifications that the crisis in the C.A.R. has for the entire Central African region – in terms of the potential of spill-over of rebel coups, influx of refugees to neighboring countries and the hunt for Joseph Kony – a more sophisticated and internationally backed solution for the C.A.R. is warranted. For instance, it might be a sensible option to place the country under a U.N. appointed administrator, as was seen in Cambodia, for a transitional period of three to five years, during which the critical ingredients needed for democracy to thrive (namely, an educated citizenry, independent courts, free press, a disciplined police force and army, vibrant civil society, independent electoral commission, etc.) are put in place. At the end of this transition period, elections could then be held and power transferred from the temporary administrator to a democratically elected C.A.R. government. The weakness of the ECCAS transition plan for the C.A.R. is that it assumes that democracy and economic prosperity would automatically emerge after holding a successful election, but experience doesn’t suggest that is plausible.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Michael Rettig

Image Source: © Stringer . / Reuters

Africa Answers: Perspectives on President Obama’s Meeting with African Leaders

Julius Agbor — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 16:00:00 -0400

Last week, President Obama met with President Macky Sall of Senegal, along with President Joyce Banda of Malawi, President Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone, and Prime Minister José Maria Pereira Neves of Cape Verde. Their discussion largely revolved around strengthening democratic institutions in their respective countries and Africa in general.

I sat down last Thursday with Abdoulaye Diagne—the director of the Consortium for Economic and Social Research (CRES) in Senegal, one of our think tank partners from Africa—to discuss the significance of last week’s meeting and new challenges facing Senegal. Below are Abdoulaye’s answers to my questions. CRES is a great resource on Senegal and economics in West Africa. You can follow them on Twitter at @CRESContact, or leave a comment below.

Julius Agbor
Africa Research Fellow
Brookings Africa Growth Initiative

Julius Agbor: What is the significance of President Macky Sall’s meeting with President Obama in Washington, D.C. this week?

Abdoulaye Diagne: The meeting between President Macky Sall and President Obama is another demonstration of the excellent relations between Senegal and the United States of America. It is also a way for President Obama to support Senegalese democracy. The election of President Macky Sall is proof of the fact that the Senegalese people are ready for democracy, and that no one can hinder the free expression of universal suffrage in this country. Finally, this visit should be seen as an incentive by President Obama to his Senegalese colleague who is courageously committed to the fight against corruption and bad government.

Agbor: Senegal is one of the few French-speaking African countries to have had a successful democratic transition in which incumbent President was defeated in an election. What is your overall rating of the democratic process in Senegal?

Diagne: Democracy is firmly anchored in Senegal. In the 19th century, during the colonial period, the Senegalese were already voting in the four municipalities (Saint-Louis, Dakar, Goree and Rufisque) to elect their council members. From the start of the 20th century to the independence of their country in 1960, they voted to elect deputies to the French National Assembly. Following independence, elections have been held regularly at both national and communal levels. An electoral system that the government cannot manipulate has gradually been established. Over time, the Senegalese have gained faith that with their vote they can remove a president of the Republic that they no longer want. The rejection of violence to resolve political differences, to attain power, is widely shared across all social strata of the country. It is this deeply rooted democracy that explains the political stability from which Senegal has benefited since its independence, with no coup to interrupt the normal functioning of the institutions of the Republic. In truth, the main challenge facing Senegalese society is less that of the establishment of democracy than that of good government at all levels in the management of public affairs.

Agbor: What are the key challenges facing Senegal’s economy?

Diagne: Senegal currently has a relatively low growth rate (between 4 and 5 percent per year) and one that is very erratic. Moreover, inequalities remain very high (almost 55 percent of the population lives in rural areas, while the primary sector contributes less than 15 percent to GDP). The first challenge is thus to change this pattern of growth to make it stronger and more inclusive. This means that it must take place mainly in the rural sector. The second challenge is good government. Many public resources are lost due to corruption and fraudulent practices; development projects are not performed well. Fighting bad government at all levels of government is a national priority. Finally, Senegal must considerably improve the quality of its education, both internally and externally. This will undoubtedly occur as a result of the pacification of educational sector, which has been disturbed by incessant strikes by teachers, and by the introduction of educational reforms and of human resource management focused on increasing continuous cognitive learning by students. A complete reorientation of the education system towards science, technology and mathematics s and short-term vocational training is also imperative.

Agbor: China-Africa relations have intensified over the past decade. How do the Senegalese perceive the growing importance of China in Africa? Is Senegal getting a fair share from this growing relationship?

Diagne: Chinese investment in Senegal is still modest. The main achievement of China in recent years has been the construction of the National Grand Theater. On the other hand, Senegal increasingly imports from China a wide variety of manufactured goods, while exports to that country are very modest. The availability of low-priced Chinese products has helped reduce the cost of living for the population, especially the urban population, but has accelerated the disappearance of a large number of manufacturing businesses.

Agbor: The franc CFA monetary arrangement with France has come under intense criticism by renowned Senegalese and African economists lately. What is your take on this debate and what is the way forward for the franc CFA currency?

Diagne: Many criticisms of the monetary agreements between France and the countries of Central and West Africa are unfounded, because they have to do with considerations not based on facts but rather on anti-neocolonial policy positions. If we consider the UEMOA [West African Economic and Monetary Union], the management of the Central Bank is fully assured by country officials. Great efforts in the harmonization of fiscal policies have been achieved; there is a unified financial market. Monetary stability is unquestionable. In my opinion, the main issue is not that of whether the two monetary arrangements with France should disappear. Rather, the issue is that of moving towards the creation of a single currency in West Africa and Central Africa. As for West Africa, UEMOA would not be an obstacle to this goal. Quite the contrary! The experience of the Central Bank of the West African States (BCEAO) is unique and is a valuable springboard to the single West African currency. Just as the common external tariff established by the UEMOA formed the basis of the definition of the TEC [external common tariff] of the states of the Community of West Africa (which includes, in addition to the eight UEMOA countries, seven West African countries, including Nigeria and Ghana), the TEC will soon be in force. In anticipation of this big step towards West African monetary integration, the BCEAO will have to abandon the fixed exchange rate linking its currency to the euro. Exchange rate flexibility would improve the competitiveness of member economies without endangering the monetary stability that is so appreciated by the people and economic actors. I thus agree with the critics who question the fixing of the CFA and the euro exchange rates. But it is possible to move to a regime of flexible exchange rates that does not entail the disappearance of the two monetary unions.

Authors

Julius Agbor

Image Source: © Yuri Gripas / Reuters

How African Governments Should Respond to the Impact of the U.S. Sequester

Julius Agbor and Brandon Routman — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 14:02:00 -0400

Based on the 2011 Budget Control Act, and due to the failure of the “supercommittee” to agree upon discretionary budget cuts in 2012, across-the-board cuts to all discretionary spending accounts in the U.S. federal budget (now known as the sequester) went into effect in March of this year. At the G-20 finance ministers and central bank governors meeting held in Moscow last February, Christine Lagarde, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) insinuated that the sequester might not be the optimal path to medium-term fiscal consolidation in the U.S., and its impact could be wide-ranging on the global economy. The sequester would potentially affect African economies directly through reduced foreign aid and indirectly through lower export receipts, remittances and foreign investment should there be an accompanying significant slow down in the U.S. economy.

According to Secretary of State John Kerry, the effects of the sequester will be fairly dramatic. For instance, they will initiate some $1.7 billion worth of cuts in foreign assistance, which will negatively affect Africa in a number of key ways.

According to the State Department’s estimations, foreign aid to the health sector may be cut by about $400 million. The highly successful President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) will loose some $280 million, which will mean that more than a quarter million fewer patients will receive HIV/AIDS medication. Other cuts in the sector will translate into 2.5 million women being denied family planning service, 3 million fewer treatments for malaria and 60,000 fewer treatments of tuberculosis. If these cuts only affected health outcomes, they would be tragic enough; however, they are compounded by budgetary slashes in other areas. There will be cuts of approximately $200 million in humanitarian assistance, cuts in international peacekeeping operations by almost $20 million and significant cuts to agricultural programs like Feed the Future. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)—another tremendously successful program and one which incentivizes good governance on a national scale throughout Africa—will also likely sustain a hit. As a consequence, cuts to this program could set back the agenda of governance reforms on the continent.

It also should be noted that the funding cuts induced by the sequester are really only a small part of the story; the larger part is the dwindling levels of funding for international assistance in the current cash-strapped climate.

It should be noted that the above figures are estimates from the State Department and the House Appropriations Committee. While we know for sure that the sequestration cuts will be in effect through 2013, the specifics of how and where these shortfalls occur will be ironed out via a budgetary process over the next few months. It also should be noted that the funding cuts induced by the sequester are really only a small part of the story; the larger part is the dwindling levels of funding for international assistance in the current cash-strapped climate. It should be noted that since 2010, there has been a systematic reduction of about 20 percent in U.S. international aid funding, which is occuring despite the fact that it is less than 1 percent of the total federal budget. Furthermore, in an era where most donors are dealing with fiscal problems of their own, finding alternative funding might be difficult. Thus, continuity of some of those programs that are jointly financed with African governments will critically depend on a greater budgetary participation by African governments themselves.

In formulating policy responses to these economic shocks, it is critical that Africa’s governments preserve the sound macroeconomic framework that has undergirded its remarkable economic growth during the last two decades. The optimal policy response of African governments to the sequester will depend on whether the sequester is percieved as temporary or permanent (the fate of these cuts is uncertain in 2014 and beyond) and on country-specific percularities. The country-specific percularities refer to the exchange regime in place (fixed or flexible) and to the availability of policy space – fiscal, monetary and external buffers. Fiscal buffers refer to the ability of governments to run larger fiscal deficits without creating unfavorable debt dynamics and undue pressures in domestic financial markets, while monetary buffers refer to the ability to ease monetary policy in support of economic activity without triggering significant inflation and exchange rate pressures. External buffers simply refers to the availability of a pile of foreign exchange reserves that can be run down in times of need. Generally, countries with flexible exchange regimes have a greater advantage over fixed exchange regime countries (notably, the African Financial Community, franc zone, member countries) in maneuvering support for affected programs as monetary and exchange rate policies can be fine tuned to support fiscal policy.

If the sequester is perceived as temporary, the optimal response would be to scale up budgetary support for similar, African-groomed programs. Countries with enough buffers could temporarily decrease their stock of foreign exchange reserves and run large fiscal deficits supported, where available, by an expansionary monetary policy stance. For countries with limited buffers, budgetary support could come from borrowing from domestic financial markets (where available) or from the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral funding agencies.

The efforts to mitigate the impact of the sequester on African economies should also be complimented by the continents’ bilateral as well as multilateral development partners.

However, if the sequester is percieved as permanent a different set of policy responses, contingent on each countries’ percularities, can be envisaged:

For countries with limited fiscal buffers (that is, those facing both high budget deficits and high debt-to-GDP ratios), the optimal response depends on the depth of countries’ domestic financial markets as well as on the extent of the pressure imposed by financial markets. Where fiscal buffers are limited, domestic financial markets are well developed but governments are under intense pressure from financial markets. For instance, in South Africa, the optimal response will be to allow a full blown impact of the sequester, which would entail a sharp increase in the price of anti-retroviral drugs in a country where 10 percent of the population is currently living with HIV/AIDS. It should be noted that under the Global Health Initiative, in fiscal year 2012, $469 million was allocated towards South Africa’s fight against HIV/AIDS, which currently tops the list of beneficiary nations. There are other African countries where limited fiscal buffers exist, domestic financial markets are developed, but the government is not under intense pressure from financial markets. For instance, in Botswana, the optimal response might be to borrow from domestic financial markets to partially offset the full blown impact of the sequester. Some sub-Saharan African countries have limited fiscal buffers, thin domestic financial markets, but do have some credibility in international markets, including Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique. These countries could attempt to raise funds internationally through sovereign and diaspora bonds.
Some natural resource-exporting countries in sub-Saharan Africa have accumulated savings in the form of a sovereign wealth fund or in foreign currency denominated assets (for instance, the franc zone countries). They could draw down on those resources to finance the additional cost of maintaining the affected programs.

The efforts to mitigate the impact of the sequester on African economies should also be complimented by the continents’ bilateral as well as multilateral development partners. On its part, the Obama administration and the black congressional caucus should strive to minimize the cuts on some of the highly successful programs like PEPFAR and MCC, and if African governments demonstrate greater commitment to good governance, economic freedom and citizen empowerment, they will be more motivated to do so. The responsibility for ensuring that African citizens continue to receive critical services delivered through U.S. foreign assistance ultimately rests with African governments themselves, notably, their willingness to step up budgetary support to similar African-groomed programs.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Brandon Routman

Image Source: © Antony Njuguna / Reuters

Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2013

Tue, 18 Dec 2012 12:14:00 -0500

Africa starts 2013 with hope and optimism. Africa has dropped its mantle as a “doomed continent” and has weathered several global economic crises fairly well. Today, the continent is a land of opportunity both for Africans and international investors. Many now see the region as “emerging Africa” because of the positive changes that have taken place and continue to take place across the continent.

Africa has changed, moving from economic stagnation to above 5 percent GDP growth on average. The continent is now home to some of the fastest growing economies in the world: Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania. This growth has helped build a burgeoning middle class, which has created new markets for goods and services. Investors focused on tapping into these new markets in Africa are likely to find it easier to do business there than ever before as African governments are working to reduce transaction costs. In addition to growing consumer markets, African countries have discovered additional natural resources. If managed properly, these resources could help spur further economic growth and development for the region and improve the lives of millions.

Such an optimistic outlook for the continent means that African and global policymakers must get ahead of the challenges and opportunities for an important year of decision-making. Since 2010, the Brookings Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) has asked its scholars to assess the top priorities for Africa in the coming year. This year, AGI experts and colleagues have identified what they consider to be the key issues for 2013 and ways to leverage opportunities so that Africa can continue its “emerging” momentum. The following briefs in the Foresight Africa collection are meant to create a dialogue on what matters in Africa for 2013, and it is our hope that this dialogue will continue through the year.

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China's New Leadership and Sino-Africa Relations

Julius Agbor, Yun Sun and Jessica Smith — Tue, 18 Dec 2012 16:52:00 -0500

Editor's Note: This chapter is part of the 2013 Foresight Africa full report, which details the top priorities for Africa in the coming year. Read the full report here.

Recent senior leadership changes in the Chinese government have Africa experts wondering what impacts these changes will have on China-Africa relations. Yun Sun, Julius Agbor and Jessica Smith expect that China’s strategies in Africa may not change dramatically in 2013; however, African governments may have an evolving view of China’s sometimes unequal partnership.

Many Africans hope China’s new leaders will shift China’s priority from short-term resource exploitation to a more long-term sustainable development model. At the same time, albeit in small numbers, some African politicians and civil society organizations have begun to be more vocal in their opposition to China’s resource-centric approach toward the continent.

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Julius Agbor
Yun Sun
Jessica Smith

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The Future of the CEMAC CFA Franc

Julius Agbor — Tue, 11 Dec 2012 11:55:00 -0500

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A total of 80 currency boards have come into existence at some point since the mid-19th century, but to date only about 15 of them still exist, among which is the CFA franc monetary zone. The future sustainability of the CFA franc zone, to which the CEMAC CFA franc belongs, is increasingly questioned in the light of increasing asymmetries in exposure to external shocks, differential speeds of adjustment of the real exchange rate following shocks, differential impacts in economic fundamentals, and low levels of intra-regional trade and financial flows between CEMAC and WAEMU. For the CEMAC bloc of countries in particular, the future sustainability of the fixed exchange regime depends crucially on continued oil exports, which currently represent about 90 percent of export revenues and 40 percent of GDP. Should oil reserves deplete in the near future or oil prices decline significantly, a substantial source of foreign reserves would be lost, thereby exposing the regime to collapse. Even without resource depletion, continued volatility in global financial markets is increasing the risks of collapse of the fixed exchange regime as oil and commodity price swings ignite currency speculation as well as render reserves much more volatile. Against this backdrop, the present study examines the stakes facing the CEMAC CFA franc, discusses the exit options from the currency board and makes recommendations towards a sustainable monetary policy framework for CEMAC countries going forward. The analysis points to the imperative of pursuing a full monetary union with a single CEMAC franc pegged to the U.S. dollar and further suggests that, like the experience of the eurozone, the CEMAC monetary arrangement can be best implemented only by complying with the principle of political union.

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Julius Agbor

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The Problem of Political Transitions in Africa: The Cameroon Question

Julius Agbor and John Mukum Mbaku — Tue, 09 Oct 2012 10:45:00 -0400

Political transitions in francophone sub-Saharan Africa have consistently been problematic due in part to the fact that incumbent heads of state have been obsessed with retaining political power for life. For example, Omar Bongo (Gabon), Félix Houphouët Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire), Gnasssingbé Eyadéma (Togo) and Lansana Conté (Guinea) remained presidents of their respective countries until they died in office. Except in Gabon, where the death of President Bongo resulted in a peaceful transfer of power to his son, transitions in the other countries were accompanied by a significant level of political violence.

For example, in Togo, just hours after the death of President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, the military violated the constitutional provision requiring the Speaker of the Togolese National Assembly to take over power in the event of a vacancy in the presidency by appointing the late president’s son, Faure Gnassingbé, interim president. Faure later contested and won a highly controversial election later that year. An even more destabilizing scenario occurred in Guinea following the death of President Lansana Conté in 2008. Just a few hours after the announcement of the death of the president, the young soldier Moussa Camara seized power, dissolved the government, and suspended the constitution and all republican institutions. Guinea then plunged into deep political chaos for almost two years until the 2011 democratic elections.

Will Cameroon [1] be able to avoid the violent and contested transitions of these countries if current President Paul Biya, age 79 and in power since 1982, dies in office? In spite of his various public pronouncements that he would democratize Cameroon’s politics, Biya has twice (in 1996 and 2008) manipulated the constitution to allow him to prolong his term in office. Also, although Cameroon officially became a multiparty state in 1992, under Biya’s leadership the country has not conducted a presidential election in which the opposition has had a fair chance of defeating the incumbent. While the opposition bears some blame for its ineffectiveness, there is no question that Biya has used the power of incumbency as well as his control of various institutions such as the national media, the Supreme Court and the National Assembly to ensure his success at the polls. Thus, many observers believe that political transition in Cameroon is likely to result only when Biya dies or is removed from office by a military coup d’état. Each of these options, unfortunately, has extremely destabilizing consequences for Cameroon and the sub-region.

Given Cameroon’s current institutional arrangements, two major concerns regarding presidential succession exist. One of these concerns is legal and the other political. On the legal front, the Cameroon 2008 Constitution has a number of ambiguous provisions that could easily be exploited by opportunistic military officers. Take, for example, Article 6(4), which states, “Where the office of President of the Republic becomes vacant as a result of death, resignation or permanent incapacity duly ascertained by the Constitutional Council, the President of the Senate assumes function as interim president for a period not less than 20 (twenty) days and not more than 40 (forty) days, during which fresh presidential elections will be held, at which the interim president is not eligible to run.”

The problem here is that Cameroon has neither a Constitutional Council nor a Senate despite the fact that Article 6(4) has existed since 1996.

Later articles attempt to fill these voids: Article 67(3) stipulates, “[t]he National Assembly shall exercise full legislative power and enjoy all Parliamentary prerogatives until the Senate is set up,” while Article 67(4) states, “[t]he Supreme Court shall perform the duties of the Constitutional Council until the latter is set up.”

Yet, the nonexistence of the Senate and Constitutional Council does not play well for a country whose institutions lack legitimacy and where ethno-linguistic and regional tensions are rife. The distrust that the Cameroonian public has for the Supreme Court and the National Assembly increased significantly when the former failed to annul a glaringly flawed presidential vote in October 1992 and when the latter hastily amended the constitution in 2008 to allow Paul Biya to run for a third consecutive term as president. These concerns about the legitimacy of political institutions in Cameroon could encourage opportunistic military officers to declare a constitutional crisis in the event of a vacancy in the presidency and seize power. Such action could plunge the country into prolonged political violence as happened in Guinea.

On the other hand, the present latent struggles for capture of the presidency of Cameroon, notably between the Muslim-dominated North and the Christian-dominated South, coupled with secessionist threats by the minority English-speaking Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), which has been clamoring for independence from the rest of French-speaking Cameroon, add complexity to an already thorny political transition process.

The political transition process in Cameroon is further complicated by the absence of a validated country-wide electoral register. Following the controversial presidential elections of October 2011, the Cameroon government embarked on a reform of the electoral system, notably by dissolving the then-existing electoral register and replacing it with a biometric system. Yet Elections Cameroon (ELECAM)—the organ in charge of organizing elections in the country—recently claimed that it will take a minimum of one year to finalize the new biometric system for elections, which is why the tenure of legislators and municipal councilors scheduled to end in 2011 has been extended until late 2013. Given the current state of affairs, in the event of a vacancy in the presidency, and even if there is a peaceful transition to an interim president, Cameroon will face political crisis as a result of its inability to hold national elections within the short window stipulated by the constitution.

In many respects, political transition in Cameroon is too important to be allowed to go wrong given the wide-ranging implications that this transition might have for the entire Central Africa sub-region. First, Cameroon plays host to the central bank of the countries of the Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CEMAC). Second, Cameroon is a major exporter of food and energy to several neighboring countries, notably Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Central African Republic and Nigeria, which means that a political and eventual economic crisis in Cameroon would negatively impact these countries. Similarly, the Cameroonian port of Douala is the largest in the sub-region and serves Cameroon’s two resource-rich but land-locked neighbors, Central African Republic and Chad. Third, the war against terrorism and insecurity related to growing Islamic fundamentalism across central Africa would be much more difficult to manage if one of the few remaining politically stable countries in the region—Cameroon—also descends into political violence. It is important then, for the African Union and other global actors to take an interest in Cameroon’s transition and make certain that the process is undertaken democratically and peacefully.

To diffuse any eventual constitutional and political crisis in Cameroon, the Cameroon people should demand, first, that the government immediately provide the two institutions prescribed by the Constitution—the Senate and the Constitutional Council. In this light, the recent amendment of the constitution making it possible for senatorial elections to be held even without a complete country-wide electoral register is welcome. Second, the Cameroon people should intensify their demands for institutional reforms to provide the country with credible democratic institutions, namely, a truly independent electoral body and a constitution that effectively guarantees the rule of law and separation of powers. Such an institutional structure will ensure a peaceful transition and provide for the type of political stability that is critical for trade and economic growth not just in Cameroon but also in the sub-region. France and the United Kingdom—Cameroon’s historical and traditional benefactors—and the United Nations, should support the efforts of Cameroonians to force their government to effect the necessary reforms.

[1] Note that the polity that is Cameroon today is not strictly a francophone country. Today’s Cameroon is made up of the former UN Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration which gained independence on January 1, 1960 and took the name République du Cameroun (Republic of Cameroon) and the former UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British administration which gained independence in 1961. Although the country’s present governance institutions are influenced significantly by the French constitutional model, which the République du Cameroun adopted when it gained independence in 1960, the country’s British institutional heritage remains strong and quite relevant.

Authors

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Poverty, Inequality and Africa’s Education Crisis

Julius Agbor — Wed, 26 Sep 2012 16:29:00 -0400

The Africa Learning Barometer, a new interactive produced by our colleagues at the Brookings Center for Universal Education, indicates that only about half of sub-Saharan Africa’s 128 million school-aged children currently attending school are likely to acquire the basic skills needed for them to live healthy and productive lives. The center’s research further suggests that if you are a poor, female child currently attending school in a rural region you are far more likely to not be learning the critical skills, such as reading, writing and math. While these gender, income and regional learning gaps exist in most sub-Saharan African countries, they are most salient in South Africa, Uganda, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Botswana.

Taking aside the legacy of colonialism and racial and ethnic inequalities in some of these countries, a number of other factors explain the continuing disparities in learning between rural and urban schoolchildren in sub-Saharan Africa. Considering the significance of rural poverty across the continent, it should come as no surprise that rural schoolchildren are the most disadvantaged from a socioeconomic perspective when it comes to access to a quality education. Rural schools generally have less qualified teachers and not enough teachers for the number of children enrolled in school. This is clearly evident in the low teachers-per-school ratios and teacher-to-pupil ratios in most rural African regions. The reasons for these low numbers in rural Africa are many and very much linked to poverty and other inequalities and socioeconomic conditions. For example, teachers generally prefer urban to rural schools because urban areas offer greater opportunities and higher incomes. There is also a better quality of life in urban areas, with better access to good infrastructure, other services (such as healthcare) and general public goods.

In contrast, rural areas in Africa are often characterized by poor or nonexistent infrastructure and little or no provisions for other critical social services. This in turn negatively impacts the quality of education for rural-area children since even getting to school is a more difficult challenge and illness of a pupil or a family member may force the pupil to drop out of school entirely. Students in rural regions of Africa are further disadvantaged by the fact that their parents are generally uneducated. Again, we see that other socioeconomic conditions and inequalities greatly impact the quality of education in rural areas compared to urban centers.

To address Africa’s education crisis, African governments must implement policies that reduce poverty in rural areas, such as improving infrastructure, health and sanitation conditions, and modernizing the agricultural sector. While urbanization is certainly good for Africa’s industrialization and economic growth, a synergy between rural and urban development needs to be maintained if the quality of education in rural Africa is to be improved. African governments can also provide incentives, such as an additional bonus for teachers who accept positions to teach in rural schools. For their part, Africa’s development partners could support initiatives and programs that specifically target rural schools in order to help improve learning outcomes in those areas.

The continent’s education crisis is serious and it adversely affects rural areas more than urban ones. African governments and their development partners should not underestimate the long-term consequences of continued poverty and socioeconomic inequalities in rural areas. These conditions will only continue to exacerbate the education and learning gaps between rural and urban African schoolchildren. And in turn, poor quality education in rural areas will only continue to perpetuate long-term poverty in the region. It is a vicious cycle that African countries and international donors must work together to solve.

Authors

Julius Agbor

Image Source: © Noor Khamis / Reuters

One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

On July 9, 2012, South Sudan will celebrate its first anniversary as an independent and sovereign state. The January 2011 referendum effectively ended the prolonged, violent confrontation between the Republic of Sudan and the territories that would ultimately gain independence as South Sudan. This development marked an important stage in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In addition to regulating relations between the two feuding parties from 2005 to 2011, the CPA also implemented the framework for the creation of two separate nations. Despite the success of the CPA in guiding South Sudan’s path to independence, the young nation must now address a myriad of challenges related to its domestic policies as well as continued hostilities with the Republic of Sudan.

As international observers applauded the CPA’s success, the people of South Sudan also celebrated the birth of their nation with high expectations. Independence brought with it hope for a better future and the opportunity to build a united developmental state. Revenue from valuable oil resources, which were a primary source of the conflict between the two nations, gave South Sudan the opportunity to invest in the development of its natural and human resources. Additionally, formal separation was expected to end the long-standing conflict with the Republic of Sudan. However, these expectations were tempered by the many restraints that came with establishing conditions for sustained economic growth and improving the delivery of public goods and services.

After many years of brutal civil war, South Sudan emerged with extremely poor infrastructure and a population with limited human capital. More importantly, the country was born with weak institutions that were not suited to the delivery of sustainable economic growth and development. Finally, while the people of South Sudan were largely united in the war against Khartoum, the country is to a large degree ethnically fragmented, with each group seeking to maximize its own objectives—a process that has significantly weakened the ability of the government to work toward national integration.

South Sudan’s first year of independence has been fraught with major challenges, like the continuing struggle with the Republic of Sudan over their common border. These conflicts have become top priorities for the country, impeding the ability of the government to concentrate on economic growth and human development.

The Africa Growth Initiative (AGI) at the Brookings Institution has been following developments in South Sudan in order to offer independent policy proposals that can translate into sustainable economic growth and development, effective delivery of public services, and the building of institutions for a united and peaceful nation. This collection of policy briefs seeks to highlight some of the important issues that have affected South Sudan during the country’s first year of independence and identify policy areas that both South Sudan and the international community must emphasize in order to enhance the nation’s ability to achieve peace, economic growth and human development. It is important to note that many of the policy recommendations offered by the various briefs are similar even though each brief was based on independent analysis. This is due primarily to the fact that many of the issues faced by South Sudan lend themselves to similar solutions.

Managing Ethnic Diversity

Fri, 22 Jun 2012 11:42:00 -0400

Julius Agbor and Olumide Taiwo provide insight into how South Sudan can deal with violent ethnic mobilization by focusing on the need to strengthen sub-national governments and provide a comprehensive process to define property rights. They argue for respect for traditional institutions (e.g., village or tribal councils) and encourage the government to engage all citizens in the construction of the country’s laws and institutions.

Publication: One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country

The Economic Challenges facing Malawi’s New President

Julius Agbor — Thu, 19 Apr 2012 17:20:00 -0400

Malawi’s third president, the late Bingu Wa Mutharika had a fairly successful first term in office from 2004-2009. During this period, Malawi’s economy grew at an average of 6.5 percent and average inflation remained below 12 percent, compared to about 2 percent growth and 35 percent inflation over the preceding decade. Additionally, exports as a percentage of GDP grew enabling Malawi to accumulate substantial foreign reserves, which helped minimize volatility in the country’s currency (the Kwacha). On the whole, Malawi increasingly became a net food exporter and significantly improved its infrastructure. To some degree, this good economic performance resulted from the positive relations the president cultivated with donors. For example, debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program with the World Bank/IMF in 2006 was concluded and a multi-million dollar exogenous shock facility (ESF) was extended by the IMF. Also, in December 2007, Malawi became eligible to receive financial support from the U.S. under the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) initiative.

Despite these gains, President Mutharika’s second term in office was very disappointing due to a series of economic flops and the general mal-governance of the country. Amongst the several economic woes were the rising cost of living, the acute shortage of fuel and power, and increased black market foreign exchange premiums. Until his death, and in contradiction to IMF advice, Mutharika resisted further nominal devaluation of the Kwacha, which had undergone a moderate depreciation between 2009 and 2011. Added to these economic malaises was the systematic violation of human rights, Mutharika’s increasingly autocratic leadership style and his fiercely antagonistic relationship with donors.

The challenge facing Malawi’s new interim president, Joyce Banda, is to find the right combination of policies that will put the country back on a path for sustainable growth. One such approach is to systematically undo the several “policy follies” of Mutharika’s second term. In particular, President Banda could pursue a more contractionary monetary policy given the current environment of high inflation. This would help mitigate further declines in foreign exchange reserves, although it would also come at the cost of lower output and employment in the short run. President Banda’s government will also need to downsize domestic public borrowing (a principal source of loss in foreign reserves), review current tax laws to alleviate its burden on the poor and progressively phase out exchange controls.

However, one should make no mistake, there are no quick fixes to the problems currently facing Malawi and an appraisal of the political economy of macroeconomic policies during Mutharika’s second term is vital to President Banda’s success. Malawi is a landlocked, agriculture-dependent economy that derives a significant portion of its foreign exchange from the export of tobacco. With steady foreign demand, Malawi’s reserve holdings were projected to grow from $137 million in 2009 to $521 million in 2011. However, due to the global financial crisis and continued eurozone instability, demand for Malawi’s tobacco plummeted by nearly 80 percent in the first quarter of 2011, resulting in a drastic decline in Malawi’s foreign exchange reserves.

Malawi, like other resource-poor sub-Saharan African economies, is heavily dependent on donor aid, which accounted for almost a third of government revenues over the past five years. However, since June 2011, Britain and the larger international donor community have suspended aid and other programs following concerns about poor governance. Notably, the IMF has suspended a $79 million aid facility because of the government’s failure to undertake crucial economic reforms including further devaluation of the Kwacha.

At the root of Malawi’s currency problems has been the systematic decline in foreign exchange reserves, which was caused by two main factors: increased domestic public borrowing and adverse external demand shocks. Either a reduction in public borrowing or an ESF loan from the IMF would have mitigated further decline in foreign reserves and stabilized the Kwacha, however Mutharika and the IMF disagreed on which approach to take. Mutharika insisted that an IMF loan was the best option while the IMF instead pointed to the need to reduce domestic public borrowing. Frustrated with his failure to obtain external financing to support the exchange rate, Mutharika resorted to capital controls to limit the drain on foreign reserves, which only amplified the currency misalignment. Faced with reduced budgetary resources, Mutharika’s government was left with few options other than to impose higher taxes on basic consumer goods such as milk and bread. The higher taxes led to increased cost of living, which in turn fueled uprising and feelings of general discontent with the government. As this standoff demonstrates, a sustainable solution to Malawi’s economic challenges rests not only with the Malawian government but also with the donor community. An important lesson for Malawi and other resource-poor, aid-dependent, small open economies is that healthy relations with donors affect the strategic choice and implementation of optimal economic policies.

Happily, President Banda seems to have correctly understood this message and has started easing Malawi’s tense relationship with donors. Over and above any potential donor assistance, Banda’s government must also implement the domestic policies outlined earlier; otherwise any action on the part of the international donor community will be futile. Similarly, the donor community and particularly the IMF/World Bank should make resources available for budgetary support and stabilization of the exchange rate to bolster the actions of the Malawian government. In the short run, further nominal devaluation of the Kwacha would be counterproductive especially as previous nominal depreciations have not been followed by a real depreciation and the country’s domestic debt is mostly denominated in foreign currency. One can only hope that joint action by the aid community and President Banda will turn Malawi’s economy around.

Authors

Julius Agbor

Around the Halls: 2012 Senegal Presidential Election

Fri, 10 Feb 2012 00:00:00 -0500

Later this month, Senegal will hold the most contentious presidential election since the introduction of a multi-party democratic system in the 1980s. Notwithstanding who wins, the election is bound to have far-reaching implications on the future of the nation. Senegal has long been held as an example of good leadership and stability in West Africa and in sub-Saharan Africa: It has escaped military rule and managed to have peaceful and democratic transition of power. Yet, the events leading to the 2012 election suggest that its record of democracy may be tainted if not completely negated. Scholars from AGI and its partner in Senegal, the Consortium for Social and Economic Research (Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale – CRES), discuss the forthcoming election.

What are the key issues and implications of Senegal's upcoming presidential election? Join the conversation on Twitter using the #AGISenegal hashtag and register for our February 16 event on Senegal's election, a turning point for democracy and economic growth.

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President Abdoulaye Wade’s Controversial Re-election Bid
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Research Assistant

A major contentious issue in Senegal has been whether it is constitutional for the incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade to run for office again. Wade has been a glowing example of a victorious former opposition figure who managed to peacefully obtain office from the then longstanding incumbent. However, his most recent re-election campaign has caused many of his admirers and supporters to doubt his commitment to democratic ideals. Popular opinion in the country – also widely held by the international community – appears to be that he should not run for another term.

President Wade came to power in 2000 after defeating incumbent, Abdou Diouf who held power from 1981 to 2000. Wade had been an opposition candidate in four presidential elections before he was finally elected in 2000. He was then re-elected in 2007 with 56 percent of the vote in a crowded field of 15 candidates. In 2001, during the beginning of his first term, the constitution was amended, which limited the presidents to two terms and reduced the length of each term from seven to five years. In 2009, he indicated that he would run again in 2012 as the amendments came into effect after he took office, but many consider such a move to be in contravention of the constitution. However, it was not official until January 27, a month before the scheduled election, when the Constitutional Council cleared Wade to run for a third term, a move that dismayed the electorate and triggered riots.

Recent public opinion surveys of likely Senegalese voters show declining support and trust of President Wade and his government:[1] in a 2008 survey, a majority of respondents felt that the president often or always “ignores the laws of the country.[2] Most telling was that 74 percent of respondents agreed or agreed very strongly that, “The Constitution should limit the president to serving a maximum of two terms in office.” Recently there have been concerns over Wade’s actions, which are seen as undermining democracy and weakening his political opponents, including his suggested appointment in the end of last year of two leading opposition figures, who are now running for the presidency, to ministerial positions and the arrest of a the rival socialist party youth leader. In the summer of 2011, Wade declared plans to change the constitution, lowering the required proportion of votes needed for a first round presidential election from 50 percent to 25 percent, a move likely intended to improve his chances of winning the election. These actions warrant concerns as to whether Wade will continue to erode the gains made in advancing democracy in Senegal if he wins another term.

What is at Stake in Regards to Senegal's External Relationships?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Witney Schneidman, President, Schneidman & Associates International, Special Guest, Africa Growth Initiative
Jessica Smith, Research Assistant

Several of Senegal’s key external relationships could be jeopardized if the elections scheduled for February 26 do not go well. In 2009, according to World Bank figures, Senegal’s net Official Development Assistance was nearly 8 percent of GDP. Last year when the government of Malawi reacted violently to public protests over an increase in food prices, the U.S., the UK and other donors suspended assistance due to an alleged deterioration in political freedoms and the death of at least 19 protestors.

Election observers from the EU, Senegal’s largest donor, have already arrived in the country and have expressed concerns about the transparency of the process used to determine the eligibility of candidates. The observers have also remarked on the use of force against opposition protestors.

U.S.-Senegal relations have been “excellent” over the past several years, but Washington has voiced apprehension about backsliding on government transparency. Two weeks ago, in reference to the upcoming elections, State Department Spokesperson, Victoria Nuland said “the [statesmanlike] thing to do would be to cede to the next generation, and we think that would be better.” This was echoed by Deputy Secretary of State Chris Burns at the African Union summit and a letter to Wade from the U.S. Senate subcommittee on Africa.

The U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation compact to Senegal requires countries to uphold political freedom performance indicators. Thus, it may be the first assistance to be suspended if there is a drop in the current level of democracy. Trade relationships, including membership in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and broader assistance are at stake if the election results in a reduction of political liberties for the Senegalese public.

The Economic Community of West African States has also sent election observers to Senegal. One of the observers, Ambassador Bassir from Sierra Leone, said, “whatever affects Senegal negatively, will no doubt spill over in the sub region and that a lot rest[s]on ECOWAS to ensure that the government, actors and the citizenry as a whole, take the necessary measures to prevent any such ugly situation.”

The Youth Vote in Senegal
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Abdoulaye Diagne, Consortium of Economic and Social Research
Jessica Smith, Research Assistant

According to the World Bank, Senegal has started to recover from the global economic slowdown that started in 2009; however, the aftermath of the crisis on the current macroeconomic conditions continue to put strain on the youth population. Senegal’s energy sector has performed poorly and tourism and remittances have begun to suffer from the eurozone crisis, keeping the West African nation below the expected 4.6 percent average sub-Saharan growth rate. Senegal, once a leader in the region in terms of economic performance, is falling behind other top performers, such as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Mozambique. Small gains in growth for Senegal are not translating into improved employment opportunities for young people.

The youth population (ages 15-24) is feeling the brunt of these adverse economic conditions. The Consortium of Economic and Social Research (CRES) in Dakar indicates that youth are blocked from many employment opportunities due to a policy of increasing the retirement age and a hiring freeze in the public sector. Additionally, sectors driving growth have intensive capital requirements, such as information and communications technology (ITC) and infrastructure and youth often have difficulty gaining access to start-up capital and credit to participate in these needed markets. Thus, young people are pushed toward working in the informal sector, migrating out of Senegal, or participating in illegal activities. In response, young Senegalese have created a movement called “Y’en a marre”, or enough is enough, to express their frustrations with the economic situation, lack of amenities, government corruption and the rise in food and fuel prices. Youth effectively protested Wade’s first attempt at constitutional tampering last year, and have already begun to protest the announcement of Wade as an official candidate via the youth dominated group “Movement of the 23rd” or M23.

If Wade is re-elected, frustrated youth might see current economic conditions as cause for large scale revolt. What is particularly disturbing is that neither the outgoing government nor a new government stemming from the opposition seems well equipped to face massive youth unemployment. The recently adopted Social and Economic Document of Policy 2012-2015, which succeeds the Strategic Documents for the Reduction of Poverty (DSRP) of the 2000s, dedicates only minor support to the unemployment issue. Even though the opposition parties denounce youth unemployment, they have not proposed concrete solutions to reduce it significantly.

Senegal’s Electoral Institutions and Prospects for Democracy
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Research Assistant

Holding elections does not necessarily strengthen democracy if the electoral processes are weak and subject to manipulation by the executive or any other branch of government, or allows the government to favor one candidate or party. Recent protests following the ruling of the Constitutional Council concerning the eligibility of the incumbent president to seek re-election for a third term reflects poorly designed electoral institutions that are likely to weaken democracy.

Besides the Constitutional Council, other electoral institutions in Senegal include the Ministry of the Interior and the Autonomous National Electoral Commission (or La Commission électorale nationale autonome – CENA). The Constitutional Council is made up of five judges appointed by the president and has the final say on matters relating to the constitution – including determining eligibility for the presidency, confirming the announcement of the CENA, and ruling on challenges related to the elections. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of the election logistics and CENA is supposed to provide autonomous oversight for the electoral process. Both the Constitutional Council and the Interior Ministry are heavily influenced by the executive. CENA is somewhat influenced by the executive as the president confirms its members, but they are initially nominated by independent sources for their integrity and unbiased opinions. Technically the CENA was established by a law so its existence is less permanent and continues at the “discretion of the legislature,”[3] and as mentioned, it still ultimately reports its results to the Constitutional Council for confirmation.

Following his re-election in 2007, Wade appointed an entirely new Constitutional Council in 2008 raising suspicion that it was to ensure his eligibility for a third term. The recent ruling on Wade’s eligibility to contest another presidential term seems to confirm those suspicions. Evidently, the executive has a firm control or influence over the functioning of the electoral institutions, making them inadequate to further democracy. Truly independent electoral institutions are a requirement for smooth and democratic transitions of government. A post-election priority should therefore be reforming the electoral institutions.

What Might Influence Electoral Choices in Senegal?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Director, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia Lewis, Research Assistant

To a large extent, voting in sub-Saharan African countries tends to be influenced by the primary loci of identification: ethnicity, religion or region. Simply, identity politics often dominate issue politics, like the state of the economy. In the past, voting in Senegal has not been primarily on the basis of identity. AfroBarometer data confirms the viewpoint that generally voters’ ethnic identity is not the leading determinant of voting and research indicates that, “Senegal is a country in which ethnicity plays little or no role in politics.[4]” Religion is seen as something that unites the electorate, with around 94 percent of the population identifying as Muslim. The Islamic brotherhoods in the country are seen as transcending ethnic divisions [5] and political leaders, similarly, have support from multiple Islamic brotherhoods or sects. However, the upcoming election could reveal some clear voting patterns along specific identities and issues. As shown in a companion piece, there is the possibility of candidates instigating divisions based on ethnicity and religious sect for lack of more relevant differences in the presidential contestant agendas.

In the upcoming election, rural-urban voting patterns may also emerge. Senegal’s population is divided almost evenly between urban and rural areas. Perceptions of the economy also vary based on region. Rural voters surveyed have a slightly less favorable view of the economy with around 10 percent more people indicating that the current state is “bad” or “fairly bad” than those surveyed in urban areas. Additionally, almost half of rural residents state that their living conditions are worse or much worse than the rest of the Senegalese population, versus 21 percent in urban areas. These differences in perceptions of well-being could influence voting patterns--opposition candidates may do better in rural areas if they have a convincing message of change.

Another voting pattern that may emerge is that of the Senegalese Diaspora. As of 2000, there were 15 different countries where Senegalese could vote externally. A 2007 study indicates that external voters account for between 4 and 5 percent of the total vote in Senegalese elections. In 2000, the majority of external voters continued to support the incumbent, Abdou Diouf, and could have had significant influence if the second round had been a close runoff. In a close election, the Diaspora vote could indeed be pivotal.

Finally, younger voters have been more opposed to Wade’s re-election bid. They are more likely to vote for opposition as persistent problems of youth unemployment plague the country and the current government lacks a plan for addressing the situation.

Senegal’s 2012 Election: Towards a Replay of Ivory Coast?
Julius Agbor, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

Although Senegal’s election differs from the Ivory Coast in that there is no armed rebel opposition involved in the election or a North (Muslim) vs. South (Christian) regional divide, the circumstances surrounding this election points very much towards an Ivorian post-election scenario. A companion piece by Mwangi Kimenyi and Zenia Lewis discusses the structural problems created by the lack of independence of the electoral institutions in Senegal. Perhaps a more subtle problem is the potential for post-election conflict in Senegal similar to the Ivory Coast during 2010-2011, which stemmed from the ambiguities arising from the overlapping jurisdictions of the various electoral bodies.

These conflicting jurisdictions in Senegal could trigger confusion with the potential for post-election violence. In the Ivory Coast, although the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) was in charge of the organization and supervision of the elections, it could only publish tentative results that were subject to the approval of the Constitutional Council – which also handled all disputes resulting from the electoral process. The confusion then resulted from significant disparities between the figures earlier announced by the Electoral Commission and those officially proclaimed by the Constitutional Council. In Senegal, this is also likely to happen in event that the official results proclaimed by the Constitutional Council contrast with those reported by the (supposedly) Autonomous National Electoral Commission (CENA). This could especially incite violence due to the widened rift of trust between Senegalese people and Senegal’s political institutions following the controversial ruling in favor of the candidacy of incumbent President Wade by the Constitutional Council. The cases of Senegal and Ivory Coast point to general weaknesses in electoral systems and institutions in former French colonies. Going forward, there is need for these and many other African countries to invest in building electoral institutions that are clear of jurisdictional overlapping and at the same time independent of any branch of government. Unless such an unambiguous electoral framework is built, elections will not serve to entrench democracy but may instead trigger chaos as seen in Ivory Coast.

Neglect of African Indigenous Institutions and the Fragility of Senegalese Democracy
Olumide Taiwo, Africa Research Fellow
Anne W. Kamau, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

The decision by President Wade to seek a third term in office remains the most contentious issue in the Senegalese elections and one that is likely to trigger a post-election crisis.

It is now a pattern that African countries appear to be stable democracies for a while and slide into constitutional crisis thereafter and most of the crises are associated with tenure elongation ambitions of incumbent presidents. Senegal is unlike other African countries where elections are contests between ethnic groups for state resources. The unifying force of the Senegalese Islamic brotherhood has served to mitigate ethnic divisions, [6] which is particularly important since over 90 percent of the population is Muslim. The Senegalese constitution also allows for a strong central government, and President Wade has taken numerous steps to even make the presidency stronger. This consolidation of power at the center is antithetical to ethnic diversity and is the undoing of many democracy projects in African countries. Moreover, such centralization of power is beginning to take its toll on Senegal. There are indications that opposition candidates and President Wade are beginning to appeal to ethnic groups and specific segments of Islamic organizations for support. With this, Senegal may follow many African countries that are mired in ethnic or religious competition.

Successful and stable democracies in Africa have reformed constitutions and redesigned governance institutions to reflect indigenous collective choice apparatuses. These involve extensive decentralization and devolution of power and recognition of the role of tribal chiefs in the governance process. For example, Botswana – cited as the most stable democracy in Africa – is organized into a federation of autonomous tribes ruled by tribal chiefs, who are also permanent members of the House of Chiefs, which plays an advisory and oversight role in government. Similarly, the Ghanaian constitution created the House of Chiefs at every level of government and empowers the chiefs to play their traditional roles and pursue the interests of their constituents. These arrangements guarantee substantial degrees of autonomy and self governance to the tribal groups and a relatively weak central government. Countries where the center remains powerful may initially appear stable, but such stabilities will always be short-lived.

The Senegalese constitution, like most African constitutions, is far removed from the history of the indigenous people. Simply inheriting a constitution and amending it will only increase the level of animosity and instability. Instead, Senegal needs to rework its constitutions in ways that decentralize power and incorporate its indigenous people in the governance process.

Footnotes

[1] AfroBarometer Report

[2] 53 percent of respondents thought that the president often or always “ignores the laws of the country.” (36 percent stating often, and 17 percent stating always, while 25 percent said never/rarely and 25 percent said they didn’t know)

[3] Senegal: Election Management Bodies in West Africa, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_EMB_Ch6_Senegal_EN.pdf

[4] Kris Inman and Josephine T. Andrews, 2009. “Corruption and Political Participation in Africa: Evidence from Survey and Experimental Research.”

[5] Dennis Galvan, 2001. “Democracy without Ethnic Conflict: Embedded Parties, Transcendent Social Capital & Non-violent Pluralism in Senegal and Indonesia.”

[6] The Casamance region lying to the south of the Gambia river is excluded from this description.

Dans les couloirs : L'élection présidentielle 2012

Ce mois-ci, le Sénégal va procéder à l'élection présidentielle la plus litigieuse depuis l'introduction d'un système démocratique à plusieurs partis dans les années 80. Quelque soit le gagnant, l'élection aura certainement des conséquences à long terme sur l'avenir du pays. Depuis longtemps, le Sénégal donne l'exemple d'un pays stable et bien gouverné en Afrique de l'Ouest et en Afrique subsaharienne : il a échappé au régime militaire et a réussi la transition pacifique et démocratique du pouvoir. Pourtant, les événements qui ont abouti à l’élection 2012 suggèrent que sa réputation en tant que pays démocratique n’est pas vraiment méritée et peut même se révéler entièrement incorrecte. Les experts universitaires de MGA et de son partenaire au Sénégal, (le Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale – CRES), parlent des prochaines élections.

Quels sont les enjeux et les implications de la prochaine élection présidentielle du Sénégal? Rejoignez la conversation sur Twitter en utilisant #AGISenegal hashtag et inscrivez-vous à notre rencontre du 16 février sur l'élection sénégalaise, tournant historique pour la croissance démocratique et économique.

Réélection controversée du président Abdoulaye Wade
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Assistante de recherche

L'une des questions les plus importante au Sénégal est de savoir s'il est constitutionnel pour le Président Abdoulaye Wade de se représenter. Wade représente le bon exemple d'un ancien membre de l'opposition qui a gagné l'élection et a réussi une transition pacifique en remplaçant un président sortant qui était là depuis fort longtemps. Cependant, au cours de sa plus récente campagne électorale, plusieurs de ses admirateurs et partisans ont pu douter de son engagement en faveur des idéaux démocratiques. D'après l'opinion publique dans le pays – partagée également en grande mesure par la communauté internationale, il ne devrait pas briguer un autre mandat.

Le Président Wade fut élu en 2000 après avoir battu le président sortant, Abdou Diouf, qui avait gouverné de 1981 à 2000. Wade avait été candidat de l'opposition pendant quatre élections présidentielles avant d'être finalement élu en 2000. Il fut ensuite réélu en 2007 avec 56 % des voix dans une arène encombrée, comprenant 15 candidats. En 2001, au début de son premier mandat, la constitution fut modifiée, limitant les présidents à deux mandats et réduisant la durée de chaque mandat de sept à cinq ans. En 2009, il signala qu'il pourrait se représenter en 2012 du fait que les modifications n’étaient entrées en vigueur qu’après sa prise de fonctions, mais beaucoup considèrent que cette démarche violerait la constitution. Ce ne fut toutefois que le 27 janvier, un mois avant l'élection, que le Conseil constitutionnel autorisa Wade à se représenter pour un troisième mandat, ce qui consterna l'électorat et engendra des émeutes.

Des sondages récents d'électeurs sénégalais montrent une diminution du soutien et de la confiance du président Wade et de son gouvernement :[7] Dans un sondage datant de 2008, la majorité des personnes interrogées ont indiqué qu'à leur avis, le président « ignore souvent ou toujours les lois du pays. [8] En outre, 74 % des personnes interrogées ont convenu et certaines ont même vivement affirmé que « la Constitution doit limiter le président à deux mandats au maximum. » Récemment, on a exprimé des inquiétudes au sujet de certaines actions de Wade, ayant pour résultat de saper la démocratie et d’affaiblir ses opposants, notamment sa suggestion en fin d’année dernière de nommer deux personnes importantes de l’opposition (actuellement candidats à la présidence), à des postes ministériels et l’arrestation d’un jeune leader socialiste du parti opposant. Au cours de l'été 2011, Wade a indiqué son intention de modifier la constitution, diminuant la proportion de voix nécessaires pour un premier tour des élections de 50 à 25 pour cent, geste sans doute calculé pour améliorer ses chances de remporter les élections. Ces actions soulèvent des inquiétudes quant à la question de savoir si Wade continuera à saper les progrès de la démocratie au Sénégal s'il remporte un autre mandat.

Qu’est-ce qui est en jeu à l'égard des relations extérieures du Sénégal ?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Witney Schneidman, Présidente, Schneidman et Associates International, invitée spéciale, Africa Growth Initiative
Jessica Smith, Assistante de recherche

Plusieurs des relations externes clés du Sénégal pourraient être compromises si les élections prévues pour le 26 février ne se déroulaient pas bien. En 2009, selon les chiffres de la Banque mondiale, le pourcentage net de l'aide au développement officiel du Sénégal était proche de 8% du PIB. L'année dernière, lorsque le gouvernement du Malawi a réagi violemment à des protestations publiques dues à une augmentation des prix de l'alimentation, les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et d'autres donateurs ont suspendu leurs aide, en déclarant que les libertés politiques s'étaient détériorées et qu’au moins 19 manifestants avaient été tués.

Des observateurs de l'UE, le plus grand donateur du Sénégal, sont déjà arrivés dans le pays et ont exprimé des préoccupations sur la transparence de la démarche employée pour déterminer l'admissibilité des candidats. Les observateurs ont également observé l'emploi de la force contre les manifestants de l'opposition.

Les relations entre les Etats-Unis et le Sénégal sont « excellentes » depuis plusieurs années, mais Washington a exprimé des appréhensions à propos d’un recul de la transparence du gouvernement. II y a deux semaines, au sujet des élections à venir, le porte-parole du Département d'Etat, Victoria Nuland, a déclaré « qu'il serait sage de faire place à la nouvelle génération, et nous pensons que ce serait mieux. » Cela a été repris par le Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint Chris Burns lors du sommet de l'Union africaine et dans une lettre adressée à Wade par le sous-comité sénatorial des Etats-Unis sur l'Afrique.

Le U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation compact pour le Sénégal exige que les pays respectent les indicateurs de performance en matière de liberté politique. C'est pourquoi c'est probablement la première aide à disparaître en cas de baisse du niveau de la démocratie. Les relations commerciales, y compris l'appartenance à l'African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) et l'augmentation de l'aide sont en jeu si l'élection entraîne une réduction des libertés politiques du public sénégalais.

La Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest a également envoyé des observateurs au Sénégal. L'un des observateurs, l'ambassadeur Bassir du Sierra Leone, a déclaré : « tout ce qui a des répercussions négatives sur le Sénégal s'étend aussi par contagion vers le Sud et la CEDEAO détient une grande responsabilité pour s'assurer que le gouvernement, les acteurs et les citoyens dans leur ensemble, prennent les mesures nécessaires pour éviter ce genre de situation. »

Le vote des jeunes au Sénégal
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Abdoulaye Diagne, Consortium de la recherche économique et sociale
Jessica Smith, Assistante de recherche

Selon la Banque mondiale, le Sénégal a commencé à se remettre du ralentissement économique qui a débuté en 2009. Toutefois, les conséquences de la crise sur les conditions macroéconomiques actuelles continuent à mettre la pression sur la population des jeunes. Le secteur de l'énergie au Sénégal se porte mal; quant au tourisme et aux envois de fonds, ils ont commencé à subir les conséquences de la crise dans la zone euro. Tout cela a fait baisser la moyenne du taux de croissance des pays en-dessous de la moyenne subsaharienne prévue de 4,6 %. Le Sénégal, auparavant en tête de la région en matière de performance économique, se classe maintenant derrière d'autres acteurs très performants comme l'Ethiopie, le Nigeria et le Mozambique. Les petits gains de croissance au Sénégal ne se traduisent pas par des améliorations d'emplois pour les jeunes.

La population des jeunes (de 15 à 24 ans) est la plus touchée par ces conditions économiques défavorables. Le Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale (CRES) de Dakar indique que de nombreux emplois ne sont pas accessibles aux jeunes en raison d'une politique d'augmentation de l'âge de la retraite et d'un arrêt de l'embauche dans le secteur public. En outre, les secteurs en croissance comme ceux de la technologie de l'information et des communications (ITC), ont de grandes exigences de capitaux et d'infrastructure et les jeunes ont souvent du mal à obtenir l'accès au capital de démarrage et les crédits nécessaires pour participer à ces secteurs. De ce fait, les jeunes sont forcés de se tourner vers les secteurs non officiels, d'émigrer ou de participer à des activités illégales. En réaction à ces difficultés, des jeunes sénégalais ont créé un mouvement désigné « Y'en a marre », afin d'exprimer leurs frustrations face à cette situation économique, du manque d'infrastructures, de la corruption du gouvernement et de l’augmentation des prix de l’alimentation et de l'essence. Les jeunes avaient protesté contre la première tentative de manipulation de la constitution par Wade l'an dernier ; ils ont déjà commencé à protester contre l'annonce de la candidature officielle de Wade par le biais du mouvement « Mouvement du 23 juin » ou M23, dominé par les jeunes.

Si Wade est réélu, la frustration des jeunes pourrait s’exprimer par une révolte à grande échelle. Ce qui est surtout inquiétant, c'est que ni le gouvernement sortant ni un nouveau gouvernement d'opposition ne semblent en mesure de gérer l’énorme taux de chômage parmi les jeunes. Le nouveau document de politique économique et sociale (2012-2015) qui succède aux documents stratégiques pour la réduction de la pauvreté (DSRP) des années 2000, ne consacre qu'un soutien mineur à l’enjeu du chômage. Bien que les partis d’opposition dénoncent le chômage des jeunes, ils n’ont pas proposé de solutions concrètes pour le réduire de façon efficace.

Les institutions électorales sénégalaises et les perspectives démocratiques
Mwangi Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia A. Lewis, Assistante de recherche

Le fait de tenir des élections ne renforce pas nécessairement la démocratie si le processus électoral est faible et soumis à des manipulations de l'exécutif, ou de toute autre branche du gouvernement ou s'il est permis au gouvernement de favoriser un candidat ou un parti. Les protestations récentes à la suite de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel, concernant l'admissibilité du président sortant à se faire réélire pour un troisième mandat, reflètent des institutions électorales mal conçues, et il est probable que la démocratie en sera affaiblie.

Hormis le Conseil électoral, les autres institutions à ce sujet incluent le Ministère de l'intérieur et la Commission électorale nationale autonome, (la CENA). Le Conseil constitutionnel se compose de cinq juges nommés par le président et celui-ci a le dernier mot en matière de constitution, y compris la détermination de l'admissibilité des candidatures, la confirmation de la déclaration de la CENA, et les décisions en cas de difficulté au cours des élections. Le Ministère de l'intérieur est chargé de la logistique des élections et la CENA doit superviser le processus électoral de manière autonome. Le Conseil constitutionnel et le Ministère de l'intérieur sont tous deux extrêmement influencés par l'exécutif. La CENA est quelque peu influencée par l'exécutif car le président confirme ses membres, mais ces derniers sont initialement nommés par des sources indépendantes et connus pour leur intégrité et leurs opinions impartiales. Techniquement, la CENA a été créée par une loi, si bien que son existence n'est pas aussi permanente et qu’elle survit à la « discrétion de la législature, »[9] et comme évoqué ci-dessus, elle transmet toujours ses résultats au Conseil constitutionnel qui doit les confirmer.

A la suite de son élection de 2007, Wade a nommé un Conseil constitutionnel entièrement nouveau en 2008, soulevant des soupçons que c'était pour assurer son admissibilité à un troisième mandat. La décision récente à ce propos semble confirmer ces soupçons. Il est évident que l'exécutif contrôle et influence fortement le fonctionnement des institutions électorales, les rendant inadéquates à la démocratie. Il est indispensable que les institutions électorales soient véritablement indépendantes pour que les transitions de gouvernement se produisent de façon disposée et démocratique. Après les élections, ce serait donc une priorité de réformer les institutions électorales.

Quelles seraient les influences des choix électoraux au Sénégal?
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Directeur, Africa Growth Initiative
Zenia Lewis, Assistante de recherche

Dans une grande mesure, le droit de vote dans les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne est influencé par les points principaux d’identification : selon l'origine ethnique, la religion ou la région. Tout simplement, la politique identitaire domine souvent la politique de résolution des problèmes, comme l'état de l'économie. Auparavant, le vote au Sénégal ne s'est pas fondé principalement sur la politique identitaire. Les donnés de l'afrobaromètre confirment qu'au Sénégal l'ethnicité des électeurs ne constitue pas l'élément déterminant des élections et les recherches indiquent que « le Sénégal est un pays où l'ethnicité ne joue pratiquement aucun rôle en politique.[10] La religion unifie l'électorat, qui comprend 94 pour cent de musulmans. Les fraternités musulmanes du pays transcendent les divisions ethniques [11] et les chefs politiques, de même, sont soutenus par de multiples fraternités ou sectes musulmanes. Malgré tout, les prochaines élections pourraient révéler des schémas électoraux basés sur des identités et des problèmes spécifiques. Comme le montre une publication qui fait pendant à celle-ci, il est possible que certains candidats créent des divisions fondées sur l'ethnicité et la secte religieuse en l'absence de différences plus pertinentes dans les programmes des candidats à la présidence.

Au cours de l'élection à venir, des schémas de vote ruraux-urbains pourraient aussi apparaître. La population du Sénégal est divisée de façon quasi égale entre les zones urbaines et rurales. La perception de l'économie varie aussi selon la région. Les électeurs ruraux ont un point de vue légèrement moins favorable de l'économie, avec 10 pour cent d'entre eux indiquant que l'état actuel des choses est « mauvais » ou « assez mauvais », par rapport aux sondages des zones urbaines. En outre, près de la moitié des résidents ruraux déclarent que leurs conditions de vie sont pires ou bien pires que celles du reste de la population sénégalaise, contre 21 % dans les zones urbaines. Ces différences de perception du bien-être pourraient influencer les schémas de vote et les candidats de l'opposition pourraient avoir de meilleurs résultats dans les zones rurales s'ils transmettaient un message convaincant de changement.

On pourrait voir apparaître un autre modèle de vote, celui de la diaspora sénégalaise. En 2000, il y avait 15 pays différents où les sénégalais pouvaient voter à l’extérieur de leur pays. Une étude de 2007 indique que les électeurs externes comprennent entre 4 et 5 pour cent du vote des élections sénégalaises. En 2000, la majorité des électeurs externes a continué à soutenir le président sortant, Abdou Diouf, et ce soutien aurait pu faire la différence si les résultats avaient été serrés au second tour. Si l'élection était serrée, les votes de la diaspora pourraient vraisemblablement faire la différence.

Enfin, les jeunes électeurs ont tendance à s'opposer à la réélection de Wade. Ils voteraient probablement pour l'opposition en raison des problèmes constants de chômage et du fait que le gouvernement actuel n’ait pas de programme défini pour résoudre la situation.

Élection de 2012 au Sénégal : Même scénario qu’en Côte d'Ivoire?
Julius Agbor, Chargé des recherches africaines, Africa Growth Initiative

Bien que les conditions de l'élection au Sénégal diffèrent de celles de la Côte d'Ivoire, vu l'absence de rebelles armés ou d'une division régionale entre le Nord (musulman) et le Sud (chrétien), les circonstances entourant cette élection ressemblent beaucoup à un scénario postélectoral ivoirien. Un texte de Mwangi Kimenyi et Zenia Lewis qui fait pendant à celui-ci traite des problèmes structuraux créés par le manque d'indépendance des institutions électorales au Sénégal. Mais il existe un autre problème plus subtil : c'est la possibilité d'un conflit après les élections comme c'est arrivé en Côte d'Ivoire au cours des années 2010-2011, du fait des ambiguïtés découlant du chevauchement de compétence des différents corps électoraux.

Ces conflits de compétences au Sénégal pourraient créer des confusions et déclencher des scènes de violence à la suite des élections. En Côte d'Ivoire, bien que la Commission électorale indépendante (CEI) ait été chargée de l'organisation et de la supervision des élections, elle ne pouvait publier que des résultats provisoires soumis à l'approbation du Conseil constitutionnel, qui était également responsable de traiter tous les différends découlant du processus électoral. La confusion a ensuite découlé des anomalies importantes entre les chiffres annoncés auparavant par la Commission électorale et ceux qui ont été proclamés officiellement par le Conseil constitutionnel. Au Sénégal, c'est aussi susceptible de se produire au cas où les résultats officiels proclamés par le Conseil constitutionnel diffèrent de ceux signalés par la Commission électorale nationale (soi-disant) autonome (CENA). Cela serait particulièrement susceptible d'inciter à la violence en raison du fossé se creusant de plus en plus entre le peuple sénégalais et les institutions politiques du pays, à la suite de la décision controversée du Conseil constitutionnel en faveur de la candidature du président sortant. Les cas du Sénégal et de la Côte d'Ivoire indiquent les faiblesses générales des systèmes électoraux et des institutions dans les anciennes colonies françaises. A l'avenir, il est indispensable pour ces pays et beaucoup d'autres pays africains de créer des institutions électorales ne pouvant pas se prêter à ces chevauchements de compétences et qui seraient en même temps indépendantes de toute branche du gouvernement. A moins qu'on ne crée ce genre de structure électorale non ambiguë, les élections ne serviront pas à renforcer la démocratie, mais plutôt à déclencher le chaos comme on l'a vu en Côte d'Ivoire.

Négligence des Institutions autochtones africaines et la fragilité de la démocratie sénégalaise
Olumide Taiwo, Chargé de recherche de l'Afrique
Anne W. Kamau, Chargée de recherche, Africa Growth Initiative

La décision du président Wade de solliciter un troisième mandat demeure la question la plus brûlante des élections sénégalaises, susceptible de déclencher une crise postélectorale.

Il apparaît maintenant que les pays africains suivent la tendance suivante : ils semblent être démocratiquement stables pendant un certain temps et glissent ensuite dans une crise constitutionnelle ; la plupart de ces crises sont associées aux désirs des présidents sortants de prolonger leurs mandats. Le Sénégal est différent des autres pays africains où les élections se transforment en luttes entre groupes ethniques pour s'approprier les ressources de l'état. La force d'unité de la fraternité musulmane a minimisé les divisions ethniques, [12] ce qui est particulièrement important, du fait que plus de 90 % de la population est musulmane. La constitution sénégalaise prévoit également un gouvernement centralisé et puissant et le président Wade a pris de nombreuses mesures pour rendre la présidence encore plus forte. Cette centralisation du pouvoir s'oppose à la diversité ethnique et mène à leur perte de nombreux projets démocratiques dans les pays africains. En outre, une telle centralisation du pouvoir commence à exercer ses ravages sur le Sénégal. Selon certaines indications, les candidats de l'opposition et le président Wade commencent à faire appel au soutien de groupes ethniques et de segments spécifiques d'organisations islamiques. En suivant cette voie, le Sénégal pourrait suivre l'exemple de nombreux pays africains embourbés dans des conflits ethniques ou religieux.

Les démocraties stables et prospères en Afrique ont réformé leurs constitutions et revu leurs institutions de gouvernance afin de refléter leur appareil de choix collectif indigène. Pour se faire, il faut effectuer une décentralisation poussée et un transfert des responsabilités et reconnaître le rôle des chefs de tribus dans le processus de gouvernance. Par exemple, le Botswana, cité comme le pays dont la démocratie est la plus stable d'Afrique, est organisé en une fédération de tribus autonomes dirigées par des chefs de tribus qui sont également membres permanents de la Maison des chefs et qui assument un rôle de conseil et de supervision au sein du gouvernement. De même, la constitution du Ghana a créé la Maison des chefs à chaque niveau du gouvernement et donne le pouvoir à ces chefs d'assumer leurs rôles traditionnels et de favoriser les intérêts de leurs électeurs. Ces arrangements garantissent des niveaux d'autonomie importants et d'auto-gouvernance aux groupes tribaux et un gouvernement central relativement faible. Les pays dont le gouvernement demeure centralisé peuvent sembler stables au début, mais cette stabilité ne dure pas longtemps.

La constitution sénégalaise, comme celles de la plupart des pays africains, est très éloignée de l'histoire des peuples indigènes. Le fait d'hériter et de simplement modifier une constitution ne fait qu'augmenter le niveau d'animosité et d'instabilité. Au contraire, le Sénégal doit refonder ses constitutions afin de décentraliser le pouvoir et de faire participer ses peuples indigènes au processus de gouvernance.

Notes

[7] Rapport de l'afrobaromètre

[8] 53 pour cent des personnes interrogées pensent que le président « ignore souvent ou toujours les lois du pays. » (36 pour cent ont indiqué souvent, 17 pour cent ont indiqué toujours, tandis que 25 pour cent ont indiqué jamais/rarement et 25 pour cent ont dit qu'ils ne savaient pas)

[9] Senegal: Election Management Bodies in West Africa, A review by AfriMAP and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/AfriMAP_EMB_Ch6_Senegal_EN.pdf

[10] Kris Inman and Josephine T. Andrews. 2009, "Corruption and Political Participation in Africa: Evidence from Survey and Experimental Research."

[11] Dennis Galvan. 2001, "Democracy without Ethnic Conflict: Embedded Parties, Transcendent Social Capital & Non-violent Pluralism in Senegal and Indonesia."

[12] La région de Casamance située au sud du fleuve Gambie est exclue de cette description.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Abdoulaye Diagne
Anne W. Kamau
Mwangi S. Kimenyi
Zenia Lewis
Witney Schneidman
Jessica Smith
Olumide Taiwo

Sub-Saharan Africa's Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or Disaster?

Thu, 05 Jan 2012 13:48:00 -0500

Julius Agbor, Olumide Taiwo and Jessica Smith analyze the implications of the growing youth population in Sub-Saharan Africa. They emphasize that African governments must heed the example set by the youth-led Arab Spring and push for greater inclusion of young people into their economies to avoid political instability in their own countries.

Publication: Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2012

Minimizing the Impact of the Global Economic Slowdown on Africa

Thu, 05 Jan 2012 13:48:00 -0500

Julius Agbor and Anne Kamau analyze the impacts of the global economic slowdown on Sub-Saharan Africa and discuss what African governments can do to better handle the ups and downs of global markets and the macroeconomic environment in 2012.

Publication: Foresight Africa: Top Priorities for the Continent in 2012

Local Governance Reforms Are Critical to Improving the Effectiveness of IMF/World Bank Lending to Africa

Julius Agbor and Olumide Taiwo — Thu, 29 Sep 2011 16:07:00 -0400

In the wake of the global financial crisis and the persistent global food and fuel price shocks, international development institutions — notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank — have increased their concessional lending to low-income countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2009 and 2010, the IMF committed new concessional lending to sub-Saharan Africa of about $4 billion, compared to $1.1 billion in 2008 and only about $0.2 billion in 2007. The IMF’s concessional lending is expected to reach $17 billion in 2014.

With higher amounts of aid from the IMF flowing to sub-Saharan Africa, issues of governance and accountability become crucially important. There is a need to ensure that the resources acquired from concessional lending translates into poverty reduction, lower infant mortality and malnutrition rates, increased rural infrastructure, higher school enrollment, and better education and learning outcomes.

However, with a few exceptions, most sub-Saharan African countries that stand to benefit from IMF concessional lending are the poorest performing in terms of governance indicators. For instance, only Ghana and Lesotho were highly ranked on the 2010 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, while only Ghana received a favorable global ranking as the least corrupt country in the 2010 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI).

In recognition of the governance deficiency in Africa, the IMF is currently upgrading the focus of its concessional loan’s conditionality from broad public participation and country ownership to issues of transparency in the management of public resources. In addition, the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) aims to strengthen governance in natural resource-rich countries through the full publication and verification of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and mining. While these initiatives could have the potential to improve governance at the national level, it is unclear whether such a top-down accountability model would improve governance at local and council levels, where accountability in service delivery is most needed.

The gradual shift in emphasis among development partners toward local accountability and inclusiveness, in order to ensure prudent management of public resources and service delivery, comes as no surprise. Strategies to achieve these objectives have been mainly placed on decentralization efforts, such as the transfer of political, financial and administrative authority and responsibilities to local councils and entrenching competitive multiparty elections at the council level. The idea here is that free and fair elections give constituents the opportunity to demand accountability from elected local council officials. Unfortunately, in practice, decentralization and multiparty elections do not always guarantee local accountability and effective service delivery. This is not even in the case in some of Africa’s most established democracies.

Typically, candidates running for local council are chosen through primaries held by each political party. In most cases, party “kingmakers” provide financial and organizational support to candidates on the condition of their party allegiance. Therefore, in the use of local council funds, elected local authorities tend to prioritize political party interest at the expense of constituents’ needs. In other instances, candidates would borrow from financial institutions to finance their electoral campaigns and would pay back with council funds. Either way, the consequence is that funds allocated for basic services are captured by local officials. The World Bank Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery Surveys, which cover 15 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, show that in the absence of interventions, large amounts of funding for education and health services are diverted by local officials and politicians.

In many African countries, institutional frameworks that balance the interests of politicians and political parties with the needs of local constituent are weak or nonexistent. Therefore, there is a general lack of accountability for local politicians and officials. Constituents often do not have a way for redress if services are not delivered other than to wait for the next election in four to six years. Therefore, free and fair elections cannot be used as the sole mechanism for ensuring political accountability, as many African politicians tend to renege on their electoral promises soon after they are elected.

The current consensus that more information guarantees transparency ignores the fact that having information is one thing but being able to act on it is another. Constituents’ ability to critically scrutinize local officials depends on the extent of their supervisory power within the local governance framework. In many cases, this supervisory power is weak or non-existent.

To address the underlying institutional weakness, we suggest the following two reforms in the governance of local councils in sub-Saharan Africa: The framework of local governance should be restructured to provide constituents with the power to recall non-performing or corrupt officials. Additionally, political party involvement should be de-emphasized in local governance. The latter is not entirely new to Africa. In Ghana political parties are banned from participating in local elections, which allows constituents to supervise their elected officials. Indeed, the World Bank Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery Surveys show public resource leakage rarely occurs between the district government and the recipient facilities in Ghana, demonstrating that accountability is better enforced by empowered constituents.

Local accountability will remain elusive as long as it is inhibited by decentralization and elections. Currently, the election process does not control the quality of political kingmakers, or the institutions that restrain the behavior of elected leaders.

Authors

Democratic Governance Is Critical to Averting Famines in Africa

Julius Agbor and Nelipher Moyo — Mon, 26 Sep 2011 14:04:00 -0400

During the last two decades, African countries have overwhelmingly embraced multiparty rule and in 2011, over 27 general elections were scheduled throughout the region. At first glance, it appears democracy has taken root and with it, expectations of improved standards of living. Sadly, this has not been the case for many African countries as human calamities imposed by disease, extreme hunger, malnutrition, and worse still, famines, persist. With the ‘advances’ in multiparty democracy, how is one to then understand the correlation between democratic advancement and the persistence of famines in Africa?

The answer lies in acknowledging that most African countries are still in the process of consolidating their democracies. Indeed, Africa is the only continent in the 21st century that has experienced, and continues to experience, mass mortality due to food crisis, with four countries—Ethiopia in 2000, Malawi in 2002, Niger in 2005, and Somalia in 2011—officially attaining the stage of famine.

This reality seems to contradict Amartya Sen’s theory that no functioning multiparty democracy can experience famine because democratic institutions—regular free and fair elections, independent courts and legislatures, free press and vibrant civil society—are all effective mechanisms of upholding the basic rights of citizens, including the right to food (“Development as Freedom,” 1999:178). Democracy also offers vulnerable citizens the opportunity to vote out incompetent governments that fail to deliver improved well-being to their constituents. Indeed, as de Waal in “Democratic Political Process and the Fight against Famine” (2000:12) asserts, ‘fully functioning democracies do provide protections against famine, but weak democracies might not’.

Evidence suggests most of the famines recently witnessed in Africa have been largely due to institutional failures resulting from the lack of broad-based accountable governance and much less to market or production failures. This governance deficiency often manifests itself through imperfect institutions, which either fail to reallocate production surplus away from food-surplus areas to food-deficit ones within the same country, or are incapable of effectively providing food price support to vulnerable citizens. Although the decline in food availability is almost inevitably witnessed immediately before all major famines, it has not been the main precursor. If met with timely and effective responses, declining food availability can be prevented from degenerating into a famine. Usually, effective anti-corruption mechanisms and efficient public interventions in agricultural support systems and extension services, effectively address food availability declines in the build-up to a famine. This was lacking in the Malawian famine of 2002, where government failures exacerbated production and donor response failures thereby precipitated an else-while avoidable human catastrophe.

Note that in the year preceding the famine, the Malawian government, faced with high deficits and the need for fiscal consolidation, yielded to International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations to export all of its 180,000 tons of grain stocked in its Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR). Contrary to what many believe, the destocking of the SGR in itself was not the major cause of the famine. Instead of exporting the grain for much needed foreign exchange, rent-seeking Malawian bureaucrats hoarded the grain until prices escalated beyond the purchasing power of the average citizen—resulting in famine. Thus, had there not been a governance problem, the famine in Malawi could have been averted. Similarly, ineffective government support structures to prevent the decline in food availability or, at least, to respond timely in the wake of decline, have resulted in famines elsewhere in Niger, Somalia and Ethiopia.

While a range of factors, arguably exogenous to government control—such as climate change and international donor response—are crucial in the famine prevention strategy, emphasis must be placed on accountable democratic governance as an effective mechanism for averting famines in Africa. An anti-famine political contract between citizens and the state, which democracy promotes, can be effective at addressing declining livestock/grain terms of trade shocks that frequently challenge poor households.

A functioning democracy also offers additional checks against inappropriate national policy choices. For instance, the abolishment of agricultural buffer stocks and the elimination of farm subsidies would normally be scrutinized by civil society, non-governmental organizations and the parliament before being implemented by executive powers. Unfortunately, these underlying institutions—independent legislatures and courts, free press and vibrant civil society—are crucially deficient in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, even where these institutions are enshrined in the national constitutions, the political will to render them effective is usually absent.

So far, the short-term response of international donors and humanitarian organizations has helped mitigate the effect of famines in Africa but the strategy to prevent the next famine lies in demanding effective governance institutions and supporting institutions with similar goals on the continent.

Authors

Julius Agbor
Nelipher Moyo

Around the Halls: African Elections

Wed, 21 Sep 2011 11:18:00 -0400

In the next two months, a number of African countries will hold presidential and legislative elections. Historically, many of these countries have faced challenges in their electoral process and given the fragility, these elections will prove to be a test to the uneasy political climate throughout the region. Mwangi Kimenyi, Nelipher Moyo, Julius Agbor, Melvin Ayogu, Anne Kamau and Olu Taiwo discuss the upcoming elections in Madagascar, Cameroon, Liberia, Gambia, Congo as well as the growing importance of China in Zambia, post-election.

Zambian Elections: The Growing Importance of China
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Senior Fellow, Director, Africa Growth Initiative and Nelipher Moyo, Research Analyst

On September 20, 2011, Zambians went to the polls to elect a new president after one of the most contested election campaigns in the nation’s history. The contest was primarily between the incumbent Rupiah ‘RB’ Banda, who represents the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which has lead the country since its first democratic elections in 1991, and Michael “King Cobra” Sata, leader of the Patriotic Front and a former MMD member.

Mr. Banda has pointed to the country’s recent economic growth and prudent economic management as justification for why he should be re-elected. Sata seeks to reach out to unemployed youths and the poor-- the constituency left behind in Zambia’s recent economic growth. Although Zambia was recently reclassified as a middle income country, many Zambians do not enjoy middle income living standards.

Mr. Sata has previously spoken out against China’s ‘exploitation’ of Zambia’s minerals and its poor labor practices. During the 2006 elections, China’s ambassador to Zambia threatened to cut diplomatic ties with Zambia if Sata was elected president. This was one of the first times that China interjected itself in the internal political affairs of an African country. While China denies providing any direct campaign assistance to Banda’s reelection bid, there is no denying the ‘made in china’ Banda campaign favors present at rallies. Some argue that this election is in fact a referendum on China, with Banda representing those Zambians in favor of closer ties and Sata representing those in favor of a more cautious approach.

Should Mr. Banda win the election, the country‘s policies will remain more or less the same. Despite softening his stance on China, it is not clear what the implications of a Sata win would be on China-Zambia relations. Would Mr. Sata revert to his previous anti-China stance, or would he prove to be more pragmatic and continue to engage the Chinese who are important for the country’s growth?

There are two areas of concern; first, Mr. Sata is among those who supported former President Chiluba’s disgraceful third term bid. In the event of a Sata Presidency, it will be important to ensure that ‘King Cobra’ does not have a similar lapse in judgment. Second, while Zambia has a history of peaceful elections, there are a large number of unemployed youths who can be mobilized for violence should either candidate fail to concede the election. It will be important for both candidates to put the interests of the country above their own.

Sustaining a Stable Post-Elections Democracy is the Crucial Challenge Facing Madagascar
Julius Agbor, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

The 2011 presidential and parliamentary elections in Madagascar have been postponed three times since the beginning of the year, due to the unfavorable political climate in the country. As has been the tradition in the past, presidential elections in Madagascar have raised ethnic tensions, whereas parliamentary elections have generally taken place smoothly. Whether or not the forthcoming Malagasy election will be free and fair seems not to be the main problem. The critical challenge facing the country is sustaining a stable post-elections democratic government, considering the high degree of ethnic polarization that has characterized Malagasy politics since 1990 and has led to the frequent deposition of democratically elected Presidents. Ethnic tensions between the coastal Betsimisaraka tribe of long serving former President Didier Ratsiraka, and the highland Merina tribe of recently deposed President Marc Ravalomanana, have often polarized Malagasy political debates, fueling violent anti-government demonstrations that frequently paralyze state institutions. A recent episode is the military-backed uprising in March 2009 that led to the deposition of democratically elected President Ravalomanana’s government and the institution of a High Transitional Authority led Andry Rajoelina. Ravalomanana, who was in the third year of his second and last five-year term in office, engaged the country in an aggressive economic recovery path following a 12 percent drop in GDP provoked by the 2002 political crisis. Sadly, Ravalomanana’s economic and political reforms have largely been reversed by his successor, Andry Rajoelina.

Madagascar’s polarized politics and frequent institutional and policy reversals are creating additional disincentives for investors in a country plagued by negative per capita income growth, high inflation, and staggering poverty levels. The greatest task ahead for Madagascar’s post-election would be to uphold the outcome of the November 2010 referendum in which a new constitution was endorsed.

Autocracy in Cameroon: C’est la Vie?
Melvin Ayogu, Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

On October 9, Cameroon will hold its presidential election. Our question, and that of many Cameroonians and international observers, is if anything has changed to ensure a fair contest, since it is not apparent that the newly established electoral commission, Elections Cameroon (ELECAM), is able guarantee a just process.

Since gaining independence in 1960, Cameroon has only been led by two presidents, who are from the same political party: Ahmadou Babatoura Ahidjo for 21 years and current President Paul Biya for 29 years. Biya has also recently announced plans to run again. Beyond the obvious problem of an autocratic history, there are many other reasons to doubt that the upcoming elections will be free and fair. The system, as it currently exists, has been criticised for its ultra openness. Critics argue that it has been deliberately designed to engender too many political parties, which prevents unstructured opposition from competing with the dominant political party. In addition, there is unequal access to the media as the State owns all the bill boards and charges exorbitantly for their use – a crucial tool to the campaign apparatus in developing countries where ownership of television sets is low and electricity very limited. Lastly, the design of ELECAM is far from independent, as the President appoints members to the election board, and laws require line reporting of ELECAM activities to the state security apparatus.

The recent ban on twitter does not give much hope that Cameroon is on the way to a meaningful procedural democracy, where free and fair elections would be the norm. Without a strong commitment to the reform of ELECAM’s structure, management and control, the idea of free elections in Cameroon remains an aspiration.

Liberia Elections: Solidifying Peace or Reversion to Conflict
Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Senior Fellow, Director, Africa Growth Initiative

On October 11, Liberia will hold presidential and legislative elections. This is a critical juncture for this post-conflict country, and fair and peaceful elections will be instrumental in solidifying gains made over the last eight years since the cessation of conflict. But Liberia remains a fragile state and tensions arising from hotly contested elections could easily reverse the recent gains. A credible election process will also impact Liberia’s economic growth trajectory, especially in regard to prudent management of natural resources. With increasing interest in oil exploration, drilling and the exploitation of other natural resources in Liberia, the election of a leader who is not committed to improving governance could expose the country to natural resource curse.

The incumbent president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, has been in power nearly six years and will face 15 other presidential candidates. Early in her term in office, President Sirleaf commanded broad support and there has been significant progress in consolidating peace and improving the economy. She has been particularly successful in forging a positive post-war image for the country internationally. However, her administration is increasingly facing criticisms for its failure to effectively deal with rising poverty, youth unemployment and corruption. The president is also being criticized for failing to devolve powers of what is considered an imperial presidency.

The upcoming Liberian elections promise to be most hotly contested in the country’s history. With a crowded field of presidential hopefuls, it is unlikely that any single candidate will receive the minimum proportion of votes required for an outright win. Thus, a runoff election is almost certain. Already the election campaigns have fractured the society along various axes of identification. Given the fragility of the security situation in Liberia, these elections could trigger widespread violence. The African Union and the broader international community must be prepared to assist in the electoral process and beef up security so as to prevent a replay of the recent Ivory Coast scenario.

The Gambia: Free and Fair Elections
Anne Kamau, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

On November 24, 2011, The Republic of The Gambia will hold its fourth democratic presidential elections. The current president, who was elected by the popular majority, is seeking a fourth term. The opposition sees these elections as a defining moment for the future of Gambia, with the president’s reelection results bringing either the establishment or the end of a monarchy. The international community and missionaries have expressed concerns about the conduct surrounding the elections, including the voter registration process and the issuing of old identification cards. Observers are concerned that foreigners from Guinea Bissau are being registered to vote in Gambia. Natives have also expressed concern that a repeat of the turmoil that followed elections in neighboring Ivory Coast will occur in Gambia if the election process is marred by fraud. As the election date draws near, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) is challenged to oversee the free and fair elections and significant progress has been made to ensure this happens. However, the political undertones remain tense, with opposition not openly campaigning and fearing terror if they lose. It is evident that citizens desire a change, but the incumbent president will not relinquish power willingly. Gambia deserves the urgent attention of the world to oversee a peaceful process of free and fair elections. International communities should advise and assist in the election process to avert any violent eruptions during and after elections and to help avoid a repeat of Ivory Coast in The Republic of The Gambia.

Democracy at the Crossroads: The 2011 Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Olu Taiwo, Africa Research Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative

The presidential election in the Democratic Republic of Congo takes place on November 28, 2011 in advance of the mandate for the current president, Mr. Joseph Kabila, expiring on December 6, 2011. Current events in the country cast doubts on both the possibility of holding the election on this schedule and the credibility of the outcome if held under the current circumstances.

There are enormous challenges to the democratic process. Pre-election violence has recently surged in the capital city and elsewhere, while renewed incidents of violence are reported in the troubled eastern part of the country. The U.S. Department of State designates the DRC as a Critical Crime and High Political Violence country. Preparation for the election is underfunded, as donors have been unable to provide adequate resources. International funding of the electoral budget has dropped from 80 percent in 2006 to 40 percent in 2011 and the DRC government is unable to make up the shortfall.

Recent changes to the electoral framework challenge the credibility of the outcome. A constitutional amendment was passed in January 2011 that eliminated the second round of voting during presidential elections. This implies that a minority of total votes may elect a president as long as the candidate receives more votes than other candidates. It also makes it possible that support from a few ethnic groups or provinces would be sufficient to win the presidency. This portends clear dangers to election credibility in a country that is home to as many as 250 ethnic groups. In addition, the highest electoral body, the Independent Election Commission (IEC), which is thought to be fairly balanced in terms of composition, has been replaced by a new Independent National Election Commission (INEC) that is constituted with a more partisan majority that leans toward the ruling party.

The DRC remains a fragile state. The forthcoming election presents an opportunity to consolidate the democratic process initiated in 2006 when multiparty elections were held for the first time in 40 years. The challenges constitute real dangers of missing this opportunity.

Authors

Averting Further Crisis in Malawi

Julius Agbor — Wed, 17 Aug 2011 13:57:00 -0400

On July 20 and 21, protests spread across the streets of Lilongwe, Mzuzu and Blantyre in Malawi. These protests— triggered by brewing political and economic concerns in the country— led to the death of at least 18 people, several hundred arrests and serious property damage. The protesters demanded that President Bingu wa Mutharika urgently address the rising cost of living in Malawi caused by fuel, foreign exchange and power shortages, and tax hikes.

For nearly two years, Malawians have been lining up for fuel and the situation appears to be getting worse. The country’s unreliable power supply has severely hurt Malawi’s nascent industries and further worsened the unemployment situation.

A new tax law in Malawi— aimed at increasing state revenues and reducing the country’s dependence on foreign aid— increased taxes on traditional commodities and imposed new taxes on essential goods, such as milk and bread. The new taxes have created an extremely difficult economic situation for the people of Malawi. The other major concern of protesters has been about the acute shortage of foreign exchange. Malawi’s narrow exporting base, coupled with an increasingly uncompetitive exchange rate, has resulted in the progressive decline in foreign exchange.

Besides these numerous economic challenges, Malawians are also becoming weary of Mutharika’s authoritarian style of leadership characterized by the victimization of political adversaries, intolerance, human rights abuses and frequent media censorship. Yesterday, civil society organizations in Malawi decided to extend their initial deadline of August 17, which they gave Mutharika to redress these problems or face further protests. The decision by civil society organizations to postpone protests until further notice will allow the courts to clear a pending legal challenge against their plan. In the meantime, foreign donors—most notably, the United Kingdom and United States— have withheld further aid to Malawi until Mutharika demonstrates sufficient commitment to governance reforms.

While Mutharika has asked civil society organizations not to resume protests, his ability and willingness to meet their concerns remain questionable, at least in the short run. First, some of the country’s present economic challenges, such as acute power shortages, can be linked to severe droughts that have been affecting many countries in Africa. Second, the slow transformation of the Malawian economy from an essentially primary commodity producer to a valued-added manufacturing economy has made it difficult to stabilize domestic prices and foreign exchange reserves. The recent 10 percent devaluation of Malawi’s currency might not sufficiently increase foreign reserves, given the current uncertainty in international capital markets and potential domestic supply-side constraints. This suggests that the problem of insufficient power and Forex might be difficult to redress in the short run even with donor assistance.

Furthermore, barely two years after complying with the stringent requirements of the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Program— an International Monetary Fund program that provides debt relief and low-interest loans— the Malawian economy was subjected to an unprecedented global oil and food price shocks during 2008-2010. For an oil-importing landlocked country, these global price shocks have had serious consequences, including: upward pressure on the exchange rate, depletion of foreign reserves, increased vulnerability of the economy and its accrued desirability of foreign aid. Malawi is now more than ever subjected to the actions and demands of international donors.

But Mutharika’s willingness to address Malawi’s problems appears to be incompatible with his erratic personality, which is why the donor community is pressing him to open up the country’s political and economic space. However, the suspension of aid to Malawi, which is meant to discredit Mutharika’s regime and force him to concede to reforms, comes at a very high price to the average Malawian in dire need of basic subsistence living. In the absence of aid to Malawi and should the deadlock between the country’s government and civil society continue after August 17, there is little doubt that living conditions will continue to deteriorate with possible negative spill-over effects to neighboring countries in the otherwise stable Southern African region.

Timely intervention by the international community, and particularly the African Union, is necessary to resolve the situation. The international community should facilitate a tripartite meeting between Malawi’s government, opposition and civil society. The support of the international community in this direction would not only facilitate dialogue, but would also ensure that the resolutions are binding for all groups involved. Possible parameters for discussion at the tripartite meeting should include: constitutional reforms to strengthen the independence of the legislative and judicial arms of government; the establishment of independent advisory councils on key sectors of the economy, such as energy, fuel and food; and the promotion of an independent media and human rights, as a means of empowerment, voice and transparency.

For his part, Mutharika must maintain a great degree of restraint and tolerance with his critics. This would improve dialogue and understanding among his countrymen. Indeed, all political actors in Malawi must exercise restraint and avoid jeopardizing the future of their country for selfish political gains.

Authors

Julius Agbor

Image Source: ï¿½ Eldson Chagara / Reuters