Brookings: Centers - Saban Center for Middle East Policy

How Arab Public Opinion Is Reshaping the Middle East

Tue, 21 May 2013 15:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 21, 2013
3:00 PM - 4:30 PM EDT

Falk Auditorium
Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

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The Arab awakening that began in 2011 is transforming the Middle East in ways that continue to surprise seasoned observers. As new political leaders and movements struggle for power and work to shape the region’s future, one thing is clear: public opinion is more consequential now than it has arguably ever been. How Arabs view themselves and the world around them will have enormous consequences for the region and the larger international community in the years ahead. How are changes in Arab public opinion shaping the changes occurring across the region? Have the U.S. and its allies done enough to understand and support the voices of Arabs seeking greater representation and opportunity?

On May 21, the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, as part of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, will host the launch of The World Through Arab Eyes: Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East (Basic Books, 2013), the latest book by Nonresident Senior Fellow Shibley Telhami. Kim Ghattas, BBC’s State Department correspondent, will engage Dr. Telhami in a discussion of the book and the issues it raises. Martin Indyk, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, will provide introductory remarks.

After the program, Telhami will sign copies of the book.

Welcome to Iran @ Saban

Suzanne Maloney — Mon, 20 May 2013 08:30:00 -0400

Welcome and khosh amadid!

Welcome to Iran @ Saban, a new blog featuring commentary and analysis on the array of issues related to Iran by scholars at the Brookings Institution. It takes only a quick scan of the headlines each day to appreciate the significance of Iran to American national interests and international security, and the variety and complexity of the issues and actors at stake. Through an intense focus on all things Iran, we hope to advance a better understanding of the internal dynamics of the Islamic Republic and promote effective international strategies for dealing with the challenges its policies pose.

We’ve timed our kick-off to coincide with the upcoming Iranian presidential election, in hopes of enriching the discussion that has already emerged around the ballot. As current president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad prepares to leave office, Iran's internal power struggles will enter a new phase. From now through the vote on June 14^th and presumably well beyond, we’ll closely follow the twists and turns of Iran’s frequently unexpected electoral dynamics and consider what the future may bring for Iran. This discussion will delve into the major issues confronting Tehran today, especially the economic crisis and the impact of sanctions.

Although the electoral interplay will consume a great deal of attention in the next few weeks, the focus of the blog will extend well beyond the events of the election and Iran's domestic dramas. We will be tackling Iran’s approach to the region and the world, its relationship with established and emerging powers, and the strategies and tactics of various players, including the United States, toward Tehran. Inevitably, we’ll spend a lot of time examining the nuclear issue, starting with the prospects for revitalizing the stalled negotiations between Tehran and the international community and discussions around alternative approaches if dialogue fails to produce a diplomatic resolution of Iran's nuclear ambitions. However, the sense of urgency surrounding the nuclear issue has narrowed the American debate on Iran in recent years, problematically in my opinion. For that reason, watch the space for a robust discussion of the range of issues and threats related to Iran, including terrorism, human rights, the peace process and the Syrian civil war, the rise of new regional and global powers, and the impact of technology and changes in energy markets on Iranian politics and the policy options of the international community.

Let me also say a few words about what this blog won’t be: this won’t be a vehicle for lobbying for or against any particular point of view. This blog will be infused with opinions – various and variegated – but in keeping with the Brookings’ mission, our discussions here on the blog will remain grounded in the ideals of intellectual objectivity, rigorous policy-relevant analysis, and civil debate. In that respect, we hope to integrate some of our longer form scholarship into the blog, by featuring previews of forthcoming publications related to Iran and initating conversations surrounding our ongoing research projects.

I also want to underscore that this will not be a solo venture. At the outset, my name may recur disproportionately, as the person charged with wrangling the blog’s content and as one of the few scholars who has the luxury of obsessing almost exclusively about Iran. However, Iran invokes a diverse and thorny set of foreign policy issues and concerns, and many of my Brookings scholars are at the forefront of research and writing on areas relevant to the Iranian challenge. We’ll try to draw in experts on a range of different regions, including China, Europe, and India as well as the scholars in our Doha office, and functional areas of expertise, such as energy, intelligence, and nonproliferation, and the site will feature the work of a fantastic team of Brookings staff providing with research and media support. As visitors to this site will soon appreciate, the whole of Brookings' work on Iran is much greater than the sum of its parts.

I want to close this opening with an overture: we want to extend the debate on Iran beyond the walls of Brookings, and we encourage you to join the conversation via email to IranAtSaban@brookings.edu We’ll also be on Twitter (via, among others, @maloneysuzanne) and engaging through a variety of other media.

Authors

Suzanne Maloney

Why Iran's Presidential Election Matters

Suzanne Maloney — Mon, 20 May 2013 12:26:00 -0400

In conversations with policymakers, journalists and analysts about the upcoming Iranian presidential elections, one question looms: does it even matter? Iran is, after all, an Islamic theocracy, a state in which the supreme leader is the ultimate decision-maker and elections are heavily stage-managed from start to finish. The president’s powers are explicitly limited, and whatever sense of electoral unpredictability that may have characterized Iran in the past— for example, in 1997, when a reformist cleric upset the heavily-favored front-runner— appeared to have ended with the contested 2009 reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Millions of Iranians outraged by the unusual speed and dubious margin of Ahmadinejad’s ostensible victory took to the streets chanting “where is my vote?” This violence that greeted this appeal, and the show trials and other Stalinist tactics that followed in its wake, seemed to suggest that Iran's quirky system had devolved to a more banal authoritarianism, where polls serve as mere pageants and institutions are unabashedly manipulated.

It would be tempting, then, to dismiss the election scheduled for June 14 as mere window-dressing or to disregard the brewing antagonisms within Iran’s political establishment as irrelevant. This would be a mistake, however, and yet another misreading of Iran’s complicated domestic dynamics. Don’t get me wrong— I don’t mean to suggest that the election will bear any resemblance to a truly democratic enterprise; even in the best of times, the Islamic Republic fell far short of meeting international standards for free and fair elections. However, while the outcome will be engineered, the element of improvisation is real, and the outcome of this latest twist in the thirty-four year power struggle within Iran will have significant implications for the future of the country and its role in the world.

If the past eight years of Ahmadinejad’s antics have taught us nothing else, they have demonstrated over and over again that Iran’s presidency matters. Despite its electoral illegitimacy, its institutional constraints, and the assiduous efforts of a system built around a divine mandate, the office of the presidency has emerged as one with real power to shape the context for domestic and foreign policy. The post exerts considerable authority over the Iranian budget, the framework for internal political activities, the social and cultural atmosphere, and even the most sensitive aspects of Iran’s security policies. Whoever assumes the office in August of this year will find himself near the apex of power, at a time of unprecedented external pressure and at the cusp of generational change within the Iranian regime. For this reason, the election and its outcome will have enormous sway over the future course of the Islamic Republic.

To appreciate the significance of the much-maligned Iranian presidency, simply consider the track records of its most recent occupants. During his two terms in office (1997-2005), reformist president Mohammad Khatami managed to curb some of the worst abuses of Iran’s own citizens and establish new avenues for political participation and speech. His tenure attracted foreign investment to Iran, unified its exchange rate, and established an oil stabilization fund to promote responsible economic stewardship. He repaired Iran’s relationships with much of the world, and even helped push through a multi-year suspension of the most worrisome aspects of its nuclear program.

It was not an unadulterated success by any stretch of the imagination; Khatami’s ambitions for change were inherently limited by his steadfast loyalty to the theocratic system and many of its most problematic policies, and even his mild reforms were thwarted at every turn by hardliners’ opposition. Still, compare those years to the two terms of his successor, who oversaw a crackdown against technocrats and the media, squandered an epic boom in oil revenues, and indulged in hate speech that helped alienate the world and isolate his country. It’s clear that Iranians as well as the international community were better served by Khatami’s halting moderation than by Ahmadinejad’s impetuous antagonisms.

It’s almost certain that the June election won’t produce a shocking upset or a reformist victory, and that whoever manages to secure the presidency this time around will offer continuity on the issues that matter most to Washington, particularly the nuclear issue. However, elections— even ones that are heavily rigged— represent critical junctures in the lifecycle of political systems, and in Iran they have repeatedly sent the revolutionary system careening in new directions. At times, these changes in course were deliberate, as in 1989 when Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani ran virtually unopposed in order to spearhead the country’s post-war reconstruction. At other times, the shifts have been wholly unanticipated, such as the advent of the reform movement or even Ahmadinejad himself, whose mid-term transformation from the Supreme Leader’s acolyte to his whipping boy has given the Iranian political establishment whiplash.

Iran’s revolution was the product of a deeply divided coalition that agreed on little beyond their opposition to the Shah, and throughout its history, the Islamic Republic has experienced a intense, evolving competition for influence. That contest remains as dynamic as ever, and the election will offer an opportunity for external observers to gauge the state of play. For those within the system, the campaign provides endless openings for ambitious contenders and rival factions to position themselves for future influence and reframe Iran’s political climate, just as Khatami and Ahmadinejad did. The election will help determine what becomes of a regime stalwart, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; the future prospects of the quixotic and enterpreneurial Ahmadinejad; and the rise or fall of a curious array of aspiring Iranian leaders.

And because the legacy of the revolution and Iran’s century-old struggle for representative rule has made popular participation incumbent even upon its theocracy, the election will mobilize millions of Iranians in ways that often prove difficult to control, even with a well-orchestrated repression. Over the course of the forthcoming weeks, we’ll be watching all these factors closely and seeking to interpret what the campaign and its outcome mean for Iran’s domestic evolution and its ongoing conflicts with the international community.

Authors

Suzanne Maloney

America and Iran: Wrestling with Ghosts

Suzanne Maloney — Mon, 20 May 2013 20:56:00 -0400

One of the very few feel-good stories in the recent history of U.S.-Iranian relations came to an unexpectedly abrupt end last week, when Iranian authorities cut short a series of wrestling exhibition matches in the United States. The first round, held in New York last Wednesday, drew large, boisterous crowds and buoyant media coverage, helping to animate a three-nation campaign (with Russia) to sustain wrestling as an Olympic sport and raise funds for youth wrestling programs. No sooner had the applause in New York died down, however, than Tehran opted to ditch a planned Los Angeles stop on the tour, and the Iranian wrestlers quickly returned to Tehran on Saturday.

So far, the rationale for the decision seems vague, and there are discrepancies between the statement of the exhibition’s American sponsor, USA Wrestling, and the official Iranian press agency's rendition. News reports referenced Iranian concerns about security provisions, and rumors circulated of anticipated protests by members of the large Iranian diaspora living in Southern California. Whatever the explanation, the hasty truncation of the American-Iranian wrestling tour is unfortunate but not entirely unexpected. For all sunny sentiments associated with cultural diplomacy, managing the political and logistical complexities of people-to-people exchanges between such longstanding adversaries can be fraught with potential minefields.

I should know; as a graduate student in the late 1990s, I participated in several of the first academic exchange programs between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I experienced first-hand the excitement as well as the issues that go along with such efforts. Thanks to funding from both governments and the coordination and contacts of the American Institute for Iranian Studies, I was able to study Persian at the Dehkhoda Institute in Tehran, travel widely throughout the country, and conduct research for my doctoral dissertation on Iran's Foundation for the Oppressed and other parastatal organizations. Fumbling my way around a country that I had studied extensively but never visited was an amazing experience. Iranians treated me and my fellow American interlopers with the hospitality for which the country rightly used to be legendary and the curiosity that inevitably accompanies three decades of official estrangement.

However, I also came to appreciate how precarious these enterprises can be. The problem with people-to-people diplomacy is, well, the people. Amateur ambassadors can be mighty difficult to manage, particularly with the limited oversight of what are ultimately low-priority programs. Inserting a gaggle of grad students, or wrestlers or any of the other professional groups that have sought to overcome official estrangement through bilateral exchanges, creates endless opportunities for normal human interactions to explode into diplomatic incidents. I'll never forget the combination of exhaustion and anxiety on the face of the one of the many Iranian handlers when a few Americans unexpectedly found ourselves in the midst of a gun battle between police and drug runners in the southeastern city of Kerman. We had arrived in Iran just as the regime unleashed its repression of the July 1999 student protests, and now this real-time brush with the country's low-intensity drug war was just the kind of mess that could cost our minder his job and his future. "I am having a nervous breakdown," he confessed as he alternated between tea and chain smoking.

I suspect that there are a number of program officers within the State Department who can sympathize. During the Bush Administration's second term, then-Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns spurred a good-faith effort to expand educational and cultural exchanges with Iran. Artists, doctors, athletes and scientists from Iran crisscrossed America, sharing expertise and experience in subjects as diverse as earthquake science and engineering and AIDS treatment and education. Publicly, the programs often appeared to be blazingly successful in their stated goal of enhancing mutual understanding between Americans and Iranians. Behind the scenes, however, the story was often more complicated, thanks to Tehran’s paranoid conviction that these innocuous opportunities were the leading edge of a Washington-sponsored ‘soft revolution.’ A number of Iranians who participated in these exchanges found their passports seized or their professional advancement threatened; some feared returning home, and several were ultimately imprisoned after permitting their stories to be featured prominently in a major American newspaper.

I believe deeply in the mission and purpose of people-to-people exchanges. What little I understand about contemporary Iranian politics is grounded in the months I spent there over the course of 1998 and 1999, as well as the skills, contacts, and subsequent opportunities to visit Iran that I acquired as a direct result of that early immersion. Surely, the benefits for my fellow American participants— as well as the hundreds of Iranians who have been able to interact with their professional counterparts in the United States— have been at least as meaningful.

Still, people-to-people diplomacy is no substitute for official diplomacy, and it frequently offers as much complication as illumination. Back in 1999, my fretful Iranian minder won an early reprieve when our exchange program was unexpectedly curtailed upon the order of the State Department. A call from the Swiss ambassador, whose embassy serves as the protecting power of Americans in the absence of official relations, initiated a flurry of bureaucratic maneuvers to hasten our departure, and a few days later we were gone. I subsequently heard a range of rumors explaining the episode, including one focused around the efforts of the Clinton administration to establish back-channel cooperation with then-President Mohammad Khatami on counterterrorism efforts. Whatever the truth, nothing ever came of that initiative, and fourteen years later, the wrestlers' unfortunately early exit underscores the steep obstacles that remain in bridging the American-Iranian divide.

Authors

Suzanne Maloney

Iran Press Report: What to Make of the Glut of Presidential Candidates?

Mehrun Etebari — Fri, 17 May 2013 11:30:00 -0400

This week in the Iranian media, we witnessed reactions to the surprising number of recognized candidates who registered – many on the final day – to run in June 14^th presidential election. Some commentators on both the left and right wings of the Iranian press spectrum suggested that the number of candidates who registered on the conservative Principlist side poses a serious risk to that front’s chances. Even with the potential for a whittling of the Principlist slate via the ongoing vetting of the Guardian Council, which is due to finish on May 21, the disorganized approach from Principlist groups who had planned to coordinate and enter a small number of unity candidates is disturbing, said Mohammad Eskandari in the hardline daily Javan, particularly with the surprising late entrance of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani buoying the reformists’ presidential hopes. He wrote that he could envision different Principlist coalitions like the 2+1 Coalition, the Coalition of Five, and the Resistance Front putting individual ambitions aside and deciding on a unified approach. “However,” he continued, “the second possible path, which is for the unification process among the Principlists to remain fruitless, could translate to a major defeat for the Principlists, and thus allow the reformists to take the presidency.”

Understandably, this has led to some glee from commentators with reformist sympathies, as Rafsanjani remains far and away the most viable candidate in the reformist camp, leaving them no such indecision. Referring first to the 2+1 group of former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, former Majlis speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Javad Qorbani in Mardom-Salari marveled at how among this coalition set up to choose a single candidate most likely to win the election, all three registered because, as he sees it, “Each of the three candidates thinks himself to be the best.” He pointed to similar disunity in the Coalition of Five members Mohammad Hassan Aboutourabi-Fard and Manouchehr Mottaki both running. He concluded, “These disagreements show not only the Principlists’ lack of a plan and contradict their claim of unity, but they also indicate that those who claim to be Principlists are actually solitary individuals who have found the way up the ladder of power by sticking with the Principlist movement.” Other reformists suggested the entry of Rafsanjani was a “shock” that would force the Principlists into discipline out of necessity. Hassan Rasuli in Bahar argued that the conservative establishment would have to find a strategic choice who could appeal to a wide base, and guessed as to who that would be: “Among all the registered candidates, Mr. Jalili – who has good relations with the younger, newer wing of the Principlists and on a related note serves with Mr. Ahmadinejad on the Supreme National Security Council – has a higher chance than others to take the central place in the elections as a rival for Mr. Hashemi.” (This idea of Jalili as the obvious choice is far from unanimous in the Iranian media, with one Principlist MP telling Tehran-e Emrooz, “Qalibaf’s experience in various management areas as well has his performance in all executive duties have shown that he has the qualifications to become the focus of the Principlists’ unity.”)

The media has also been rife with reactions to the registration of Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, the controversial Ahmadinejad advisor and central figure in what critics call the “Deviant Current” that surrounds the president. The president has been criticized for his “illegal” act in accompanying his protégé to the registration, with Ali Rezaei writing in Javan that the president’s legal justification for his actions are ludicrous: “Another justification that the president and his entourage used is that the president had taken the day off on that day and he was using his personal identity, not his legal identity! Even if this justification is made in a kindergarten, the children will laugh at it since any illiterate knows someone serving as president cannot separate his personal identity from his legal identity under any circumstance.” In the same paper, pointing to arguments from the president’s entourage aimed at preventing the Guardian Council from disqualifying Mashaei, Yadollah Javani argued that the legal duty of the council must be performed without interference, and ignorance of the Council’s role and independence is tantamount to lawbreaking and reminiscent of the defiance that marked the 2009 election protests. Connecting complaints against the Guardian Council to the “sedition” of that year, he wrote, “According to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, the roots of the events of 1388 were a disregard for the law.”

APPENDIX: Translated Summaries of Selected Opinion Pieces (Newest to Oldest)

“The Principlists, Unity, and Passing this Historic Turning Point.” Mohammad Eskandari, Javan, 24 Ordibehesht 1392 / 14 May 2013.

In the hardline Javan, Eskandari expresses worry that the conservatives of the Principlist movement, who should be poised to easily win the presidency, are putting that goal in serious jeopardy through their own disorganization and lack of consensus on a candidate. He writes that these elections are at such a crucial time that the importance of getting them right is magnified, saying, “Iran, the region, and the world are poised at a historical turning point where any move on this chessboard has the potential to be crucial and fateful,” particularly due to Iran’s current role as the “standard-bearer of independent nations.” He argues that while a Principlist victory would have immensely positive ramifications, “a victory by the reformists, and particularly by Hashemi, would have to be considered a backward step.” However, he says, given the current state of affairs in the Principlist camp, Rafsanjani’s “arrival at the 90^th minute” and his ability to generate momentum has meant the prospect of Principlist defeat is a real one if the conservatives remain complacent. “Unfortunately, the state of the Principlists’ election planning is chaotic and there is no think tank to lead and organize the number of candidates. A high number of people in the Principlist movement have made themselves presidential candidates and each is based in a different branch of the movement.” He criticizes the inability of Principlist subgroups that should have been far more organized among themselves, such as the Resistance Front (which includes candidates Jalili and Lankerani) and the 2+1 coalition (made up of Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Ali Akbar Velayati, and Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel) to register only one candidate each. He writes that the number of Principlist candidates will come down with the Guardian Council’s vetting, but that groups like the abovementioned alliances and the “Coalition of Five” will ideally get the number of their candidates down to two at most, which would at least be likely to guarantee that the election goes to a second round. But he remains worried: “However, the second possible path, which is for the unification process among the Principlists to remain fruitless, could translate to a major defeat for the Principlists, and thus allow the reformists to take the presidency.”

“Ahmadinejad is Opening Up a Confrontational Phase.” Hassan Rasuli, Bahar, 24 Ordibehesht 1392 / 14 May 2013.

In the reformist daily Bahar, Rasuli argues that Rafsanjani’s late entrance into the presidential election has shocked the reformists’ opponents both in the Ahmadinejad camp and the Principlist establishment. He writes that the Principlists in particular were given a sense of shock and factional uncertainty regarding their own strategy for the elections, as they had not been counting on a major reformist candidate such as Rafsanjani or former President Khatami to enter. He writes that looking at Principlist websites or looking at “newspapers such as Kayhan, the intellectual tribune of the movement” in advance of Rafsanjani’s entrance, it was clear that the conservatives had no expectation of a serious rival in the election. But now, the Principlists will be forced to sow unity among their varied ranks – or at least attempt do so. He suggests that one candidate above all would be ideal Principlist choice: “in the opinion of this author, amongst all the registered candidates, Mr. Jalili – who has good relations with the younger, newer wing of the Principlists and on a related note serves with Mr. Ahmadinejad on the Supreme National Security Council – has a higher chance than others to take the central place in the elections as a rival for Mr. Hashemi.” Meanwhile, he writes, Ahmadinejad’s camp, featuring Mashaei, appears to be seeking to sow controversy and chaos in the aftermath of Rafsanjani’s entry.

“Where Do Hashemi’s Doubts Come From?” Mohammad Imani, Kayhan, 24 Ordibehesht 1392 / 14 May 2013.

Following upon its articles last week insisting that Rafsanjani’s lack of a popular base and his near-certain failure in the election would keep him on the sidelines of the election, the Kayhan editorial by Imani argues that his entrance into the race does not change the fact that the ex-president has serious doubts about his ability to succeed in the race – and with good reason. Imani writes that the hesitation of the candidate comes from his own knowledge that his supposed supporters among the reformist front can’t be trusted to vote for him. He says that Hashemi remembers well how he gave support, via “secret” influence over his Kargozaran party, to Mohammad Khatami’s election effort in 1997, but that within 2 years, he received “payback” in the form of vilification from reformist activists.

“Words With the Flavor of Sedition.” Yadollah Javani, Javan, 23 Ordibehesht 1392 / 13 May 2013.

In the hardline Javan daily, Javani writes that there is a great threat from certain candidates – most notably Mashaei – of unconstitutional activities that seek to interfere with the legal process under which the Guardian Council is vetting candidates. He points to the way in which President Ahmadinejad accompanied his advisor on the occasion of his registration as evidence of the attempt to pressure the Guardian Council, which should be left to its independent duty. He also says that those who criticize the Council in advance, suggesting that its vetting is a hindrance of democracy on political grounds, are mistaken, because it is an important duty to “prevent improper individuals from becoming president.” He asks those candidates who accuse the Council of plotting to interfere, “Is it their view that all 686 registered candidates be allowed to run in the election?” He insists that all candidates remain silent and wait for the results of the vetting, because anything else is tantamount to ignorance and violation of the constitution. “According to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, the roots of the events of 1388 were a disregard for the law.”

“Two Coalitions, One Fate: The Principlists’ Un-principled Behavior.” Javad Qorbani, Mardom-Salari, 23 Ordibehesht 1392 / 13 May 2013.

In the moderate daily Mardom-Salari, Qorbani writes that the Principlists are in complete disarray, as can be seen from the chaotic nature of their candidate registration. Particularly, he points at the fact that two notable Principlist coalitions that were set up to choose a single candidate failed to limit their registrations to a single candidate, showing a lack of discipline and unity. Even though the 2+1 coalition was designed for only one candidate, deemed to be the most likely to win, to come forward as a candidate, as he puts it, “Each of the three candidates thinks himself to be the best.” He writes that words from Haddad-Adel indicating that all three candidates registered to ensure that at least one of them emerged from the vetting process smacks of insincerity and it laughable. “With the knowledge that we have of the Guardian Council, if the eligibility of these three candidates is not confirmed, whose eligibility will be?” He also points to the fact that the Coalition of Five supposedly announced that Aboutourabi-Fard was put forward as a candidate with the approval of the entire group – yet former foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki registered anyway, citing his greater popularity in polls. He argues, “These disagreements show not only the Principlists’ lack of a plan and contradict their claim of unity, but they also indicate that those who claim to be Principlists are actually solitary individuals who have found the way up the ladder of power by sticking with the Principlist movement.”

Authors

Mehrun Etebari

Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan’s Comeback Kid

Bruce Riedel — Tue, 14 May 2013 09:12:00 -0400

Nawaz Sharif is the comeback kid of Pakistani politics. With his party’s electoral victory, he is poised to become prime minister for an unprecedented third time. The Sharif odyssey has been remarkable—but now we will see if he can convert his victory into a new beginning for his deeply troubled country and our own tortured relations with it.

The 63-year-old Nawaz Sharif was born into money as the scion of a very wealthy family in Lahore. He entered politics to protect the family’s industry from nationalization. In the 1980s he became a protégé of Pakistan’s third military dictator, Zia ul Huq, and became the dominant politician in the country’s richest and most populous province, the Punjab. In 1990 Sharif was elected prime minister after his great rival, Benazir Bhutto, was booted out by the military.

I first got to know Sharif when I was President George Bush’s Director for South Asia and Persian Gulf Affairs in the White House in the early 1990s. Sharif was America’s partner in trying to wind down the decade-old war in Afghanistan against the Soviet-backed communist government that had outlived the defeat of the Soviet 40th Red Army in 1988, and was still clinging to power in Kabul. Unfortunately, when the communist government finally did collapse in 1992, it only ushered in a vicious civil war among the victorious mujahedin. Pakistan was left to deal with the consequences on its own as America abandoned Afghanistan to its fate. And Sharif lost power in 1993 to Benazir Bhutto.

He was elected back to a second term as prime minister in 1997. A year later he tested Pakistan’s nuclear weapons after India tested its first. As President Clinton’s Special Assistant for Near East and South Asia Affairs, I tried to persuade Sharif not to follow India’s path, but to no avail. In 1999 Sharif’s hand-picked Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, exploded a détente Sharif had arranged with India by starting a war in Kashmir. Normally very shy, Sharif invited himself to the White House on July 4, 1999, to find a way out, and wisely agreed to Clinton’s demand that Pakistan unilaterally abandon the war Musharraf had orchestrated. Sharif’s decision averted a wider—and very possibly nuclear—war.

Sharif fired Musharraf on October 12, 1999, while the general was visiting Sri Lanka. The general refused to step down and instead orchestrated a coup and arrested Sharif. A military court was summoned to try Sharif for treason. Only in Pakistan could a legitimately-elected prime minister be labeled a traitor for firing the country’s top general—a general who Sharif had selected for the job in the first place. Many expected Musharraf to have Sharif executed, just as Zia ul Huq had executed Benazir Bhutto’s father, Zulfikar Bhutto.

Clinton tasked me with saving Sharif’s life. The president believed Sharif did not deserve death, and that it would be a disaster for Pakistan to execute another elected leader after a military coup. I spent a great deal of time arguing for clemency with the Pakistani ambassador in Washington. The ambassador was sympathetic to the argument—but I needed more help. The Saudi ambassador to Washington at the time, Prince Bandar, provided the heavy lifting.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also did not want a repeat of the Zia-Zulfi nightmare. Then Crown Prince Abdallah used the Kingdom’s considerable influence in Pakistan to save Sharif. Saudi Arabia is Pakistan’s closest ally, and has given more financial aid to Pakistan than to any other country in the world. Abdallah asked Musharraf to let Sharif go into exile in Saudi Arabia. As Musharraf later wrote in his memoirs, it was an offer he could not refuse. After 14 months in prison, Sharif went into exile in the Kingdom in December 2000. Few expected him to ever return home.

Now the tables have turned. Sharif has won a massive electoral victory and his long time tormentor, Musharraf, is under arrest in Pakistan after returning from his own exile to run in the elections. Musharraf was ousted by popular pressure in 2008, became a billionaire in exile in London, and then foolishly decided he was Pakistan’s savior this winter and decided to go home to be swept back into power by the people. He miscalculated badly. No one in Pakistan wanted the self-appointed savior, and he is now under house arrest. He faces a number of charges and could be tried for the coup he orchestrated against Sharif. The irony is rich.

But Sharif faces a real challenge over what to do with Musharraf. The general has few supporters even in the army, but the officer corps will be very uncomfortable with the prospect of one of its own serving prison time, or worse. Since many of the senior commanders in the army today, including Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, are former Musharraf protégés who rose with him to power, the question of what to do with Musharraf now is a dangerous challenge. The courts will decide his fate but the next prime minister’s voice will matter.

Deciding how to handle the Musharraf affair is only one of Sharif’s huge challenges. The country is under siege by some of the extremists it nurtured during the wars in Afghanistan. Some 45,000 Pakistanis have died in extremist terrorism since 2001, and violence wracked the election. Sharif has urged a political process to try to end the terror, and has been widely accused of being too soft on the Pakistani Taliban. He has long coddled Pakistan’s most dangerous terrorist group, Lashkar e Tayyiba, which carried out the Mumbai massacre in 2008 and which has its headquarters in Sharif’s home city of Lahore. LeT retains very close links to the army and the intelligence service, the ISI.

Nonetheless, Sharif has also promised to turn a page in Pakistan’s relations with India and has invited Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to his inauguration. As an industrialist billionaire, Sharif knows the Pakistani economy desperately needs more trade and investment from its far more vibrant Indian neighbor. Pakistan’s economy is in shambles, and half the people in the country are under 15 with little hope for a decent education or a good job. Sharif is not obsessed with rivalry with India like his generals; his vision of Pakistan is more about building highways and mass transit than an arms race Pakistan cannot win. In the campaign, he promised that he will build a fast bullet train line linking the port city of Karachi to the northern city of Peshawar. When last in the prime minister’s office, he built a modern highway to link Lahore to Islamabad.

America’s relations with Pakistan are at an all-time low, yet Washington provides huge quantities of military and economic aid to Pakistan: over $25 billion since 2001. We are on opposite sides of the war in Afghanistan where Pakistan and the ISI are the Afghan Taliban’s key ally, even as we depend on Pakistan for the vital supply line that allows us to withdraw our heavy equipment from Afghanistan as we transition out of the country by 2014. Inside Pakistan, our drones fly daily missions looking for al Qaeda— missions Sharif promised to try to halt during the campaign. He did not endorse his rival Imran Khan’s call to shoot down American drones (probably with American-supplied F-16s) but he will face much popular demand to end the drone war.

Two presidents, Bush and Clinton, worked with Sharif with mixed results during his two previous tours as prime minister. Now that the comeback kid of Pakistani politics is on the verge of his third time in the top office, President Barack Obama will need to partner with Sharif. It’s an opportunity Obama needs to make a success.

Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Image Source: © Goran Tomasevic / Reuters

And They’re Off: The Campaign for a New Iranian President Has Begun

Suzanne Maloney — Mon, 13 May 2013 09:26:00 -0400

The race to replace Iran’s deeply polarizing president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, officially opened last week with the registration of prospective candidates, and already the campaign promises an utterly fascinating ride through the unpredictable politics of the Islamic Republic. The shock and awe surrounding the last-minute decision by Iran’s iconic former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, to throw his hat into yet another race has only been topped for drama by the latest antics of the current incumbent aimed apparently at elevating a controversial protégé to succeed him. At least at the outset, these sensational developments have overshadowed the emerging shape of the real race among an array of regime functionaries, most notably nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.

With 686 would-be candidates and an array of insidious regime mechanisms for influencing the outcome, it is literally impossible to predict today who the ultimate contenders will be, much less who will win the race. However, what is clear is that Iran’s presidential election represents the opening salvo in another historic turning point in the volatile evolution of the revolutionary theocracy.

The application period is a deliberately chaotic process, designed to justify the pretense behind the clerical vetting process and bolster the credibility of the nominees who are ultimately tapped by Iran’s Guardians’ Council, a 12-member unelected clerical oversight body. There is also a keen dimension of political theater, as the prospective candidates seek to gauge their relative prospects and the leadership endeavors to maintain an uneasy balance between galvanizing popular interest in the campaign and inciting the kind of electoral exuberance that has generated instability in the past. Over the course of the next 10 days, the field will be narrowed from several hundred to a mere handful who are assessed to meet the constitutional standards for the office.

This time around, the chaos has been intensified by the lingering memories of the upheaval that ensued in 2009, when an implausibly rapid vote-count and wide margin in favor of Ahmadinejad’s reelection instigated the largest and most sustained protests in Iran’s post-revolutionary history. The ensuing crackdown left Iran’s burgeoning reform movement estranged, imprisoned or scurrying into exile. Predictably, however, no sooner had the conservative wing of the Iranian political spectrum achieved uncontested dominance than deep fissures emerged within them. For the past two years, frictions among Iranian hard-liners have been directed, full bore, at Ahmadinejad himself, which greatly heightens the significance of the current contest to succeed him.

Cue Ahmadinejad’s first electoral adversary, Rafsanjani, whose entrance has sparked an intense debate about his motivations as well as about the competition to come. In a prospective field comprised mostly of second-tier Iranian political figures, mostly former ministers and parliamentarians, he is vastly better known and boasts a political machinery that spans factions and decades. For many within Iran’s dispirited reformist and opposition ranks, the former president offers their best hope of political redemption and national salvation, a hint of their own marginalization given their past differences with him. Rafsanjani’s reputation for pragmatism is well-earned; he was tasked by Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution’s founder, with ending the futile war with Iraq and later endeavored against stiff opposition to rehabilitate the country and reform its economy. He has carefully navigated fidelity to the system while critiquing both Ahmadinejad and the 2009 election, and his return to the presidency would likely revive now-dormant diplomatic fantasies in Europe and perhaps even Washington.

However, the former president faces powerful impediments that had persuaded many observers that his recent hints about the race were just a tease. Mostly notable is his age – almost 79 – which raises questions of capacity but also may undermine his appeal in a country with a disproportionately young population. More problematic is the unfortunate reality that he appears to have a more effusive constituency in the Western media than in Iran. Among the Iranian establishment, Rafsanjani is widely perceived as wildly corrupt and ideologically untrustworthy, and the population at large rejected his bid for a parliamentary seat in 2000 and favored Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential run-off. Now his unexpected entrance has incited a firestorm among the most doctrinaire of the hardliners, who have accused him of conspiring to delegitimize the system by daring the clerical supervisors to reject his candidacy.

Whatever happens, though, the calculations of the politician nicknamed “The Shark” (a reference to his lack of facial hair as well as his wily political skills) have already upended a race expected to rely on a motley array of second-tier Iranian political figures. His close ally, former nuclear negotiator Hassan Ruhani, had previously pledged to quit if Rafsanjani ran; Ruhani is a sharp-elbowed politician who has been an early and consistent critic of Ahmadinejad’s nuclear diplomacy and economic policy. So far that withdrawal has not come, despite much Twitter speculation to the contrary, and other similar pacts among conservative contenders also appear to be fraying under the weight of a suddenly reconfigured competition.

The Rafsanjani wild card is only one novelty in a race replete with interest. The other aspirant whose registration on Saturday has electrified Iranian poll watchers is Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. Mashaei, a close advisor to Ahmadinejad, has long been the focus of fierce clerical ire as a result of his eclectic religious and political views. He was forced out of a vice presidential slot in 2009 and is routinely scorned as the mastermind of a ‘deviant current’ that has infiltrated the Islamic Republic in an effort to undermine it. Mashaei’s ambitions have been telegraphed over many months through increasingly unsubtle efforts of Ahmadinejad to stack the deck in his favor, culminating in the tandem appearance at Mashaei’s registration. That move prompted a legal complaint against the president – either a quaint nod at legalism in a patently manipulated electoral framework or the first step in a process of silencing the unpredictable Ahmadinejad via intimidation or imprisonment.

The calculations of Rafsanjani, Mashaei and Ahmadinejad are compelling in their own right, and they will no doubt influence Iran’s future. However, the drama associated with them has diverted attention from the likely electoral landscape, which features a less thrilling but still significant roster of contenders. For several months, some speculation has centered on former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, a pediatrician by original training whose entire 32-year political career is the product of patronage by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Others have long fixated on Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqr Qalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guards commander who has assiduously restyled himself as a moderate, modernist problem-solver. Another dark horse to watch closely Gholamali Haddad Adel, a parliamentary leader and literature professor whose daughter is married to Khamenei’s powerful son Mojtaba.

The real heavyweight in the pack, however, is Jalili, who was virtually unknown beyond a small circle of the Iranian leadership until his appointment as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in 2009. In leading the contentious negotiations with the international community over Iran’s nuclear program, he has personified Iran’s quixotic mix of defiance with occasional bursts of pragmatism. One of his early forays in the high-stakes talks featured a discursive lecture on the Prophet Mohammad’s diplomacy, the subject of his doctoral dissertation. But Jalili was also responsible for signing onto a Western confidence-building step in 2009 that was quickly disavowed by Tehran. He survived the ensuing outcry among conservatives unscathed, a testament to his primary patron, Khamenei, whose office he directed for four years. Of all the would-be aspirants for the presidency in this round, Jalili appears to benefit from an air of ordination, and already talk has emerged among other conservatives of withdrawing in order to bolster his competitiveness.

Setting aside the personality politics, the most astonishing, and important, dimension of the campaign is simply that we care at all. Four years ago, many observers – including myself – argued the blatant orchestration of Ahmadinejad’s reelection had all but extinguished the relevance of the electoral dimension of Iran’s convoluted governing system. Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and many academics forecast that Iran was descending into a military dictatorship. So many of these predictions now appear off the mark, as external analysts and politicians all too often find when interpreting Iran.

Let’s be clear – the 2013 ballot will be rigged to a greater or lesser extent depending on how the campaign evolves, and the winner will undoubtedly benefit from unabashed assistance from the institutions, including the Guard. However, as the initial maneuvers of the 2013 presidential race underscores, politics in Iran remain competitive, unpredictable, and captivating. So stay tuned, and watch this space. One week from today, Brookings will be launching Iran @ Saban, a new blog that will focus on political and economic developments within Iran as well as the threats posed by its current policies and the strategic responses of the international community. The blog will showcase the deep bench of Brookings scholarship on the Middle East and issues such as proliferation, terrorism and, of course, electoral politics and the future of Iran.

Authors

Suzanne Maloney

Image Source: © Stringer Iran / Reuters

The Egypt-Israel Peace Test

Itamar Rabinovich and Tamara Cofman Wittes — Fri, 10 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The rocket strikes that a militant Islamist group recently fired from the Egyptian Sinai into the Israeli city of Eilat served as yet another reminder of how delicate bilateral relations remain two years after Egypt’s revolution. Terrorist activity could easily cause a crisis on the border, with the potential to trigger an unwanted confrontation that would threaten the peace treaty that normalized bilateral relations in 1979. To avoid such an outcome, Israel and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.

Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for the cease-fire with Gaza’s ruling Hamas. Morsi thus implicitly recommitted Egypt to upholding peace on the border and to playing a constructive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This boosted confidence in Israel that the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s ruling party, would uphold the 1979 peace treaty. But Morsi has not explicitly endorsed peace with Israel and has avoided direct engagement with Israeli leaders.

Preserving peace is in both countries’ interests. The attack on an Egyptian army outpost in the Sinai last summer, in which armed militants killed 16 soldiers, demonstrated that terrorism threatens Egypt just as it does Israel.

In this volatile environment, reverting to a confrontational relationship with Israel would be extremely dangerous, inviting the risk of another disastrous war. Upholding the peace treaty with Israel would have the opposite effect, enabling Egypt to pursue its goals of consolidating the military’s authority at home and enhancing its influence throughout the Middle East.

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Authors

Publication: Project Syndicate

Image Source: © Mohamed Abd El Ghany / Reuters

Israel’s Three Gambles in Syria

Daniel L. Byman and Natan B. Sachs — Tue, 07 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Israel's recent attacks against Syria are the latest, dramatic development in a conflict that is already spiraling out of control. In the past few days, Israeli aircraft reportedly targeted Iranian surface-to-surface missiles headed for Hezbollah, as well as Syrian missiles in a military base in the outskirts of Damascus. Israel's strikes show, once again, its intelligence services' ability to penetrate the Iran's arms shipment route to Lebanon and its military's skill in striking adversaries with seeming impunity. But Israel is also risking retaliation and further destabilization of its own neighborhood -- in ways that may come back to haunt it.

With much of Syria outside the control of Bashar al-Assad's forces, Israel is particularly wary of chemical weapons or advanced conventional weaponry falling into the wrong hands, whether it's extremist Sunni opposition groups like Jabhat al-Nusra or, more immediately, Assad's and Iran's Lebanese ally, Hezbollah. The missiles Israel sought to hit in the first attack on Friday have a significantly larger payload, greater accuracy, and longer range than the bulk of the Lebanese Shiite group's current arsenal. Contrary to the allegations of the Assad regime that claims Israel's strikes prove it is backing the opposition, Israel is not throwing its weight against Assad. Indeed, Israel's latest strikes represent the latest in a long-standing policy of denying the transfer of arms that could alter the balance of power between Israel and Hezbollah -- weapons systems such as advanced Russian surface-to-air missiles; the Iranian-made Fateh 110 surface-to-surface missiles (reportedly targeted this weekend) that would significantly increase Hezbollah's threat to northern Israeli cities; or additional surface-to-sea weaponry, such as the kind successfully used against an Israeli ship in July 2006.

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Authors

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Baz Ratner / Reuters

When Bombing Syria, Remember Lebanon

Bruce Riedel — Tue, 07 May 2013 16:23:00 -0400

For more than two years, Israel has wisely kept a low profile as civil war has engulfed its northern neighbor Syria. But this past week, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu sent his air force to strike targets in and around Damascus, significantly raising Israel’s profile in the conflict. As Israel and America consider their next steps in that unstable environment, it would be wise to remember how Israel gradually got engaged in the Lebanese civil war and found nothing but frustration and failure as its well intentioned policies yielded unanticipated effects and unintended consequences.

Syria and Lebanon share the same bitterly sectarian politics. Both are the creations of French imperialism. And both were misruled too long by minority sects that spawned vicious and violent civil wars. Israel began interfering in Lebanon’s internal affairs in the 1960s when the Palestinian movement built its headquarters there. Starting with an air attack on Beirut International Airport in 1968, successive Israeli governments got more and more sucked into the swamp of Lebanese politics and warlord conflict.

In 1978, Israeli built a proxy army in south Lebanon and created a security zone to defend northern Israel from terror attacks. Similarly, there is talk now in Israel of a security zone in Syria and perhaps a Druze collaboration partner. In 1982, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon invaded Lebanon to create a “new Middle East” that would destroy the PLO and Hafez al-Assad’s Syria. Instead, Operation Peace for Galilee led to the Sabra and Shatila massacre, the Marine barracks bombing, two attacks on the American embassy, an eighteen-year-long insurgency in south Lebanon, the awakening of Lebanese Shia militancy and creation of Hezbollah.

Peace for Galilee was followed by Operation Accountability in 1993, Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1995 and finally Israel’s complete and unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. Israel’s Lebanese allies were abandoned to their fate. But the war continued across the border. In 2006, a half million Israelis were displaced from their homes during the thirty-four-day war with Hezbollah. Today Hezbollah has more weapons than ever before.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The National Interest

Image Source: © Sana Sana / Reuters

Around the Halls: Israel's Airstrikes in Syria

Tue, 07 May 2013 11:22:00 -0400

Following news of Israel’s weekend airstrikes in Syria, Brookings experts examine the implications of Israel’s actions, analyze Syria and Hezbollah’s possible responses, and offer foreign policy recommendations for the United States. Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth M. Pollack, Natan Sachs, Salman Shaikh, and Tamara Cofman Wittes weigh in on the latest developments.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli airstrikes in Syria over the past few days were an instance of a standing Israeli policy: preventing, by all means necessary, the transfer of “game changing” weapons to either Asad’s ally, Hezbollah, or—of increasing Israeli concern—to extremist groups among the Syrian opposition. Such weapons include not only chemical weapons from Syria’s large stockpile but also advanced conventional weapons such as Russian anti-aircraft missiles or the Iranian Fateh 110 surface to surface missiles Israel reportedly targeted this weekend (missiles with significantly larger payload, better accuracy and longer range than most existing Hezbollah weaponry, such that Israelis cities would be under considerably more threat from Hezbollah than in the past).

The Israelis are betting that their actions do not backfire, either by provoking a larger conflict with Hezbollah or the Asad regime or by influencing the Syrian civil war in unpredictable ways (see this piece Dan and I wrote in Foreign Policy). Israel, in its view, has no horse in the race in Syria. It has no love for the Asad regime but is deeply wary of the potential for chaos or for an extremist takeover of parts of Syria. The Israeli stance has been, therefore, to take action on tangible, operational intelligence as it emerges but to refrain from involvement in the civil war itself; to protect its vital interests while remaining largely outside the fray.

But acting on the tactical and operational level without influencing the situation at large can be a difficult balancing act. Israel would provide the perfect foil for the Syrian regime or for Hezbollah, both of whom are mired in a bloody civil war where they on the wrong side, in popular Arab eyes. A diversionary conflict with Israel would offer them an out from the ire of the Arab publics, as the renewed anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Syrian regime in the past few days has demonstrated. Indeed, Israel was on alert in its north, deploying Iron Dome batteries, temporarily closing off the northern civilian airspace and ramping down a planned military exercise, for fear of stoking the flames. But Israel remains relatively confident that the situation will remain under control—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu departed the country for a state visit to China—with both the Asad regime and Hezbollah wary of opening a front with the vastly more powerful Israel, and especially its airpower, while they struggle to hold their positions on the ground in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, I'd like to just note that three Israeli strikes with non-stealthy aircraft cast some doubt on the Administration's alarmism about Syria's vaunted air defenses. Indeed, I wonder if that isn't also in the back of Bibi's head—demonstrating just how poor Syrian air defenses actually are.

Second, I would like to resurrect some of my comments from my blog post from last week: namely that whether the regime retaliates against Israel will be driven by its assessment of the fight with the opposition. As long as the regime feels it has a prospect of beating the rebels, it won't retaliate for fear of an escalatory spiral with Israel. They are very wary of taking on the IDF while they are fighting for their lives against the Sunnis--as long as they think they can win that fight. However, once they become concerned that they cannot win that fight, then the regime's incentive structure flips and it becomes more likely that they will retaliate against Israel, since the possibility of transforming the contest into an Arab-Israeli war outweighs whatever damage the Israelis could do once they conclude that they are doomed anyway. Right now, I do not believe the regime has reached that level of desperation, so I doubt they retaliate.

Salman Shaikh
Director, Brookings Doha Center, Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, Israel seems intent on defending its "red lines" and has already acted to stop the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; responded directly to fire from Syrian army units in the Golan Heights; and sounded the alarm on the use of chemical weapons.

With regard to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, it has shown that it is willing to change the 'rules of engagement' with the Assad regime and hit these weapons inside Syria. In doing so, it is seeking to establish a new level of deterrence with respect to such activities. Certainly, the latest strikes against weapons depots and reportedly the headquarters of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard as well as the 4th Division commanded by Bashar's brother, Maher Assad are punitive and painful. The psychological effects that such strikes could have on the senior officer core, particularly the Alawite officers, who form the backbone of the army and its security forces will be worth watching. In a short period of time, the certainty of the previous 40 years of "cold peace" has been replaced by the realisation that Israel will strike again and harder if Asad continues to supply Hezbollah.

The likely response from the Assad regime, as has already been the case since the strikes over the weekend, is to exploit the propaganda value of Israel's "aggression" and attempt to link it with efforts to aid the opposition's rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army has condemned the "Israeli aggression" but denied any connection to it. The Syrian National Coalition has responded by engaging in “verbal acrobatics” by condemning the attacks but also blaming Assad for weakening the country.

What will matter is the effect that this will have on the large number of people, particularly in the cities, who have not openly sided with either the regime or the opposition. If the situation escalates, the regime could gain ground by hammering the message that Israel has sided with rebels and extremists and that only the regime can protect the unity of Syria in this difficult period.

Key states in the Arab world, at least rhetorically, seem to be following suit. In addition to the predictable condemnations from the Syrian regime's supporters in Lebanon and Iraq, statements from President Morsi of Egypt and the Saudi government have condemned Israel's "violation of international law" and pointed to its dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretary-General called it "a blatant aggression and a serious violation of an Arab country's sovereignty." He has also called for the UN to take action (never mind the League's silence over the recent massacres in Baniyas and the alleged use of chemical weapons).

Whether these statements reflect the views of Arab publics is debatable. For now at least, the focus will likely remain on the Assad regime's brutal use of force against its own people. The majority of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs are angry with Assad and resentful of the support that Hezbollah and the Iranians have provided to him. However, the suspicions that many in the region have towards Israel's actions will likely grow if the attacks continue and if these are perceived as only furthering Israel's interests.

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

For U.S. policy, my concern is that several important U.S. allies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and now Israel— are involved in significant ways. And other neighbors, notably Lebanon and Iraq, are suffering increasing instability from the Syrian conflict. Meanwhile, the instability from Syria is steadily spreading beyond its borders. Even beyond the human cost, the United States has long had its own interests, including counterterrorism, in playing a more decisive role. Now the problem is metastasizing, and U.S. allies might work at cross purposes, and their actions may end up harming each other in the end.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree wholeheartedly with Dan. The issue for me is the abdication of American leadership. I cannot remember another time when the United States was so noticeably absent from a major issue— the major issue— in Middle Eastern international politics. It's important to make a distinction between leadership and direct intervention. Often when people call for a more robust American policy, they are shut down with a pointed question: "What do you want, another Iraq war?" But there is much that the United States could do, short of military intervention, to coordinate the activities of its allies. Leadership requires, before anything else, a clear vision of the future— a picture of an end state that is both desirable and achievable. The United States has no vision whatsoever of the outcome that it would like to see in Syria. It does not even have a clear definition of its major interests in the conflict. The only interest that the Obama administration has clearly articulated is its desire to remain aloof.

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Syrian activists on the ground and in exile are at least ambivalent about the Israeli strikes, and some are downright celebratory. But the Egyptian government and the Arab League were quick to issue statements denouncing Israeli interference. Given the involvement of Arab League members and the League itself in Syria’s internal crisis, the latter condemnation in particular was thick with irony. But just as the speedy criticisms from Cairo reflect the ongoing nationalist sensitivity there, the controversy in the rest of the Arab world over how to respond to the Israeli strikes likewise underscores the ways in which the Arab Awakening— and the Syrian conflict most pointedly— has upended once-comfortable principles regarding sovereignty, Arab nationalism, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli air strikes have been interpreted by many as a message to Tehran, hardly surprising given Iran’s central role in providing materiel support to Bashar Al Asad and its reliance on Damascus as both a bulwark against regional isolation and a conduit to its proxies in the Levant. What is interesting is Tehran’s response – not simply the predictable fulminations from senior officials and clerics, but the stepped-up pace of Iran’s diplomatic outreach on Syria. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi arrived in Amman today for talks, just in time to announce a visit to Tehran next week by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani.

This is the latest indication of Iran’s underlying objective with respect to the conflict in Syria – ensuring that the Islamic Republic retains influence in Damascus irrespective of the outcome of the civil war. This imperative has shaped a hedging strategy from the outset of the unrest: Iran hopes to preserve at least a vestige of its ally Bashar, but has also sought a seat at the table in shaping post-Asad Syria in any formal regional dialogue. Tehran’s hedging here goes beyond protecting its equities and bolstering regime security; there is a genuine national interest in precluding the expansion of Sunni extremism, which Iran has rightly viewed as a threat since the emergence of the Taliban more than two decades ago.

The concept of Iranian engagement on Syria is anathema to Washington, for good reason. And yet it should not be reflexively blocked by an Obama Administration that is under fire for its absurd public dithering on Syria. Iranian diplomatic engagement on Syria will not preclude troublemaking by Tehran; however, excluding Iran from the contentious regional politics surrounding the conflict is a recipe for inflaming the situation even further. Any long-term stable outcome in Syria will require neutralizing Iran’s incentives for sabotage as well as stemming the sectarian violence brewing amidst the conflict.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Khaled Al Hariri / Reuters

A Preview of the 2013 U.S.-Islamic World Forum

Tamara Cofman Wittes — Mon, 06 May 2013 12:35:00 -0400

We’re just a month away from the tenth annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, which will take place in Doha on June 9-11. The Forum will feature discussions of security in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the relationship between political reform and economic development, and international responses to the crisis in Syria. We will also host sessions on the role of arts and culture in societies emerging from conflict, and the evolution of Arab identity.

As always, our Forum will include four expert working groups to consider some crucial issues: advancing women's political participation, the role of faith based leaders in diplomacy, freedom of speech within Muslim communities, and promoting inclusive development in Egypt and Tunisia.

If you won’t be with us in Doha, you can join our conversations online. To get an idea of what’s in store, please view our website— where there are findings and recommendations from our working groups last year—or watch our video highlights from last year’s forum entitled, “New Voices, New Directions,” below:

Download Media

U.S. - Islamic World Forum: New Voices, New Directions

We recently engaged Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jaber Al Thani in a conversation on the key questions about Qatar’s diplomatic, economic, and political role in the region. I invite you to listen to the discussion with Sheikh Hamad, moderated by Brookings Vice President for Foreign Policy Martin Indyk.

Keep checking this space for updates on the upcoming forum, as we post videos previewing the lively discussions to come. Follow us on Twitter or tweet your own ideas with the hashtag #usislam13.

Video

U.S. - Islamic World Forum: New Voices, New Directions

Authors

Tamara Cofman Wittes

Image Source: Paul Morse

Iran Press Report: The Election Season Begins

Mehrun Etebari — Mon, 06 May 2013 17:00:00 -0400

The 2013 Iranian presidential campaign in Iran officially begins tomorrow. Naturally, with just over a month left until the June 14^th polls, the election season has been ongoing in a heated manner in the Iranian media for months. One issue that has remained at the forefront of the campaign coverage since well before the discussions of potential candidates has been the election as a landmark of national strength and resistance. Not only did the Supreme Leader declare the need for a “political epic” in his Nowruz speech, which has meshed with calls for a high level of voter participation to show the world the vibrancy of Iranian democracy, but there has always been the specter of foreign infiltration in the form of fifth columns. Coverage has frequently brought to mind the upheaval that followed the election of 2009, when supporters of ostensibly regime-approved candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, took to the streets in what the conservative establishment in Iran has called the “2009 Sedition,” which it has attributed to Western intelligence agencies. Thus, there have been attempts to tie candidates and political movements to foreign agents and brand them security threats throughout the pre-campaign season.

A prime example has been rhetoric by certain hardline commentators linking the reformist camp and its likely candidates to the “seditionists,” and suggesting that they should not be allowed into the election process by the clerics of the Guardian Council, which vets every politician who seeks to enter the race for acceptability. For example, a piece by influential Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari last week called reformist former President Mohammad Khatami a hypocrite for suggesting that reformists be allowed to participate when “hundreds of documents” make it clear that they can’t come up with “even one example of an action they have taken which was not directly ordered by the American-Israeli-British triangle.” This prompted retaliation from the reformist daily Bahar, which slammed Shariatmadari for resorting to twisting comments made by Khatami three decades ago to indict him while forgetting that only a few years back, Shariatmadari was on the record as a fierce supporter of the Ahmadinejad government, of which he has now become a strong critic. Two articles in Bahar suggested that Shariatmadari was only resorting to attacking the reformists, which he had previously called a dead force, because he was proven unable to back up his own advocacy of Ahmadinejad in past elections. On Saturday, Shariatmadari retorted that aside from the current economic predicament, the unsavory aspects of the recent phase of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, such as ties to corrupt groups and individuals, are the very same blots that mark the record of the Khatami era.

As many Iranians, including most of the political class, have become more consistently more disenchanted with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad due to issues including the state of Iran’s economy and his clashes both with the Majlis and the Office of the Supreme Leader, a large segment of the press surrounding the election has focused on the candidate to emerge from the president’s camp. For years, there has been speculation that the controversial advisor Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei would be Ahmadinejad’s successor, and thus we have seen an increase in the number and intensity of articles criticizing Mashaei – painted as the leader of a “Deviant Circle” in the hardline media. There has also been great criticism, both from conservatives and moderates, of the vociferous attempts by the president to position Mashaei prominently before the election and to issue subtle threats to his opponents who wish to see him barred from running.

For example, last Monday, writers both in Kayhan and Etemaad noted with astonishment that Ahmadinejad’s camp seems to believe they can prevent any rejection of Mashaei, and have not considered any second-choice candidates (the former used more subtle language, while the latter referred to the government’s embrace of the “Putin-Medvedev model” in selecting Mashaei as an ostensibly one-term stand-in for his mentor). In a separate article, Shariatmadari wrote that, for a president who supposed cared so much about economic justice, Ahmadinejad was wasting a great deal of public money on provincial trips and a New Year-related celebration that amounted to thinly veiled campaign stops on behalf of Mashaei. When the president warned unnamed enemies that he had documents implicating illegal actions on their part, he was criticized from right and left, with Shariatmadari saying that blackmail was unbefitting a president – whom he insinuated must have something to hide himself if he is not revealing the details of such crimes – and Kasra Nuri in Bahar writing that it appeared he was trying to “engineer the election,” rather than defend Iranians’ democratic rights as he was claiming.

In spite of the high tension in spots, there remains an overall lack of clarity in the elections, as candidate registrations do not officially begin until tomorrow. Since the beginning of the year, outlets such as the conservative Resalat have argued that the pre-electoral season has been dominated by empty slogans rather than true proposals to attack Iran’s serious problems. Outlets have also considered the great abundance of possible candidates – including over 20 well-known politicians who have said they are up for consideration. In a piece called “Candidacy Fever” in the reformist Etemaad, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh wrote that the Principlists – the dominant conservative faction in the Majlis – had badly managed their selection process. He argued that by promoting themselves as the triumvirate from which a consensus candidate would emerge, the “2+1” group of former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, former Majlis Speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel, and Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had miffed others in the front, who announced their candidacies in response, leading to the glut of Principlist candidates. The reformist and moderate camp also remains cloudy, as a lengthy interview and analysis piece in Etemaad suggested that the reformists may form a consensus around the candidacy of former Khatami advisor Eshaq Jahangiri, assuming that Khatami and Rafsanjani both stay out of the race. With the registration period beginning imminently, the picture is sure to become clearer in the next two weeks.

APPENDIX: Translated Summaries of Selected Opinion Pieces (Newest to Oldest)

“What ‘Magnanimity’?” Amir Abbas Najafi, Bahar, 10 Ordibehesht 1391 / 30 April 2013.
“A Threadbare Game.” Bahar, 10 Ordibehesht 1391 / 30 April 2013.

After Hossein Shariatmadari’s scathing editorial against the reformists and former President Khatami from the day before, two pieces in the reformist daily Bahar hit back at the hardline editor’s accusations and defend the reform movement. Najafi, in his piece, notes the conspicuous lack of any of Shariatmadari’s past vocal praise for President Ahmadinejad in his article, suggesting that since he has no track record of his own to base his arguments on he instead resorted to cowardly attacks on the reformists. After citing speeches from Shariatmadari prior to his distancing himself from Ahmadinejad, including lines referring to the president as “a hard-working brother who has done everything he has in service of the people and of the revolution,” he writes, “But apparently the sunny weather of the Ahmadinejad government has these days must have turned too cloudy for Hossein Shariatmadari, who seems to still remember the words of Mr. Khatami about artists from his time in the Culture Ministry about 29 years ago. Yet he has forgotten his own words from seven years ago.” He mockingly urges Shariatmadari to stay true to his convictions and show he deserves his accolades as a great thinker and writer by finding a way to maintain his support for Ahmadinejad, and not stoop to hurling ludicrous insults at the reformists. Meanwhile, in the paper’s unsigned editorial, Kayhan is slammed for accusing the reformists of complicity in foreign plots and of “selling out the country.” Bahar argues that the true sale of the country has been corruption and mismanagement which has seen “the auctioning off of the nation’s wealth and material and intellectual capital. Are the sellers of the nation the reformists or those who have remained silent while this unprecedented assault on the nation’s resources has occurred?” The paper argues that the “dear brothers” at Kayhan are incomprehensibly bringing down the level of political debate in the nation to the point where they seriously expect readers to believe that foreign intelligence services are openly and publicly using Iranian politicians as their pawns. Finally, it wonders why Shariatmadari felt the need to direct so much vitriol at a movement he has frequently described as dead and useless: “Have you not been saying that the reformists are dead and that society pays no attention to them and does not welcome them?”

“Water Won’t be Moved by Water.” Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan, 9 Ordibehesht 1392 / 29 April 2013.

Hossein Shariatmadari writes that there is an unrealistic belief among those who were part of the “American-Israeli sedition” in 2009, whom he says cannot provide “even one example of an action they have taken which was not directly ordered by the American-Israeli-British triangle”, that their candidates – namely, a reformist candidate – will be approved. He extends this criticism to the “deviant circle” associated with Ahmadinejad advisor Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, which he claims the reformists are working in concert with now. However, much of the article is devoted most specifically to slamming the reformists in general and former President Khatami in general, as the influential Kayhan editor claims that the “seditionists” have forfeited their right to participate in the election and that any attempt by Khatami – who has not yet announced a decision on his entry into the race – to say otherwise would be hypocrisy. He cites Khatami’s own words during his time as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance when he said filmmakers who had made works deemed contrary to Islamic morals before the revolution should not be allowed to return to the mainstream by appearing in the Fajr film festival. He says Khatami must be asked, “How is it that Your Excellency doesn’t accept corrupt people and those with tainted pasts in cinematic society but you hope that individuals who have tied themselves to hundreds of crimes of corruption and treason can work in the most central posts with the greatest responsibility in the entire system, such as the presidency?!”

“End of the Highway; Drive Carefully!” Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan, 3 Ordibehesht 1392 / 23 April 2013.

Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari writes in the hardline daily that the recent series of provincial visits by President Ahmadinejad are nothing but a thinly veiled campaign tour on behalf of his controversial advisor, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, whom he refers to as the candidate of the “Deviant Circle.” Further, he claims that the president’s comments alluding to fighting back against “threats” by unnamed parties – possibly referring to those who would like to see Mashaei prevented from participating in the presidential election by the Guardian Council – are not only politically crude but are insensitive given that the president is spending so much time traveling on an apparent campaign at a time when the inflation is deeply affecting average Iranians. He also excoriated the president for his recent rally – ostensibly in honor of the Iranian New Year – in the national Azadi Stadium, saying it diverted tens of millions of dollars from the people all to serve as a clandestine campaign event on behalf of Mashaei. “Do the 50 billion tomans in costs to the Treasury and from the poor and downtrodden people for a campaign advertisement for Mr. Mashaei in Azadi Stadium count as an example of the President’s constant quest for justice?” In response to the president’s claims against his unnamed adversaries that he has secret files that could end their political careers, Shariatmadari retorts that if there are true crimes that the president has knowledge of, he must reveal them – his refusal to do so indicates either that he is lying or that any files he has also implicate himself in wrongdoing.

“Misleading.” Kasra Nuri, Bahar, 31 Farvardin 1392 / 20 April 2013.

Kasra Nuri writes in the reformist-leaning Bahar that recent vocal warnings by President Ahmadinejad that nobody should “interfere” in the election process are self-serving threats rather than a true attempt to defend Iranian citizens from electoral manipulation, in that they are aimed at those who wish to marginalize Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. He argues that defending citizen’s rights to free elections under the constitution is a noble cause, but that the president’s past indicates that he may be championing the people only when it suits him and his entourage. “Perhaps in his eyes, according to the law, all citizens are equal, but certain of them are more of citizens than others, and the president is obliged to do anything to defend their rights, or to help them attain their goals!” Essentially, he says, Ahmadinejad is trying to pre-empt decisions on the suitability of Mashaei to be an approved presidential candidate, and thus he himself is trying to interfere and “engineer the election” on behalf of his close ally.

“Candidacy Fever.” Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, Etemaad, 31 Farvardin 1392 / 20 April 2013.

In the reformist-leaning Etemaad, Former MP Falahatpisheh writes that there is an astonishing number of politicians in the traditional conservative (Principlist) camp declaring themselves ready to enter the presidential election, which he attributes to poor party discipline as well as a perhaps dangerous confidence among the Principlists that there is no worthy competitor for the office, and that they will thus be able to determine the next president in what essentially amounts to an internal election. He also suggests that many who have announced their candidacy had no true intention to run for president, but found the announcement of the “2+1” Coalition of potential candidates – Tehran Mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, and Former Majlis Speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel – to be a detrimental act to crowd out other potential candidates without consulting the party base, and declared their own candidacies in subtle defiance. He also suggests that there has been a low standard of quality among many candidates in recent elections, and thus politicians are less likely to view themselves as unqualified for consideration. But in the end, he writes, most are not serious candidates, but people trying to gain attention. “They are announcing themselves as candidates out of a desire to carve themselves a place in a unity cabinet after the election, and all this complexity is due to the weaknesses that currently exist in the party system.”

“The Known and Unknown of the 11^th Election.” Mohammad Imani, Kayhan, 27 Farvardin 1392 / 16 April 2013.

Citing the goal of realizing the “political epic” called for by the Supreme Leader in his Nowruz address, Imani acknowledged that high participation in the June election will strengthen the nation and defy Iran’s enemies – but emphasized that this high participation cannot come at the expense of allowing internal enemies freedom to join the election. Specifically, he cites the “Seditious Current” – the supporters of the Green Movement in the 2009 election – and the “Deviant Circle” around Mashaei. He says they are selfish, corrupt groups who act against the Leader, and act against the principles of the Iranian political epic, and thus cannot be given legitimacy to have candidates in the election. He claims that these very groups who wish to have their candidates approved for the election this year in the name of increasing participation were the very same who acted against it last year: “The Sedition and Deviant groups are the very same ones who tried and failed to bring the 9^th Majlis Elections to stagnation last year.”

“The Overload of Campaign Slogans Without an Overload of Political Rhetoric.” Hamed Hajji-Heydari, Resalat, 14 Esfand 1391 / 4 March 2013.

Hajji-Heydari writes in the conservative daily Resalat that the campaign has begun without true substance. Instead of attacking the very serious issues facing Iran, he writes, candidates are putting forth empty slogans and campaigning on personality. “Political elites must hear the comments of the people, must understand their problems, must devise solutions to those problems in adequate detail, must put those proposals in front of the people in different manners, and finally, after attracting the support of the people in the election and based on the support of the people of their policies and plans, must use electoral victory as political capital to build policies over the next four years.”

“The 1392 Election and the Enemy’s Hyperactivity.” Hesameddin Boroumand, Kayhan, 19 Esfand 1391 / 9 March 2013.

Hesameddin Boroumand argues that the West sees the election as an opportunity to sow discord in Iran, but that it will fail. “With only three months left until the 1392 Election, it is appropriate to reflect how the enemies of the Islamic Republic have, since the beginning of the current year [March 2012], undertaken every effort to influence next year’s [June 2013] presidential election.” He also argues that attempts to get Iran to fear a military strike through repetition of the phrase “All options are on the table!” are “now clearly seen as having been only a bluff.” He writes that, now that the efforts to create political turmoil within Iran have failed, the enemy will wish to try a more direct route to sabotage the Iranian election and use it as a platform for unrest – but also the “conspiracy of the enemy” was “exposed” by Khamenei in remarks indicating the foreigners’ plans for infiltration, with the goal of replicating the sedition of 2009 which was cached in such slogans as “Free elections!” He cites recent reports by WINEP and RAND to suggest that Washington well knows its efforts to pressure Iran have been in vain, and that Iran stands to deliver a further blow to its efforts by remaining vigilant in the 2013 election and turning out in large numbers.

Authors

Mehrun Etebari

Mr. Obama, Don’t Draw That Line

Daniel L. Byman — Sat, 04 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

“The use of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable,” President Obama warned Bashar al-Assad’s government last December. “If you make the tragic mistake of using these weapons, there will be consequences and you will be held accountable.”

This threat followed the president’s earlier warning that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized.” This red line has come to haunt Mr. Obama. Last week, the American intelligence community assessed “with varying degrees of confidence” that the Syrians had used the chemical agent sarin in their attacks on the opposition.

The administration’s ultimatum now seems like cheap talk, and it illustrates the risks of carelessly drawing red lines and issuing highly public threats that won’t be enforced.

So far, at least, the Obama administration has put off both consequences and accountability and simply pushed for further investigation. Meanwhile, Mr. Assad has not blinked, and the president’s political opponents, like Representative Mike Rogers, Republican of Michigan, argue that Iran and North Korea will draw the wrong lessons if the president lets Mr. Assad call his bluff.

Red lines can be attractive tools of foreign policy, deterring foes from ethnic cleansing, genocide or, in the case of Syria, using chemical weapons. Part of the reason to go public, as one administration official put it last year regarding Syria, is to have a “deterrent effect.” By threatening to act in advance of a problem, you stop the problem and don’t have to act. Issuing a red line can also reassure allies or placate domestic critics.

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Authors

Daniel L. Byman

Publication: New York Times

Obama's Strategy in the Middle East: The Blurry Red Line

Shadi Hamid — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 13:23:00 -0400

As evidence of the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons mounts, the Obama administration has further confused matters regarding its own stated "red lines." The evidence appears to be strong but not necessarily "conclusive." As the April 25th White House letter states, "the chain of custody is not clear, so we cannot confirm how the exposure occurred and under what conditions." This sort of rhetoric points to an administration that finds itself cornered but, at the same time, seems intent on postponing any decisive action for as long humanly possible. The debate over whether, how, when, and to what extent lines were crossed not only seems petty (and undermines the very notion of a red line); it is also a distraction.

Presumably, the Obama administration's red-lining of chemical weapons isn't just about the risk of mass civilian casualties. After all, mass slaughter -- with over 70,000 killed -- has already happened and hasn't apparently shaken the U.S. commitment to studied inaction. The real concern is over the security implications of chemical weapon use or transport. First, the weapons could fall into the hands of non-state actors, metastasizing the terror threat. Second (and related to the first), the spread of chemical weapons would lead to unprecedented regional destabilization in the form of a sharp increase in refugee flows, which, in turn, could threaten the stability of friendly autocrats like the Jordanian monarchy.

These concerns are of course justified, but the focus on security implications -- rather than focusing on the 70,000 already killed by good old-fashioned artillery and aircraft -- suggests an outdated (and morally problematic) calculus for action. In saying that chemical weapons are a red line, the Obama administration is also saying that the killing of 70,000 Syrians is not a red line, which, when you think about it, is a remarkable thing to say.

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Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: The Atlantic

Syria's Use of Chemical Weapons: The Ball’s in Your Court, Mr. President

Bruce Riedel — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 09:18:00 -0400

The news that Washington and London finally believe Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime has used chemical weapons against its own people is both an opportunity and a series of traps. Both the opportunity and the traps are huge, and President Obama needs to tread carefully to quickly exploit the first and avoid the second.

Credible observers of Syria like my colleague at the Brookings Doha Center, Salman Shaikh, have been reporting since December on the evidence that Assad’s forces have used small quantities of chemical weapons in the civil war that has been raging in Syria for more than two years. Like almost everything else in Syria, Assad’s arsenal of missiles and chemical weapons are a legacy of his father Hafez Assad. After the Syrian army and air force was defeated by Israel in Lebanon in 1982, Hafez ordered development of a chemical arsenal to provide a deterrent against the Israelis. Syrian scientists developed an effective chemical weapons program using the nerve agent sarin, a substance 500 times more toxic than cyanide. In 1988, the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein used sarin in his war against the Iranians and in attacks on Iraqi Kurds with devastating impact.

Syria mated the nerve agent with Scud missiles acquired from the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. When Israeli learned of the Syrian program, it considered military action to destroy it but concluded the program was too developed and too disbursed to be susceptible to air attacks without an unacceptable risk that Syria would respond by firing chemicals into Tel Aviv, potentially killing thousands. The Syrian arsenal remains disbursed in numerous facilities making it a complex military challenge.

By using chemical weapons Assad has crossed not only an American red line but an international consensus against the use of chemical weapons that goes back to the First World War. He has given Obama the opportunity to break the Russian and Chinese diplomatic support for Syria that has paralyzed the United Nations from imposing harsh sanctions on Syria as well as a total arms embargo on the Assad regime. Washington is right to demand an immediate UN-led inspection on the ground in Syria with a very short deadline.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Daily Beast

Is Syria's Alleged Chemical Weapons Use the Tipping Point for U.S. Intervention?

Kenneth M. Pollack — Thu, 25 Apr 2013 15:00:00 -0400

Today's admission that the U.S. Government believes that the Syrian regime has employed chemical warfare agents (chemical weapons) in its ongoing civil war places the Obama administration on the horns of a dilemma. Washington has twisted itself into the proverbial pretzel trying to avoid a deeper engagement in the Syrian civil war. Over the past two years, their excuses for inaction have multiplied and morphed in shameless fashion. They have hidden behind everything from "we can't act without Russian permission" to the president's appalling claim that he had to weigh intervention in Syria to alleviate the suffering there against the humanitarian needs of Congo—as if he were contemplating intervention there and despite the fact that he has intervened in neither country.

Nonetheless, the administration is right to be cautious about intervention in Syria. The United States could intervene—there is even a good case to be made that the U.S. and its allies could end the civil war in a positive, hopeful fashion. But doing so would require a huge effort, precisely on the scale of Iraq (as Tom Friedman has rightly warned in the New York Times) because "solving" the Syrian civil war would require an effort tantamount to the surge in Iraq—but lasting longer to prevent the slide back into civil war that we are seeing in Iraq today.

Thus, the administration is understandably wary of intervention in Syria, regardless of the poverty of the excuses it has used to justify its stance. And going after Syrian chemical warfare could create a slippery slope toward general intervention. First, Syria has a large chemical warfare infrastructure and the regime's forces have reportedly stockpiled large amounts in over a dozen locations. Taking out all of these sites—and others if the regime is able to disperse them before we can destroy them—it could require a large military effort, possibly involving the insertion of significant special operations forces and thus raising the possibility of ground battles. Military operations are inherently unpredictable and the hundreds of air sorties and hundreds or even thousands of troops that might be involved in such an effort could become the start of an escalatory spiral that the administration clearly seeks to avoid (even though it might still someday be unavoidable).

However, the Syrian regime's use of chemical warfare poses an equally vexing problem for the administration. The greatest problem is that if the regime believes that it can use chemical warfare with impunity, the war itself—and its spillover into neighboring states will become many times worse. As bad as the Syrian civil war already is, if the regime is employing chemical warfare liberally, deaths will rise and panic will soar. Refugee flows could turn into a torrent, swamping Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. Neighboring Sunni populations would become infuriated and either demand that their governments openly intervene in Syria to stop the fighting, or greatly increase the covert flow of arms, money and jihadists to the opposition. Either and both would be both probable and extremely dangerous for all of the states involved—as would any effort to resist the calls for intervention. In short, unchecked chemical warfare use could have severe repercussions for the rest of the region, and in ways that would threaten American interests.

Add to this the reputational costs of the Obama administration failing to back up its self-proclaimed "red line"—which could have an impact on Iranian thinking, or on Israeli thinking about America's commitment on Iran—and the administration faces real risks if it does nothing too.

At least for the moment, there would seem to be an easy out for the administration: the demonstration shot. The easiest move by the administration would be to pick out a valuable, discreet target of the regime's and obliterate it—with cruise missiles and possibly manned aircraft as well. The strike would be a warning to the Syrians that worse would follow if the regime does not desist from further chemical warfare use and a demonstration that Washington will back up its red line.

That seems to be the administration's obvious recourse here, but the real question then would be the Syrian regime's response. In particular if the regime backs down and does not use more chemical warfare, it will be a sign of optimism about their prospects in the civil war—that they are still more afraid of the Americans than the opposition. On the other hand, if they have become desperate, and fear defeat by the opposition more than whatever the U.S. does, they might shrug off such a limited strike and employ everything in their arsenal to try to stave off defeat. In that case, then the administration will really face a dilemma about what to do next.

Authors

Kenneth M. Pollack

Lessons of the Syrian Reactor

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 11:01:00 -0400

The office of the assistant to the president for national-security affairs in the West Wing of the White House is a spacious, well-lit corner room in a building where space is at a premium. It contains not only the national-security adviser’s large desk but also a table for lunch discussions and other small meetings as well as a couch and easy chairs for more relaxed discussions. In April 2007, this commodious setting was the scene of a remarkable meeting. Stephen Hadley, the national-security adviser at the time, welcomed Meir Dagan, head of the Mossad, who came with a special briefing for his American host. Dagan revealed a secret nuclear reactor in the final stages of construction in the Syrian desert, developed with the help of North Korea. Knowledge of this project constituted a stunning intelligence coup for Israel.

Later that year, on September 6, 2007, the Israeli Air Force destroyed Syria’s nuclear facility at Al Kibar along the Euphrates River. The mission emerged from more than two decades of comprehensive intelligence collection and analysis by American and Israeli intelligence services targeting Syria’s development of weapons of mass destruction. It was a dramatic demonstration of intelligence success—all the more so given the ongoing civil war that has devastated Syria since 2011. The world does not need to worry about a Syrian nuclear reactor under threat of capture by Islamic radicals. Israel took that concern off the table.

But the incident also demonstrated that once a policy-intelligence feedback loop becomes dysfunctional, as happened to the George W. Bush administration after it exaggerated and distorted intelligence estimates to justify the Iraq War, there are serious policy implications. Israel wanted America to take out the reactor, but Bush was constrained by an intelligence community unwilling to cooperate with another major military operation based primarily on intelligence data.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The National Interest

Could al-Qaeda Direct a Canadian Plot From Iran?

Bruce Riedel — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 15:30:00 -0400

The revelation of an alleged plot to attack the Canada-U.S. train system by a small cell somehow connected to al-Qaeda’s presence in Iran has sparked interest in the relationship between the Sunni Muslim terror group and the Shia Muslim Iranian government. There is no doubt that al-Qaeda has a presence in Iran – but how it relates to the Tehran regime has been murky for years.

The relationship between al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran has been shrouded in mystery and secrecy for years. Al-Qaeda operatives have transited through Iran regularly before and after Sept. 11, 2001, and some found sanctuary in Iran after fleeing Afghanistan in late 2001, although the circumstances of their status in Iran was always unclear. But the hints of occasional operational co-operation between al-Qaeda and Tehran are mostly outweighed by the very considerable and public evidence of the deep animosity between Sunni-extremist al-Qaeda and Shia-extremist Iran.

Antipathy for each other is at the root of their ideologies and narratives. It has been most visible in their competition for influence in Iraq, and now also in Syria.

The Sept. 11 plot is a good place to start if we wish to understand the mystery. The 9/11 Commission report concluded that there was evidence of contacts between Osama bin Laden and Iran (through its Lebanese Hezbollah ally) dating back to his years in Khartoum in the mid 1990s.

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Authors

Bruce Riedel

Publication: The Globe and Mail