Brookings: Centers - Brookings Doha Center

Building New Democracies: Institutional Reform after the Arab Spring

Wed, 22 May 2013 01:00:00 -0400

Event Information

May 22, 2013
9:00 AM - 11:00 AM AST

Doha Ritz Carlton, Doha, Qatar

On May 23, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a plenary discussion on the challenge of institutional reform after the Arab Spring as part of the 13th Doha Forum. Speakers discussed how the countries of the Arab Spring could build new, representative governments, as well as how they could best balance demands for change with the requirements of an inclusive and successful transition. The discussion featured Ambassador Nabil Fahmy, former Egyptian Ambassador to the United States and founding Dean of the American University in Cairo’s School of Public Affairs; Dr. Rafiq Abdessalam, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia; Dr. Bernardino Leon, European Union Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean; Nikolay Mladenov, former Foreign Minister of Bulgaria; and Michael Posner, former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. The discussion was moderated by BDC Director Salman Shaikh.

The panel opened with speakers taking stock of the situation of the countries of the Arab Spring, and Egypt and Tunisia in particular, more than two years after 2011’s revolutionary wave. Both Fahmy and Abdessalam pointed to the challenges their countries faced. “It’s impossible to deny that almost everybody [in Egypt] is frustrated at this point,” Fahmy said. He told the audience that he remained optimistic over the long term but was, over the short term, “quite disturbed.” For his part, Abdessalam acknowledged that Tunisia’s transition had been difficult. At this point, he said, the goal of the Tunisian “Troika” was to steer the country through this period “at the least possible cost” with an approach based on partnership and consensus.

These challenges reflected the scope of the change underway in these countries. Fahmy asserted that what is happening in Egypt is a “societal” transition, not merely an institutional one – an argument that Abdessalam seconded. Egyptians, Fahmy said, are now defining an Egyptian political identity for the 21st century. Mladenov identified this as a key point of difference between earlier transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and those in the Arab world: whereas the end goal in European transitions may have been relatively clear, in the Arab world it is still in the making.

In order to best conduct this societal dialogue, Mladenov emphasized the “roundtable” approach Bulgaria had taken to arrive at a consensus vision for the future. This had parallels with the Tunisian approach, which Abdessalam said was based on a recognition that no single faction could bear these burdens alone. Fahmy, meanwhile, expressed unhappiness that Egypt had entered the political process before setting its constitutional ground rules, a decision he blamed for Egypt’s polarization. When politics are put first, he said, political forces “pull you apart rather than push you forward.” Posner was also critical of the Egyptian case, and in particular what he saw as a “very flawed” constitution – both the drafting process and the resulting document.

Participants worked to put forward an approach that was forward-looking but also workable. Leon laid out the key points on which he had counseled these transitioning countries. He advocated a transition that held accountable those responsible for excesses and dramatically reformed fiscal structures and the security services. At the same time, he argued for retaining the personnel and institutions of the state and broadly accommodating officials not implicated in crimes as part of the former regime. Fahmy warned that by too-aggressively dismantling everything that had come before the revolution, you risked “destroy[ing] the core of the country,” while Mladenov cautioned against not going far enough – he said that old regimes “have a tendency to come back from the ashes.” Leon read the successes of al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt as evidence of a desire for change – but said that support for Ahmed Shafiq in Egypt’s presidential election and Beji Caid Essebsi in Tunisia showed the need for a process that was respectful to and inclusive of all parties.

Any solution, of course, has to match up with the aspirations of the peoples who overthrew their dictators. As Posner put it, these are “young societies” whose people want economic opportunity and a political stake in the future of their countries. Fahmy argued that people need to see real progress on reform and improving their quality of life if they are to remain committed to the transition.

Participants touched on different ways that the West could support these transitions and reform processes. Mladenov raised as examples both European efforts to assist political party formation and the EU Endowment for Democracy. Still, Leon said that it is “very important to listen to what these societies want.” Posner and Mladenov agreed that any process had to be domestically driven, given the particularities of any given country case; looking at examples as diverse as Argentina, Serbia, and East Germany, they rejected a one-size-fits-all model.

In a discussion of the Gulf role in supporting these transitions, Abdessalam praised Qatar’s role but condemned some other Gulf states’ fear of change and “pessimistic depiction” of what is now going on in Egypt and Tunisia. Fahmy said that the Gulf should continue to provide support for these transitions, but not for one party over another. Posner, for his part, was sharply critical of the Gulf states’ position on the uprising in Bahrain. Bahrain should have been a model for a managed transition to a constitutional monarchy, he said, but instead the Gulf had been silent as the Bahraini government declined to implement key recommendations of the “Bassiouni Report.” Mladenov and Leon, on the other hand, were much more positive about the support of the Gulf for the Arab transitions and the Gulf countries’ role as a partner for the West. Mladenov did warn, however, that the Gulf faced possible blowback from its involvement in the Syrian conflict.

Dr. Yassin Said Noaman, Secretary-General of the Yemen Socialist Party and former Prime Minister of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, had been meant to represent the Yemeni experience in the discussion but was ultimately unable to attend. Fortunately, Yemeni Minister of Information Abu Bakr al-Qirbi and Minister of Industry and Trade Saad al-Din bin Taleb were able to contribute during the panel’s question-and-answer session. They discussed the progress on and hopes for Yemen’s national dialogue and, in the case of bin Taleb, highlighted how previous regimes’ corruption and self-serving contracts had left their countries with an unsustainable economic burden.

Participants

Moderator

Salman Shaikh

Director, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Ambassador Nabil Fahmy

65 Years After 'Catastrophe,' Palestinians Have Little to Cheer About

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Tue, 14 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

On May 15, the Palestinians will commemorate 65 years of their “Nakba” – “the Catastrophe.” This is how they describe 1948, which saw the destruction of Palestinian society, 750,000 Palestinians forced from their homes, and over 450 Palestinian towns wiped off the map. Today, there are over 5 million Palestinian refugees registered with the United Nations’ UNRWA. But while 1948 was a terrible trauma for the collective Palestinian memory, the reality is that it was only the beginning of a long journey of displacement, dispossession, and exile. The real Nakba is ongoing, and the Palestinian people live it on a daily basis both inside and outside the Palestinian territories. As U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry throws himself into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, we have to ask: Will his efforts bring this human tragedy a step closer to the end? Or only make it worse?

On a recent trip to Lebanon, I made sure to visit the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. While under control of the Israeli army that occupied Beirut in 1982, approximately 800 to 3,500 Palestinian refugees were massacred at the hands of Christian militias. In the camps today, the bitter reality of the Palestinian refugees’ life in exile is on full display: an enormous mass grave in the camps’ center holds the victims of 1982 massacre. It is a daily reminder to the refugees of their continuing human tragedy.

The Palestinians in Syria’s Yarmouk refugee camp have hardly been spared the bitterness of displacement and dispossession. Since the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, the estimated 150,000 Palestinian refugees in Yarmouk have reportedly been subjected to terror, horror, and murder of all kinds. Many have fled the camp to become “double refugees” in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. Um Mazen, one of these twice-displaced told the Financial Times, “It’s the Nakba of Yarmouk.”

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, too, have their share of Nakba. An Israeli policy of collective punishment has left 1.7 million Palestinians trapped in a besieged Gaza, the world’s largest prison. In the West Bank, the modern-day Nakba can be seen in continued settler violence, settlement expansion, and a dividing wall that encroaches on Palestinian land and, in many cases, deprives people of their livelihoods. This is in addition, of course, to the many Palestinians of Jerusalem who lost the right to return home after living only a few years abroad.

Against this grim backdrop, Kerry has made a public commitment to bring peace to the region through his intensive personal diplomacy. But while it may be too early to pass judgment on his initiative, the traditional American approach to this conflict has been predictable – and unworkable. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for example, suggested ending the agony of Palestinians refugees’ exile by sending them to…Chile and Argentina.

As Edward Abington told me, Arafat urged President Bill Clinton to ask Benjamin Netanyahu to stop or at least delay the construction of the Har Homa colony – a colony that threatened the collapse of the entire peace process. Abington – former U.S. Consul General in Jerusalem and the key U.S. contact with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in 1996 – said that Arafat repeatedly entreated Clinton, but to no avail. Finally, Clinton is said to have passed the request on to newly appointed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. She seemed to done nothing. It was then, Abington said, that Arafat knew he could not count on the Americans to make a real difference.

The Palestinian Nakba is one of the root causes of today’s Israeli-Palestinian conflict; if Secretary Kerry is to succeed, he will need to address it. The economic package he plans to introduce would affect the Palestinians in the West Bank. But it would do nothing for the Yarmouk’s double refugees or Shatila – surrounded by death, past and present.

Kerry’s major step to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has been the adjustment of the 11-year-old Arab Peace Plan to include mutual land swaps. The plan will now accommodate the illegal Israeli colonies in the West Bank – including Har Homa. It is absurd that Washington’s position has shifted from freezing settlement activities during the Obama administration’s first term to accommodating those settlements in the second term.

By pressuring the Arabs to accept land swaps even before negotiations begin, Kerry has set up his mediation efforts for failure. He has left no incentive for the Netanyahu government to negotiate; on the contrary, now that the Arabs have in principle accepted land swaps, Netanyahu will likely take advantage of this concession to further intensify settlement activities.

By presenting the land swap to Netanyahu without a firm commitment to stop settlement building, Kerry has sabotaged himself. As he will discover, Netanyahu’s right-wing government is only interested in exploiting every possible opportunity to sabotage peace efforts, building more colonies – and as a result, continuously exacerbating the crisis of America’s image and credibility in the Middle East. To be certain, Netanyahu government has just announced, in response to Kerry’s land swap, the building of 300 units at the heart of the West Bank’s city, Ramallah. This outcome has shown clearly there is nothing innovative about Kerry’s peace plan and that his efforts align perfectly with traditional Washington mediation efforts of appeasing Israeli governments, damaging American image and credibility in the region, and of course making the anniversary of the Palestinian Nakba more painful.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Mohammed Salem / Reuters

Morsi and the Muslims

Shadi Hamid — Wed, 08 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Many Americans -- and many Egyptians -- are souring on the Muslim Brotherhood. Some are rather smugly saying, "I told you so." From the American and Arab liberal perspectives, the Brotherhood seems run by hyper-charged Islamists bent on imposing their will on the Egyptian people. Like most things in politics, though, it depends on what exactly you're comparing them to. More than two years into the Arab revolts, Islamists are weighing the virtues of moving more aggressively to implement their agenda versus the benefits of proceeding cautiously in an attempt to placate their critics and opponents.

There is little doubt that the Brotherhood has veered to the right. The real debate within the group is whether they've veered far enough. With Egypt as polarized as ever, the Brotherhood has effectively given up on reaching out to liberals and leftists, focusing instead on closing ranks and rallying its base. During the presidential race, Khairat al-Shater, the Brotherhood's original candidate, chose a Salafi-leaning council of scholars for his first campaign event, where he affirmed that the application of sharia law was his ultimate goal and that he would form a committee of scholars to help parliament achieve that goal. After Shater's disqualification, Mohammed Morsi -- a weaker, less convincing candidate -- doubled down on Shater's back-to-basics message. "Needless to say," Morsi said, "[I am] currently the only contender who offers a clearly Islamic project."

After winning the presidency, Morsi took a brief stab at rising above his partisan origins. But the tragic events of Dec. 4, when anti-Brotherhood protesters and government supporters clashed outside the presidential palace, rendered such efforts moot. The violence of that night -- provoked by the Brotherhood when it called on supporters to confront protesters -- claimed "martyrs" on both sides. For many in the opposition, this was the point of no return -- blood had been spilled.

Read the full article on Foreign Policy »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: Foreign Policy

Image Source: © Handout . / Reuters

Around the Halls: Israel's Airstrikes in Syria

Tue, 07 May 2013 11:22:00 -0400

Following news of Israel’s weekend airstrikes in Syria, Brookings experts examine the implications of Israel’s actions, analyze Syria and Hezbollah’s possible responses, and offer foreign policy recommendations for the United States. Daniel Byman, Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney, Kenneth M. Pollack, Natan Sachs, Salman Shaikh, and Tamara Cofman Wittes weigh in on the latest developments.

Natan Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli airstrikes in Syria over the past few days were an instance of a standing Israeli policy: preventing, by all means necessary, the transfer of “game changing” weapons to either Asad’s ally, Hezbollah, or—of increasing Israeli concern—to extremist groups among the Syrian opposition. Such weapons include not only chemical weapons from Syria’s large stockpile but also advanced conventional weapons such as Russian anti-aircraft missiles or the Iranian Fateh 110 surface to surface missiles Israel reportedly targeted this weekend (missiles with significantly larger payload, better accuracy and longer range than most existing Hezbollah weaponry, such that Israelis cities would be under considerably more threat from Hezbollah than in the past).

The Israelis are betting that their actions do not backfire, either by provoking a larger conflict with Hezbollah or the Asad regime or by influencing the Syrian civil war in unpredictable ways (see this piece Dan and I wrote in Foreign Policy). Israel, in its view, has no horse in the race in Syria. It has no love for the Asad regime but is deeply wary of the potential for chaos or for an extremist takeover of parts of Syria. The Israeli stance has been, therefore, to take action on tangible, operational intelligence as it emerges but to refrain from involvement in the civil war itself; to protect its vital interests while remaining largely outside the fray.

But acting on the tactical and operational level without influencing the situation at large can be a difficult balancing act. Israel would provide the perfect foil for the Syrian regime or for Hezbollah, both of whom are mired in a bloody civil war where they on the wrong side, in popular Arab eyes. A diversionary conflict with Israel would offer them an out from the ire of the Arab publics, as the renewed anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Syrian regime in the past few days has demonstrated. Indeed, Israel was on alert in its north, deploying Iron Dome batteries, temporarily closing off the northern civilian airspace and ramping down a planned military exercise, for fear of stoking the flames. But Israel remains relatively confident that the situation will remain under control—Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu departed the country for a state visit to China—with both the Asad regime and Hezbollah wary of opening a front with the vastly more powerful Israel, and especially its airpower, while they struggle to hold their positions on the ground in Syria.

Kenneth Pollack
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, I'd like to just note that three Israeli strikes with non-stealthy aircraft cast some doubt on the Administration's alarmism about Syria's vaunted air defenses. Indeed, I wonder if that isn't also in the back of Bibi's head—demonstrating just how poor Syrian air defenses actually are.

Second, I would like to resurrect some of my comments from my blog post from last week: namely that whether the regime retaliates against Israel will be driven by its assessment of the fight with the opposition. As long as the regime feels it has a prospect of beating the rebels, it won't retaliate for fear of an escalatory spiral with Israel. They are very wary of taking on the IDF while they are fighting for their lives against the Sunnis--as long as they think they can win that fight. However, once they become concerned that they cannot win that fight, then the regime's incentive structure flips and it becomes more likely that they will retaliate against Israel, since the possibility of transforming the contest into an Arab-Israeli war outweighs whatever damage the Israelis could do once they conclude that they are doomed anyway. Right now, I do not believe the regime has reached that level of desperation, so I doubt they retaliate.

Salman Shaikh
Director, Brookings Doha Center, Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

First, Israel seems intent on defending its "red lines" and has already acted to stop the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah; responded directly to fire from Syrian army units in the Golan Heights; and sounded the alarm on the use of chemical weapons.

With regard to the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, it has shown that it is willing to change the 'rules of engagement' with the Assad regime and hit these weapons inside Syria. In doing so, it is seeking to establish a new level of deterrence with respect to such activities. Certainly, the latest strikes against weapons depots and reportedly the headquarters of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard as well as the 4th Division commanded by Bashar's brother, Maher Assad are punitive and painful. The psychological effects that such strikes could have on the senior officer core, particularly the Alawite officers, who form the backbone of the army and its security forces will be worth watching. In a short period of time, the certainty of the previous 40 years of "cold peace" has been replaced by the realisation that Israel will strike again and harder if Asad continues to supply Hezbollah.

The likely response from the Assad regime, as has already been the case since the strikes over the weekend, is to exploit the propaganda value of Israel's "aggression" and attempt to link it with efforts to aid the opposition's rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army has condemned the "Israeli aggression" but denied any connection to it. The Syrian National Coalition has responded by engaging in “verbal acrobatics” by condemning the attacks but also blaming Assad for weakening the country.

What will matter is the effect that this will have on the large number of people, particularly in the cities, who have not openly sided with either the regime or the opposition. If the situation escalates, the regime could gain ground by hammering the message that Israel has sided with rebels and extremists and that only the regime can protect the unity of Syria in this difficult period.

Key states in the Arab world, at least rhetorically, seem to be following suit. In addition to the predictable condemnations from the Syrian regime's supporters in Lebanon and Iraq, statements from President Morsi of Egypt and the Saudi government have condemned Israel's "violation of international law" and pointed to its dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile, the Arab League Secretary-General called it "a blatant aggression and a serious violation of an Arab country's sovereignty." He has also called for the UN to take action (never mind the League's silence over the recent massacres in Baniyas and the alleged use of chemical weapons).

Whether these statements reflect the views of Arab publics is debatable. For now at least, the focus will likely remain on the Assad regime's brutal use of force against its own people. The majority of Arabs, particularly Sunni Arabs are angry with Assad and resentful of the support that Hezbollah and the Iranians have provided to him. However, the suspicions that many in the region have towards Israel's actions will likely grow if the attacks continue and if these are perceived as only furthering Israel's interests.

Daniel Byman
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

For U.S. policy, my concern is that several important U.S. allies—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, and now Israel— are involved in significant ways. And other neighbors, notably Lebanon and Iraq, are suffering increasing instability from the Syrian conflict. Meanwhile, the instability from Syria is steadily spreading beyond its borders. Even beyond the human cost, the United States has long had its own interests, including counterterrorism, in playing a more decisive role. Now the problem is metastasizing, and U.S. allies might work at cross purposes, and their actions may end up harming each other in the end.

Michael Doran
Roger Hertog Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

I agree wholeheartedly with Dan. The issue for me is the abdication of American leadership. I cannot remember another time when the United States was so noticeably absent from a major issue— the major issue— in Middle Eastern international politics. It's important to make a distinction between leadership and direct intervention. Often when people call for a more robust American policy, they are shut down with a pointed question: "What do you want, another Iraq war?" But there is much that the United States could do, short of military intervention, to coordinate the activities of its allies. Leadership requires, before anything else, a clear vision of the future— a picture of an end state that is both desirable and achievable. The United States has no vision whatsoever of the outcome that it would like to see in Syria. It does not even have a clear definition of its major interests in the conflict. The only interest that the Obama administration has clearly articulated is its desire to remain aloof.

Tamara Wittes
Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program

Syrian activists on the ground and in exile are at least ambivalent about the Israeli strikes, and some are downright celebratory. But the Egyptian government and the Arab League were quick to issue statements denouncing Israeli interference. Given the involvement of Arab League members and the League itself in Syria’s internal crisis, the latter condemnation in particular was thick with irony. But just as the speedy criticisms from Cairo reflect the ongoing nationalist sensitivity there, the controversy in the rest of the Arab world over how to respond to the Israeli strikes likewise underscores the ways in which the Arab Awakening— and the Syrian conflict most pointedly— has upended once-comfortable principles regarding sovereignty, Arab nationalism, and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Program, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

The Israeli air strikes have been interpreted by many as a message to Tehran, hardly surprising given Iran’s central role in providing materiel support to Bashar Al Asad and its reliance on Damascus as both a bulwark against regional isolation and a conduit to its proxies in the Levant. What is interesting is Tehran’s response – not simply the predictable fulminations from senior officials and clerics, but the stepped-up pace of Iran’s diplomatic outreach on Syria. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi arrived in Amman today for talks, just in time to announce a visit to Tehran next week by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani.

This is the latest indication of Iran’s underlying objective with respect to the conflict in Syria – ensuring that the Islamic Republic retains influence in Damascus irrespective of the outcome of the civil war. This imperative has shaped a hedging strategy from the outset of the unrest: Iran hopes to preserve at least a vestige of its ally Bashar, but has also sought a seat at the table in shaping post-Asad Syria in any formal regional dialogue. Tehran’s hedging here goes beyond protecting its equities and bolstering regime security; there is a genuine national interest in precluding the expansion of Sunni extremism, which Iran has rightly viewed as a threat since the emergence of the Taliban more than two decades ago.

The concept of Iranian engagement on Syria is anathema to Washington, for good reason. And yet it should not be reflexively blocked by an Obama Administration that is under fire for its absurd public dithering on Syria. Iranian diplomatic engagement on Syria will not preclude troublemaking by Tehran; however, excluding Iran from the contentious regional politics surrounding the conflict is a recipe for inflaming the situation even further. Any long-term stable outcome in Syria will require neutralizing Iran’s incentives for sabotage as well as stemming the sectarian violence brewing amidst the conflict.

Authors

Publication: The New York Times

Image Source: © Khaled Al Hariri / Reuters

Will Reports of Chemical Weapons Spur Global Action on Syria?

Salman Shaikh — Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with Voice of Russia’s Kim Brown, Salman Shaikh says resolution of the Syrian crisis must be a Syrian, regional, and international effort. Shaikh warns that the Syrian uprising has the potential to create regional chaos, in part due to the burgeoning humanitarian crisis. On this basis, Shaikh says the United Nations Security Council has a responsibility to form consensus between Russia and the United States, as well as to assure that the United Nations inspection team enters Syria and conduct its investigation on the use of chemical weapons. There is, Shaikh concludes, a collective responsibility for the international community to take action.

Shaikh says rising terrorist threats in Syria are the consequence of a “self-fulfilling prophecy” by the Assad regime. Increasingly, the situation on the ground reflects a chaotic environment, characterized in part by militarization of Islamist groups and jihadist involvement in the crisis. Shaikh notes the Assad regime is partly responsible for these developments, which demonstrate the need for the international community to more actively respond to the crisis, and to do so quickly. Shaikh notes the sooner Syria reaches its process of national reconciliation, the better.

Shaikh argues that if and when the United States takes heightened action toward the Syrian crisis, it must do so alongside the international community. Although the international community is hopelessly divided on the issue, Shaikh says the United States has the potential to serve as a unifying force for the international community.

Listen to the full interview on Voice of Russia »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Voice of Russia

Syria, Chemical Weapons, And The Intervention Question

Shadi Hamid — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

In an interview with NPR’s On Point program, Shadi Hamid calls for American intervention in Syria on the basis of humanitarian grounds, as well as rising levels of anti-American sentiment and radicalization on the ground. Hamid says a lot of damage has already been done with regard to radicalization in Syria and that the country’s future is bleak. Despite this reality, Hamid concludes it remains important for the United States to intervene.

The Assad regime will fall regardless of American intervention, Hamid says. The questions, then, are how long the United States waits to intervene and how many people die in the process. On this basis, Hamid supports a military intervention which doesn’t involve putting boots on the ground, but rather uses surgical air strikes and safe zones to diminish the regime’s ability to kill its own people. Hamid says to alternately depend on channels such as the United Nations or wait for a verification process regarding the regime’s use of chemical weapons will take time and delay action, thereby exacerbating existing problems, whether inside Syria or involving anti-American sentiment in the region.

Hamid says the idea that the international community can nurture a perfect Syrian opposition before committing to military action is misguided. He says the fighting forces in Syria are not primarily secularist, and more accurately reflect varying shades of Islamism. Hamid points out extremists tend to gain prominence during situations of war because they generally have better access to weapons and support, and that in Syria these extremists have already come to the fore.

Considering radicalization and rising levels of anti-American sentiment inside Syria, Hamid notes there is an issue of American credibility at stake not just in Syria but in the broader region. Hamid says American intervention in Syria will show the United States sides with the Syrian people and will make a difference in the longer-term of American-Middle Eastern relations. Hamid suggests the world, including Syrians, still look to the United States for moral and political leadership.

Hamid says the American public is historically receptive to foreign policy action in light of humanitarian crises. If the Obama administration wanted to explain the Syrian case clearly, Hamid suggests there would likely be public willingness for American engagement. However, Hamid also says the Obama administration has demonstrated it does not want to get involved in Syria and has a lot of wiggle room to avoid following up on prior-delineated “red lines” on the use of chemical weapons.

Listen to the full On Point program »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: NPR

Is Obama’s Red Line a Green Light?

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 29 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime was finally blown open last week. In a letter to U.S. lawmakers, the White House stated that U.S. intelligence agencies believed "with varying degrees of confidence" that Syria had used the nerve agent sarin on a "small scale." The letter followed others sent to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon by Britain and France alleging the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and similar assessments by Israeli military intelligence in the last few weeks.

Still, President Barack Obama's administration sounded a cautious note. Asked whether Assad crossed the "red line" Obama drew last year that could spur American intervention, a U.S. official replied, "we're not there yet." The White House continues to contend that the evidence is not "airtight," and that it needs further corroboration. In meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan on Friday, Obama stated that "there are a range of questions around how, when, where these weapons may have been used."

While these are important questions, especially a decade after the intelligence failure in Iraq, the evidence already gathered by Western countries from inside Syria provides significant evidence of chemical-weapons use by the Assad regime. Here is what I have learned about the regime's use -- and logic for the use -- of chemical weapons over the past six months.

The Assad regime's scientists have been experimenting for more than a year with mixtures of toxic and poisonous gasses that could be used to "cleanse areas" of what it calls "terrorists" -- the rebel forces it is fighting. Its security and military apparatus has sought to devise methods to use artillery shells or aircraft to deliver chemical weapons in "localized ways" -- in areas of one or one and a half square kilometers.

The regime's logic was that the relentless bombardment of rebel-controlled areas, including in the neighborhoods around the main cities of Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus, had forced most civilians to leave. Civilian casualties, in this warped thinking, could therefore be kept to a minimum if chemical weapons were used in these areas. This was important if the regime was to avoid the attention of the international community, especially the United States, which clearly did not want to intervene in Syria.

I first heard this frightening information in the late summer and fall of last year. It came from a small number of privileged Syrians who often travelled to and from Damascus. I had gotten to know and trust them, especially as their information was often corroborated later by other sources and events. All spoke often to current and former senior security officers and regime personalities from the Assad regime's feared security forces, including the presidential guard, Syrian military intelligence, and Syrian air force intelligence -- people they had known in some cases since childhood.

Listening to them, it was clear to me that the regime had the intention to use these horrendous weapons -- and that it would do so as it came under further pressure in key strategic areas, especially the major cities in the west of the country.

According to my interlocutors, Assad and those closest to him had been emboldened by the international community's weak response to his bloody military campaign. The United Nations claimed in February that the death toll from the fighting in Syria was well over 70,000 people, while, during that same month, a lieutenant from Syrian military intelligence informed one of my Syrian interlocutors that the regime estimated that around 85,000 civilians had been killed, with many more thousands "missing."

Successive statements from Obama and senior U.S. officials, these interlocutors said, had been interpreted by the regime as a "green light" to continue its campaign. The exclusive focus on political and diplomatic solutions, as well as the international community's rising fear of Islamic jihadists, further reinforced the regime's belief that "the U.S. and its Western allies did not mind the current military operations," according to a retired general in Damascus. "Like any war, there are political and diplomatic efforts, while it is the winner that dictates terms in the end."

In the eyes of the regime, therefore, Obama's "red line" prohibiting the use of chemical weapons -- first drawn last August, in the midst of an election campaign -- had to be tested.

Read the full article »

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Foreign Policy

Obama's Strategy in the Middle East: The Blurry Red Line

Shadi Hamid — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 13:23:00 -0400

As evidence of the Syrian regime's use of chemical weapons mounts, the Obama administration has further confused matters regarding its own stated "red lines." The evidence appears to be strong but not necessarily "conclusive." As the April 25th White House letter states, "the chain of custody is not clear, so we cannot confirm how the exposure occurred and under what conditions." This sort of rhetoric points to an administration that finds itself cornered but, at the same time, seems intent on postponing any decisive action for as long humanly possible. The debate over whether, how, when, and to what extent lines were crossed not only seems petty (and undermines the very notion of a red line); it is also a distraction.

Presumably, the Obama administration's red-lining of chemical weapons isn't just about the risk of mass civilian casualties. After all, mass slaughter -- with over 70,000 killed -- has already happened and hasn't apparently shaken the U.S. commitment to studied inaction. The real concern is over the security implications of chemical weapon use or transport. First, the weapons could fall into the hands of non-state actors, metastasizing the terror threat. Second (and related to the first), the spread of chemical weapons would lead to unprecedented regional destabilization in the form of a sharp increase in refugee flows, which, in turn, could threaten the stability of friendly autocrats like the Jordanian monarchy.

These concerns are of course justified, but the focus on security implications -- rather than focusing on the 70,000 already killed by good old-fashioned artillery and aircraft -- suggests an outdated (and morally problematic) calculus for action. In saying that chemical weapons are a red line, the Obama administration is also saying that the killing of 70,000 Syrians is not a red line, which, when you think about it, is a remarkable thing to say.

Read the full article »

Authors

Shadi Hamid

Publication: The Atlantic

Image Source: © George Ourfalian / Reuters

Qatar-U.S. Relations in a Changing Middle East

Wed, 24 Apr 2013 19:30:00 -0400

Event Information

April 24, 2013
7:30 PM - 8:00 PM EDT

Washington, DC

Washington, DC

On April 24, during an event honoring His Excellency Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Qatar, Martin Indyk asked about Qatar's views on the Syrian crisis, the stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace talks, and the still unfolding Arab Awakening. The event marked Qatar's ten years of support for the Brookings Doha Center and the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

Video

Power Struggle: Implications of the Changing Global Gas Market for the Middle East and Asia

Mon, 01 Apr 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Event Information

April 1-2, 2013

Four Seasons Hotel, Doha, Qatar

Second Annual Brookings Doha Energy Forum

The Brookings Doha Center (BDC) and Brookings Energy Security Initiative (ESI) convened the second annual Brookings Doha Energy Forum in Doha, Qatar. This year’s forum, from April 1-2, explored the theme “Power Struggle: Implications of the Changing Global Gas Market for the Middle East and Asia.”

The private, closed-door conference was the second in a series that examines the relationship between the Middle East and the emerging global powers of the 21st century. This year’s forum shed light on three principal themes:

The increasing prominence of Middle East-Asia energy relations;
The implications of political and economic change in the region for energy production and consumption; and
The prospects for investment in the region’s energy infrastructure. The Forum addressed these questions with a primary focus on natural gas.

The 2013 Forum’s Keynote Address was given by H.E. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor Al-Thani, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the State of Qatar. Following the keynote address, opening remarks were given by H.E. Dr. Mohammed bin Saleh Al Sadah, Qatari minister of energy and industry; H.E. Eng. Ali bin Ibrahim Al Naimi, Saudi Arabian minister of petroleum and mineral resources; and Andrew Swiger, senior vice president of Exxon Mobil Corporation.

The Brookings Doha Energy Forum was attended by decision-makers and experts from major Gulf producers, the United States, Europe, and key Asian powers, including China, India, Japan, and South Korea. Attendees include a range of high-ranking officials, experts, leaders of national oil companies, and representatives of the corporate sector.

“The world is facing structural shifts in international gas flows at the same time it is witnessing rapid and unprecedented change in the Middle East,” said Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center. “The 2013 Forum will bring together senior figures in the energy industry—including officials, executives, and analysts—to discuss these changes from a constructive, multidimensional platform.”

"Global natural gas markets are at a critical juncture,” said Charles Ebinger, director of the Brookings Energy Security Initiative. “The shifting dynamics of gas supply and demand are rewriting the traditional energy producer-consumer relationships, a shift that has still unclear geopolitical implications. Through its 2013 Doha Energy Forum, Brookings is placing itself at the center of this critical issue."

The Brookings Doha Energy Forum is a product of the BDC-ESI Energy Partnership, which aims to address issues arising out of the nexus between the changing global energy landscape and the growing importance of local politics in the world. This collaboration links the expertise of the Energy Security Initiative with the Brookings Doha Center’s experience and scholarship on political transitions in the Gulf and broader Middle East.

Event Materials

Al Naimi Opening Remarks Doha Energy Forum

Participants

Panelists

BRICS Leadership Will Be Tested by Syria

Salman Shaikh — Mon, 25 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

The humanitarian tragedy unfolding in Syria is probably the most serious crisis facing the world today. And yet, the international community is struggling to find a way forward. With more than four million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance and three million internally displaced – a conservative UN estimate based on surveys of 6 out of 14 governorates in Syria – the humanitarian response to the plight of civilians so far has been entirely inadequate. A recent UNICEF report highlighted the two million children maimed, orphaned, and suffering from malnutrition as a result of the conflict – an entire generation “scarred for life”. Meanwhile, over one million refugees are seeking asylum in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This number will likely hit the three million mark by the end of 2013 – a ticking bomb for countries based on delicate social, ethnic, and sectarian balance.

Humanitarian access in opposition-held areas, where assistance is most urgently needed, is extremely limited. The humanitarian policy dilemma has shown what a mess we are currently in. Under General Assembly resolution 46/182, the United Nations cannot operate inside rebel-held territory without the explicit consent of the Syrian government. As that government’s authority is waning, however, many wonder whether we should be bound by the sovereignty of a tyrannical regime that continues to aggravate the crisis. Others, meanwhile, are advocating for direct humanitarian cross-border action in coordination with the internationally recognized Syrian National Coalition. With the election of Ghassan Hitto as the interim prime minister of a transitional government in “liberated” areas, this call will no doubt grow louder.

It is time for the international community to overcome this obstacle and allow for a more effective humanitarian response in Syria – whenever and wherever it may be required. One way forward would be for key countries such as Brazil, South Africa, and India to support a more aggressive effort to ramp up the UN’s cross-border aid operations inside the country. Such an opportunity presents itself at the forthcoming 2013 BRICS summit in Durban next week. These countries should use their influence to secure a Security Council endorsement of this approach, principally by applying pressure on Russia and China.

Furthermore, they should use their direct channels with Assad to insist that the regime allow for cross-border operations and give full humanitarian access to all areas of the country.

Why the BRICS? Given their rising prominence on the world stage, it’s become clear that these nations play a key role in steering the international response to this crisis. Bouthaina Shaaban, political and media advisor to Assad, travelled to South Africa last week to deliver a message to President Zuma, urging BRICS nations to intervene to stop the violence in Syria and encourage the opening of a dialogue. Three weeks ago, she was in India, doing the same. It goes without saying that such cynical diplomacy on the part of the regime should be met by more purposeful calls to spare the lives of civilians. This is a strategic opportunity for the BRICS to use their influence and play a more decisive, helpful role.

There is no time to lose. To date, the international community has failed in its responsibilities to protect the Syrian population. Even with regard to the funding of UN humanitarian operations, only 20% of the $ 1.5 billion pledged by international donors in Kuwait in January has been honored. International inaction in Syria will leave a lasting legacy of insecurity and suffering, while the spillover effects of this humanitarian crisis will only contribute to the growing instability in Syria’s neighborhood and across the greater region. The BRICS nations, along with the international community, have a responsibility to act now.

Given the state of emergency on the ground, however, humanitarian cross-border access alone may not be sufficient. In order to protect civilians, guarantee the safe passage of relief organizations as well as refugees attempting to leave the country, there is a growing imperative for the establishment of humanitarian corridors and civilian safe areas along the sensitive borders of Syria. Make no mistake, such safe areas will have to be secured and protected by all means possible. Here, there will be much to learn from the UN’s experience in Bosnia in the 1990s – involving an assessment of what went right as well as wrong.

The BRICS and their international partners should be ready to endorse such measures. The situation demands it. Yet at a minimum, they must now demand that Assad allows the UN to cross Syria’s borders to reach civilians in need. The UN has the required institutional knowledge to deliver aid to fragmented areas making it the organization that is best placed to do so in Syria. Enabling the UN to undertake a country-wide response would help prevent the politicization of assistance as well as ensure a coordinated response in crucial sectors such as water, sanitation, infrastructure reconstruction, food assistance and education. The end goal would be to ensure that the UN is able to meet the basic needs of all civilians and upholding fundamental humanitarian principles in this bloody conflict.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Publication: Asharq Al-Awsat

Syria's First Interim Prime Minister

Salman Shaikh — Tue, 19 Mar 2013 12:30:00 -0400

After weeks of hot debate within Syrian opposition circles, the Syrian Opposition Coalition has managed to appoint a new interim prime minister, Ghassan Hitto. Much of the commentary has focused on his expatriate background as an information technology executive who had lived in the United States for more than 30 years. Reports of the Coalition’s meeting in Istanbul also point to a fraught voting process with a dozen or so of the more liberal-leaning members walking out in disgust.

Whatever the backstory, Hitto and his transitional government will now face the daunting task of meeting the expectations of a desperate population living inside the so-called “liberated” or regime-free areas of northern and eastern Syria. The UN has estimated that up to 3 million people are displaced inside the country and that up to 4 million need humanitarian aid. Both are likely to be very conservative figures given the ferocity of the conflict and inability of the UN and other international agencies to get aid to rebel-held areas.

To date, the Coalition has struggled to build the infrastructure required to deliver such aid efficiently and consistently. If it manages to do so, and to establish a real presence on the ground, it may just have a chance of establishing real credibility as an opposition force inside the country. This, however, would be no mean feat given the intensity of the regime’s aerial attacks and the fragmented nature of control exerted by various military groups and civilian local councils. Much will also depend on the international support that has been promised to the new government from regional and Western supporters, but which has been very slow to arrive. The U.S. decision, in particular, to support directly the political opposition and the fighting rebels may be a sign of things to come.

In his first address, Prime Minister Hitto has recognized the very difficult task that lies ahead for his administration. He has pledged to provide the services that so many Syrians are lacking. He has also promised to prepare the conditions for free and fair elections in a post-Assad regime Syria.

Many Syrians, though, will regard the appointment of Hitto with suspicion. Since the announcement, I have heard both Syrian nationalist figures and those from some minority communities – inside and outside the country – talk dismissively about the move. For them, Hitto is a pawn of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which has undoubtedly gained a key role in the internationally-recognised SOC. They point to the instrumental part played by the Brotherhood leadership within the SOC in securing Hitto’s election, saying that he would reached the position without their backing. . There is a sense that Hitto’s appointment has allowed the Muslim Brotherhood, assisted by key regional actors, to walk in through the front door and assume control of Syria’s opposition movement. (One interlocutor remarked acidly “who would have thought that one hundred years later, a Syrian Prime Minister would be announced in Istanbul.”) For them the move signifies the complete revival of the Brotherhood, a movement which suffered terribly under the brutal assault of the Baathist regime in the 1980s.

Such talk, even if exaggerated, should be worrying for the SOC and the Muslim Brotherhood. It shows that there is a very large number, particularly in the “grey area” of Syrians who have not declared their opposition to the Assad regime, have not accepted either the SOC or the Muslim Brotherhood. The appointment of Syria’s first interim Prime Minister should be a watershed moment for all Syrians. That it may not prove to be so, does not bode well for the impending post-Assad transitional period, which surely will start sooner or later.

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Image Source: © Osman Orsal / Reuters

Nonviolent Resistance Key to Middle East Breakthrough

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0400

Almost twenty years of negotiations “brought us nothing but more Israeli settlement. Palestinians have had enough of negotiations,” one senior Palestinian official said at a conference I attended recently. And yet, ahead of his first visit to the Middle East as secretary of state this month, John Kerry appeared to be suggesting more of the same.

“My prayer is that perhaps this can be a moment where we can renew some kind of effort to get the parties into a discussion,” he reportedly said. Such platitudes bode poorly for President Obama’s planned visit to the region this week. Indeed, it seems as if it will be business as usual on Palestinian-Israeli policy during the president’s second term, with yet more fruitless talks and an ever-increasing disconnect between U.S. diplomacy and developments on the ground.

Yet unmentioned by U.S. officials and diplomats is the fact that a credible alternative to the 20-year-old, U.S.-sponsored negotiation process has emerged on the ground. Nonviolent popular resistance could create a real breakthrough – and even an opportunity for a constructive American role.

Read the full op-ed on CNN »

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: CNN

Image Source: © Mohamad Torokman / Reuters

Politicizing Security Sector Reform in Egypt

Omar Ashour — Sun, 03 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

A couple of weeks ago, Egypt’s renowned intellectual Dr. Fahmy Howeidy summarized a study I conducted earlier on security sector reform (SSR) in Egypt. Howeidy was trying to highlight an important fact: the availability of the SSR “know-how” in Egypt, whether in this study or in others. What Dr. Howeidy probably did not know was that the study and other related initiatives were earlier submitted to several Egyptian officials. Interest in such studies/initiative was definitely there. Capacity to implement them is another story.

It is well-established by now that tourism, foreign direct investments, political stability, social justice, and probably the success of Egypt’s democratic transition, rest on the security conditions in the country. The two questions usually asked: is the security sector effective in containing real threats? And is that sector accountable to the people, represented by their elected civilians? So far, the answer in Egypt is probably a “no” to both questions.

‘Ikhwanization’

The presidency’s approach to SSR was so far gradual, not revolutionary; working within the rules of the system rather than fundamentally altering them. Far from “ikhwanization” (Brotherhoodization) of the Police, President Mursi appointed General Khaled Tharwat, as the new head of the National Security Apparatus (NSA) in October 2012. General Tharwat comes from the very core of the notorious State Security Investigations (SSI). He used to head “Internal Activity,” the general administration in charge of monitoring and investigating civil society groups, political parties, and media outlets. At one point, he was also heading the “Countering Brotherhood Activity” group, in charge of neutralizing the Muslim Brothers.

Moreover, far from Tunisia, where the first Interior Minister was a civilian, torture-victim from al-Nahda Party, the first Interior Minister under the first-ever civilian, democratically elected Egyptian President was General Ahmed Gamal al-Din, a figure known to be loyal to the criminally convicted, General Habib al-Adly, Mubarak’s Minister of Interior. Gamal al-Din was a hardliner during negotiations to release political prisoners following the success of the revolution, as well as during the talks to end the Mohammad Mahmoud street clashes of November 2011. He was also a witness in the “Giza Officers Trial,” in which 17 policemen were accused of killing and injuring protesters in January 2011. He defended the policemen, claiming that the victims had been killed in “self-defence.” Officers but Honourable Coalition, an unofficial organization of police officers who are pushing for internal reforms, accused Gamal al-Din of being a member of a powerful anti-reform faction in the ministry, dubbed “al-Adly’s men” (after former Interior Minister Habib al-Adly). Overall the Mursi administration did not make any major steps in SSR, probably due to very cautious political calculations.

“I got 186 dead officers and more than 800 injured so far, petty-officers blocking security chiefs from entering their offices, a presidential palace getting torched on weekly basis by a hundred kids or so … and Egypt’s largest government complex was blocked for four days, when will I have time to reform? … When these political polemics end,” said the new Interior Minister, General Mohammed Ibrahim February 19, 2013. It was one of the rare times an incumbent minister speaks out publically about the limitations of the security forces and the reform process. And, more worrying, he was not lying about the facts or the numbers. A collapse of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) at the moment can have disastrous consequences in Egypt.

The Interior Ministry’s Catch-22

The violence on the streets and the politicization of the SSR by rival politicians had negative consequence on the reform process and its credibility. On talk-shows, opposition figures call for SSR to be implemented and for police brutality to end. At the same time, the very same political figures praise security generals and corrupt judges/prosecutors known for their support of brutal tactics and faking charges. Some politicians even call for them to intervene in the political process, by cracking down on their rivals. In that sense, the MoI is in a “catch-22.” On the one hand, it is responsible for defending state institutions, constantly under attack by violent groups from various backgrounds. On the other hand, if any of these protestors were killed or injured, the MoI will be accused of brutality. Add to that the limited experience in non-lethal tactics of riot control. “All what they [activists] tell you is lies…the pattern we got here is that the officer gets attacked with shotguns and Molotov cocktails. If he flees, he gets accused of negligence and then he gets tried. If he fights back, he gets accused of brutality and then he gets tried as well. What exactly is he supposed to do?…” told me a major in the Central Security Forces, who witnessed the attacks on the presidential palace last January.

In all cases, no democratic transition is complete without targeting abuse, eradicating torture, and ending the impunity of the security services, with effective and meaningful civilian control of both the armed forces and the security establishments. Those objectives were at the core of the Egyptian revolution of 2011. They cannot be attained in the current extreme polarization in Egypt; nor in the middle of constant attempts to manipulate the security sector by political rivals. As shown in other comparative cases, the unity of political forces on that particular demand is key for the success of both security sector reform and democratization.

Authors

Omar Ashour

Publication: Al Arabiya English

U.S. Intervention in Syria

Salman Shaikh — Fri, 01 Mar 2013 00:00:00 -0500

The U.S. has pledged financial and other non-lethal support for rebel factions now engaged in a two-year long civil war with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime. As the death toll mounts and conditions become more dangerous, there are many who question whether America is doing enough. Fellow Salman Shaikh, director of the Brookings Doha Center, says the situation is critical and notes that the Syrian people need more than simply “biscuits and band aids” they need U.S. leadership.

Video

U.S. Intervention in Syria

Authors

Salman Shaikh

Islam and Secularism in the Arab World: Lessons from Turkey

Thu, 28 Feb 2013 01:00:00 -0500

Event Information

February 28, 2013
10:00 AM - 11:30 AM AST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On February 28, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a policy discussion focused on the relationship between Islam and the state in the Arab world and the idea of a “Turkish model” for reconciling Islam and secularism. At the event, Ahmet Kuru, a visiting fellow at the BDC, presented his recently published policy briefing, “Muslim politics without an ‘Islamic state’: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development Party be a model for Arab Islamists?” In discussion with Kuru was H. A. Hellyer, a nonresident fellow with the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution. The event was moderated by BDC Director of Research Shadi Hamid and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, business and media communities.

Ahmet Kuru began his presentation by establishing a distinction between what he called “assertive secularism” – as practiced in France or during Turkey’s Kemalist past – and the “passive secularism” embraced by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) today. While the former actively seeks to exclude religion from the public sphere, the latter encourages the accommodation of the public visibility of religion. Kuru argued that an “AKP model” – characterized by both the party’s move from Islamism to passive secularism and a shift of state institutions from assertive to passive secularism – provides important and practicable lessons for Arab Islamists today.

This model, he stressed, should not be seen as a perfect blueprint to be imposed from above. Certain aspects of the “model” may appeal to Arab parties more than others, and the exchange of the ideas associated with it may occur in an organic manner through a variety of channels. Kuru added that the AKP model itself is not without its own deficiencies; Arab Islamists should seek to learn from its failures as much as its successes.

At the moment, Kuru said, the Arab world finds itself in a middle ground between the passive secularism of Turkey and the “semi-theocratic semi-republican model of Iran.” While Tunisia looks set to maintain a constitution that refers neither to sharia or secularism, Egypt has taken a step in the Iranian direction by granting al-Azhar a constitutional role in the interpretation of Islamic law. By moving toward Turkey’s model, Kuru argued, Arab states would “allow diverse understandings of sharia to apply in a bottom-up, rather than top-down fashion.”

The second pillar of the “AKP model” refers to its ability to conduct “Muslim politics” – the pursuit policies that reflect Islamic values – without seeking the establishment of an Islamic state. Many Islamic actors in Turkey, Kuru said, see that an “Islamic” state is actually a hindrance to the application of Muslim values. Often, these states’ perceived religious legitimacy makes them less accountable to their people. Furthermore, these critics assert, “Islamic” states often focus on formalistic aspects of Islamic law rather than genuinely promoting the substance of Islamic ethics.

Finally, the AKP’s pragmatism – for instance in its gradualist approach to effecting change or its ability to balance conflicting foreign policy agendas – offer further important lessons for Arab Islamists. Spefically, Kuru asserted, ruling Islamists in Arab countries will find this sort of flexibility useful in their efforts to establish working relationships with Western governments on which they rely for economic and other forms of support.

To be sure, the AKP’s transformation came about as a result of certain constraints and incentives – from the military, Turkish society, and the West – that may not exist in the same way in Arab cases. Still, Kuru argued, other institutional or societal influences may well encourage the embrace of passive secularism in the Arab world. These could include the enduring influence of anti-Islamist security establishments or the presence of indigenous Christian populations in countries such as Egypt.

Hisham Hellyer began by stressing that the appeal of the Turkish model in the Arab world had a lot to with the idea of autonomy, which had also been at the core of uprisings in countries such as Egypt. In that regard, Turkey’s homegrown success in building its own economy – more than the AKP’s approach to religion – was what had initially attracted Arab Islamists, he said. It should not come as surprising, therefore, if Arabs focused on building their own futures reject the idea of an external model being imposed.

In the Arab world today, no “post-uprising ideological formation” has yet solidified, Hellyer said. The model that may emerge, he argued, may well share much with the centrist, “moderate secularism” embraced by the AKP and will “probably owe very little to the Muslim Brotherhood’s approach to the Salafi political vision.” Hellyer posited that Libya and Syria – where pious Muslim leaders outside the realm of Islamism hold significant influence – may well be the first to develop this model.

Hellyer agreed with Kuru on the advantages of state-sponsored moderate secularism in countries where there is deep religious belief. While Kuru saw a state role in defining religious law as a blow to democracy, however, Hellyer suggested that it could perhaps be beneficial. He argued that in the contemporary Muslim world, there is a “crisis of religious authority” fueled in part by a proliferation of preachers (for instance in Tunisia and Egypt) who “feel they have the right to issue fatwas and expect people to act upon them.” The establishment of a “quality assurance mechanism” in the form of a role for institutions such as al-Azhar may not be negative development, as long as that role remains consultative rather than coercive.

Hellyer joined Kuru in warning against the idea of an “Islamic state.” He sought to deconstruct the term, saying that in adopting the goal of an “Islamic state,” Islamist movements often failed to acknowledge that the state itself is a modern construct. The idea of a pre-modern “Islamic state” that must be revived, Hellyer insisted, is something of a fallacy, and one that is largely ignored by today’s Islamists. He further questioned Islamists’ claim to a monopoly on interpretations of Islam. Islamism is not simply “political Islam,” he asserted, but is rather the marriage of a “certain reformist approach to Islam” with politics. He pointed out that religious institutions in many Muslim countries “contest the right of Islamist political movements to independently articulate religion.” Hellyer questioned whether Arab Islamists would be able or likely to adopt an AKP model, given the important differences that exist “not only in their political histories, but in their religious approaches.”

Following their presentations, Shadi Hamid questioned both panelists on the applicability of an AKP model in Arab societies that, unlike Turkey, often show strong support for the application of sharia. Perhaps countries such as Egypt – where according to a 2010 Pew poll, as many as 82 percent support the stoning of adulterers and 77 percent favor cutting off the hands of thieves – may actually want to establish Islamic states?

Kuru responded by arguing that the situation in Egypt and Tunisia over the last four months had shown that Islamists’ strategy of appealing solely to their base would backfire. The degree of instability in Egypt had shown that a “more balanced discourse is clearly needed.” Furthermore, he contended, by encouraging more diverse interpretations of sharia, the Muslim Brotherhood would succeed in distinguishing itself positively from its Salafi rivals.

Hellyer argued, meanwhile, that in reading these sorts of polls, there is a need to distinguish between religiosity and religious literacy. While Egypt regularly ranks as the “most religious country in the world,” he said, religious literacy there is “incredibly low.” Where questions pertain to religious identity, Egyptians will largely respond in an emphatic manner. This is not to say, however that they see religion as a political priority. “Inflation, unemployment, and the lack of security” were consistently cited as the top priorities of supporters of all major political parties, he said, while Islamic law “didn’t feature.”

Event Materials

BDC_AKP Model_Kuru

Participants

Moderator

Shadi Hamid

Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Egypt's 'Spoilers' Threaten Democracy

Omar Ashour — Mon, 25 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

“The street wars will continue to extreme levels. … We will force this regime to renounce power and succumb to the will of the Egyptian people,” said the man who was voted out by a majority of Egyptians, and earlier removed by popular revolutionary forces. Mubarak’s prime minister and chief henchman Ahmad Shafiq made these statements last December from Abu Dhabi. The statement proved to be true. Politically motivated violence on the streets of Cairo continued, including attacks on city councils, police stations, prisons, headquarters of political parties, and multiple attempts to shut down Egypt’s largest governmental complex in Tahrir Square. This is in addition to almost weekly attacks and arson attempts on the Presidential Palace, where Shafiq’s main rival, President Mohammed Morsi, resides.

The scene in Egypt is quite intricate. There are definitely more than two parties in the power struggle. In a July 2011BBC article, I expected a usual post-revolution power struggle between Islamist and non-Islamist forces to unfold, with the losing side reneging on democratization process and attempting to spoil it. I showed that the exclusionary behavior among Egypt’s political elite has been a historic trend since Nasser’s coup of 1952, and even before it. What I underestimated is the level of violence associated with the reneging process.

The political scene is not fully captured by the simple “Islamist versus secular” explanation. After all, not only the ultraconservative Salafi Nour Party supported the demands of the “secular” National Salvation Front, but also it altered an earlier fatwa (religious edict) forbidding alliances with non-Islamist parties. In political contexts, opportunism checks belief; and political Salafis are not always an exception.

Three factors may help explain major parts of the complex Egyptian political scene. High expectations of the Egyptian people in the aftermath of the popular revolution is one of those factors. With a shaky economy, limited security, conflicting interests, scarce resources, and chaos on the streets, the current conditions hardly meet any of the revolution’s slogans: “bread, freedom, social justice, and human dignity.”

Add to that another factor: the limited capacity and inexperience of the new political elite, whether the ones chosen by Egyptians in elections, or the ones who weren’t but were part of the revolution against Mubarak. Incompetence of the government and the opposition is a second factor. The ones who were victorious in the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood and their Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), were so far unsuccessful in containing polarization, in fulfilling some of their pre-election promises, and even in appeasing some of their political allies. Still, they managed to be on the winning side every time Egyptians got a chance to cast a ballot; that is four historic national elections/referendums in less than two years. And here lies the third factor.

In 1997, Stanford’s political scientist Stephen Stedman authored a seminal study entitled “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” He argued that when civil war ends, various “losers” from the peace process emerge. The “losers” are groups of leaders and parties who believe that the new transition will threaten their interests. And as a result, they will do their best to “spoil” the peace. His theory applies to various forms of transition, including democratic ones. In the latter, former elites who lost their positions of power and have limited chance for a quick comeback via elections are more interested in “spoiling” the democratic game, and coming back via alternative routes. Additionally, some of the groups and parties that took part in the revolution, but consistently lose in every electoral exercise, can have a similar behaviour.

The spoiler problem and its implications are extremely dangerous for democratic transitions; equally dangerous for both national and human security. If successful, usually the country in question either descends into a vicious civil war or the process ends in a brutal military coup. In other words, spoiler behavior can turn a democratic dream into a bloody nightmare.

But the spoiler problem is not without a solution. Key in the solution is to properly identify the spoilers, their types/goals, actual weights on the ground, actual capacity to spoil, and the appropriate strategy to deal with them. Stedman identified spoilers based on their intentions/goals: limited, greedy, and total. He advised a range of strategies for managing or ending political violence, the key feature of spoiler behaviour.

Limited spoilers are those who seek a share of power within a constitutional framework, seek basic security and protection of themselves or their followers, or suffer from specific economic- or justice-related grievances. For those an inducement-based strategy to abandon political violence is advised. Greedy spoilers are the ones who expand or contract their goals based on calculations of cost and risk. Those may commit to democratic institutions and non-violent politics, but renege on it whenever faced with low costs and risks. A socialization-based strategy is advised to deal with those, including the establishment of a set of norms for acceptable behavior. These norms then become the basis for judging the demands of the parties (are they legitimate or not?) and the behaviours of the parties (are they acceptable in the normative framework or not?). Finally, total spoilers are usually led by individuals who see the world in all-or-nothing terms and often suffer from pathological tendencies that prevent the pragmatism necessary for compromise settlements. For those, a coercion strategy is advised by Stedman; a strategy that relies on the use or the threat of punishment to deter or alter unacceptable spoiler behavior or reduce the capability of the spoiler to disrupt democratic transition.

All three types of spoilers exist and operate currently in Egypt. The categories are never set in stone, though. In Egypt, the reliance on street violence to attain political goals is on the rise, and proved to be effective and useful. Whereas those tactics were justified by revolutionary forces and political groups operating under brutal dictatorships, they cannot be justified in a nascent democratization process where alternation of power is guaranteed by ballots, not bullets.

Authors

Omar Ashour

Publication: Al Monitor

The Libyan Revolution at Two

Ibrahim Sharqieh — Fri, 22 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

Arriving in the Libyan capital Tripoli, it is immediately (and dispiritingly) clear just how much needs to be done before the country can experience any sort of secure and just order. During my January research trip to Libya, the city seemed to have been overtaken by a paramilitary culture. The streets of Tripoli are thronged with Libyans in military uniform; not members of a national army, but rather of an expanding constellation of independent revolutionary and military councils. The city regularly rings out with automatic gunfire, particularly at night. Its walls, meanwhile, are papered with posters of the 2011 revolution's "martyrs," some of which couple a professional studio portrait with a later, amateur picture of the same man's corpse. Surrounded on all sides by headshots of the Libyan revolution's dead, it can sometimes be difficult to imagine how Libya can achieve national reconciliation and become a stable, functioning country.

Post-revolutionary Libya's accomplishments to date, of course, should not be minimized. The country saw a smooth handover of power in August 2012 from the National Transitional Council to an elected and representative parliament, the General National Congress. The previous month's parliamentary elections to the National Congress, held in a country with no history of electoral politics, were considered generally free and fair by local and international observers. This is a very strong start for Libya's transition process. Libya has witnessed political party formation, another novelty. The country now has functioning political parties -- with offices, staff, and publications -- that work to represent their respective constituencies and took part in last year's elections. Political parties were banned under the ousted ruler Muammar al-Qaddafi. The parliament has also passed a law that governs the drafting of the new Libyan constitution. It sets out how the constitutional committee's 60 members, split evenly among Libya's three districts, will be elected.

Outside the realm of formal politics, Libya has seen a proliferation of civil society organizations, including women's and youth organizations. The women's organizations include those pushing for greater political empowerment and participation for women; in particular, they are advocating the application of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, which emphasizes the importance of women's political participation in post-conflict societies. And in a reflection of Libyans' hunger to speak freely (and to criticize their government), the country has also seen a flood of new media voices. The blossoming of private television channels and newspapers has created a vibrant media scene you might think has existed for decades, not just two years.

Libya also has some cultural factors working in its favor as it struggles to rebuild. It has managed to avoid some of the issues that have dominated transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, notably the ideological divide between Islamists and liberals. There is an irony in the fact that many pointed to the National Congress elections as a success for liberals. "Liberals'" majority share of the vote can be explained in that the Islamist and non-Islamist divide essentially does not exist in Libya, thanks to the deep religious and social conservatism of almost all Libyans. Supposedly liberal factions like that of former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril are closer to Islamism than to the sort of "West-leaning liberalism" on display in Egypt. As some like to put it, Libya's liberals are the equivalent of Tunisia's Islamists. Insofar as this neutralizes the electoral advantage Islamists have enjoyed in other Arab countries, it has also helped to avoid the majority-minority and Islamist-secular dynamics that have proven so divisive and poisonous elsewhere.

Still, it is clear that other basic questions of Libyan identity remain disputed and unanswered, and, in the aftermath of its 2011 revolution, the country has in many ways become a blank slate. Libyans reject the Qaddafi-era system and its legacy, and symbols of the old regime have been removed or defaced. There is little certainty, however, on what should take their place, particularly among symbols of the country's past. Omar al-Mokhtar, a hero of the resistance to Italian colonialism, has become a sort of new unifying figure for the Libyan people. (Former King Idris barely figures into the country's political narrative.) Al-Mokhtar, though, is probably the only personality in the country's past and present on whom there is a Libyan consensus; everyone else in Libya today is the subject of disagreement.

These issues are part of a broader effort by Libyans to deal with their national past, reconstructing their history and piecing together a shared narrative of their experience under Qaddafi's rule. Among the problems they face is ambiguity and disagreement over how far they should look back. How much history must be exhumed before the new Libya can move forward? Some argue that it is only necessary to go as far back as the beginning of Qaddafi's "Popular Revolution" in 1973. A consensus seems to be forming, however, on the need to begin from Qaddafi's arrival to power in 1969. This effort to deal with the past is not simply a philosophical exercise. It is crucial to the functioning of the state and the prospects for reconciling different Libyan factions. Qaddafi's Ownership Laws of 1978, under which all properties not in use by their owner were confiscated, present one problematic example. Libyans have been drawn into complicated -- and often violent -- struggles for ownership as some try to reclaim properties taken under these large-scale redistribution policies. The Libyan state must struggle to fairly adjudicate these disputes, which have their roots in decades-old practices of the Qaddafi regime.

The issue of how to deal with members of the former regime is one of the most high-stakes and controversial challenges to realizing Libyan national reconciliation. The National Congress has agreed in principle to a Law of Political Exclusion that will prohibit old-regime figures from participating in politics or occupying leadership roles in the new Libya. The criteria for defining a "member of the former regime," however, have yet to be determined -- and raise difficult questions. There seems to be overwhelming support from revolutionaries and militia members for the exclusion of anyone who was part of the Qaddafi regime. That could include up to 80 percent of the current National Congress, however, if the law is implemented in the broadest sense. There is not even consensus on whether regime defectors should be integrated into the new order. Some say only those who defected in the first four days of the revolution should qualify, others that it should be anyone who joined the rebels before NATO strikes began.

Many are pushing for purging the judiciary in particular of all Qaddafi-era authorities. If such a step is taken, however, there will be almost no remaining judges to try members of the former regime. (Some have advocated bringing in other Arab or Muslim judges from abroad.) Former dissident Saami al-Saadi, a prominent Salafi figure, demonstrates the thorniness of this issue when he notes that the judge who had ordered his execution in a Qaddafi-era court is still working today. "How can I accept him as a valid authority?" he asks.

Libya's new institutions, meanwhile, are hamstrung by the strength of revolutionary groups and militias. It is these groups that represent the real centers of power in the country today. At least two Libyan states, but arguably many more, exist in parallel. The "official state," led by civil authorities and represented by the General National Congress and the government, is relatively weak. The "unofficial state," led by the Supreme Security Committee (SSC, al-Lajna al-Amniya al-Ulia) and other military councils in the country, hold the real power. While the SSC receives funding from the state, it is still outside the official structure of the state. Beyond this body, there is an array of revolutionary unions and organizations in each town that effectively run their own mini-states. Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi is, for example, being held in a Zintan prison and will likely be tried in a Zintan court. Libya has repeatedly refused to surrender him to the ICC for trial in The Hague. These rebels' arsenals are one source of their strength -- of a declared 200,000 rebels, only 10,000 have signed up for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs and surrendered their arms to state control.

The revolutionaries, meanwhile, are themselves divided. Mr. Haidar, a prominent leader in the Misurata rebels, is keen to point out that the real anti-Qaddafi rebel forces are only about 40,000-strong in all of Libya. The remaining 160,000 "rebels" are in fact just power-seeking opportunists, he says.

What unites the revolutionaries, though, is a "culture of the victor" that poses a real obstacle to post-conflict reconciliation. This culture has divided Libya into victorious towns and cities like Misurata, Zintan, and Benghazi and defeated ones like Bani Walid and Sirte. The victorious have taken ownership of the revolution and indulge in self-glorification, while the defeated undergo a process of shaming and marginalization. As resentment grows among the revolution's "losers," there is no real sign of the deep divisions between the two camps being bridged.

One former "Qaddafi town," Tawergha, has been entirely emptied of its citizens. When Tawerghan men attacked Misurata during the war, Misuratans say, they systematically raped Misurata's women. Now Tawergha's 35,000 residents are either refugees or internally displaced. The majority of Tawergha is now being housed in three camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) from where most young men have fled. The Libyan judiciary is at a loss for how to deal with a "town accused of rape," and no one has the weight or nerve to convince the rebels of Misurata to allow these people to return to their homes. "We do not have, in our legal system or in our tradition, a way to deal with systematic rape," says Minister of Justice Salah Margani. "We just look at it, acknowledge the suffering of the victims of rape and the IDP camps, and feel powerless about doing anything about it, simply because we don't know how."

The debate over transitional justice has become a central feature of the Libyan transition. A formal transitional justice mechanism is seen by almost all revolutionary factions as a prerequisite to any form of national reconciliation. There is currently no forum in which rival Libyan factions can sit down together, making clear the need for a national dialogue of sorts. There is a general unwillingness, however, to meet with any members of the former regime, foreclosing the possibility of an inclusive transition that could actually resolve the country's security challenges.

Libyans have begun to establish some processes of national reconciliation, but little has actually been achieved thus far. They have set up an independent truth and reconciliation commission led by a judge who served in Qaddafi's Supreme Court but defected before the revolution. Almost a year after its launch, however, the commission has yet to begin its work. A major part of the problem is a lack of technical expertise. The commission's members have sought external advice, but, in the absence of more hands-on cooperation and assistance, they are struggling to make use of it.

If the Libyan people are to restore order to the country and begin to build the modern society Qaddafi denied them, they have a number of key priorities. First and foremost, the establishment of security is an absolute necessity. The lack of security can be seen and felt throughout Libya, whether in raids on Benghazi police stations in the East or the brazen and aggressive smuggling enterprise in Southern city of Sebha. Libya has no future without the return of security and the end of the parallel security-militia state that effectively governs much of the country.

The reintegration of militants into society will require an effective DDR process. Ex-combatants have legitimate grievances and concerns that the state must listen to and address. This will require a state-revolutionary dialogue that, as of now, does not exist. There must also be an end to the culture of victor and vanquished. To whatever extent possible, the state must try to resist the classification of whole tribes and towns as defeated elements of the old regime. As towns like Bani Walid and Sirte and tribes like the Warfella are excluded from the process of rebuilding the country, divisions within society are being deepened. IDPs and refugees have likewise been ignored, which threatens to produce a generation that feels excluded, frustrated, and angry. To the extent that all these segments of Libyan society feel marginalized and abandoned, this situation has dangerous implications for the country's stability. They must be included in the country's rebuilding to avoid the return of violence and civil conflict. For the state to absorb these actors, of course, this process must be coupled with the reform of Libyan state institutions. Libya has made very slow progress in institutional reform, but it can start with its judiciary.

The international community also has a role in the rebuilding of Libya. On border security and the care of refugees (of whom there are approximately one million), Egypt and Tunisia are seen as key partners. Technical support is needed, meanwhile, in initiating a national dialogue, starting the work of the truth commission, and rehabilitating revolutionaries. While the European Union is widely cited as a natural partner for this sort of support, many Libyans have concerns about blurring the line between assistance and intervention. The only real international presence in the country at the moment is the United Nations, which has limitations to what it can achieve. One key message stressed by Margani, moreover, is that whatever assistance is given to the country should not come with conditions that might conflict with "Libyan sovereignty and cultural sensitivities."

Libyans face a long process of rebuilding their country -- or in some respects, building it for the first time. The impoverished state in which Qaddafi left Libyan society has only made Libyans' accomplishments to date all the more impressive. Now is the time, though, to push even harder for a real and comprehensive political transition and to realize Libyan national reconciliation. If not, the forces of revenge and militia violence threaten to overtake everything else.

Authors

Ibrahim Sharqieh

Publication: Foreign Policy

Muslim Politics Without an "Islamic" State: Can Turkey's Justice and Development Party Be a Model for Arab Islamists?

Ahmet T. Kuru — Thu, 21 Feb 2013 00:00:00 -0500

As Islamist parties assume power in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, many – in both the West and the region – have turned to the experience of Turkey’s pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) for lessons on negotiating the relationship between Islam and the state.

The “AKP model,” it is argued, occupies the middle ground between the “assertive secularism” of Turkey’s past, and the marriage of religion and politics seen in countries such as Iran. Given striking differences, however, between Turkey, with its Kemalist past, and the Arab world, where “secularism” itself is sometimes almost taboo, can the AKP’s experience really be an effective model? Will Islamists in deeply conservative Arab countries even see it as desirable?

In a policy briefing from the BDC, Muslim Politics Without an "Islamic" State: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development Party be a Model for Arab Islamists?, Visiting Fellow Ahmet T. Kuru explores the relationship between Islamism and secularism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Kuru writes the continued rise of the AKP and its embrace of a “passive secularism” that effectively advances Islamic values provide an important and potentially attractive example for Arab Islamists. The differences between the Arab and Turkish contexts, he argues, need not inhibit the adoption of certain aspects of the AKP model. Rather, the dividends brought by the AKP’s pragmatism and the party's success in pursuing Muslim politics without seeking an “Islamic” state may yet encourage Arab Islamists to follow a similar path.

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Ahmet T. Kuru

Publication: Brookings Doha Center

The Future of the Palestinian National Project

Wed, 20 Feb 2013 10:00:00 -0500

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February 20, 2013
10:00 AM - 12:00 PM EST

Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar

On February 20, 2013, the Brookings Doha Center (BDC) hosted a policy discussion on the future of the Palestinian national project. Speakers assessed national efforts to end the Israeli occupation and achieve political reconciliation between opposing factions. Key national challenges were addressed against the backdrop of regional and international developments, such as the ongoing Arab Awakening and President Obama’s upcoming visit to Israel and the West Bank. The panel featured Mustafa Barghouthi, secretary-general of the Palestinian National Initiative, Sabri Saidam, deputy secretary-general of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, Ahmed Yousef, secretary-general of the House of Wisdom and former advisor to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, and Khaled Elgindy, fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. The discussion was moderated by BDC Director Salman Shaikh and attended by members of Qatar’s diplomatic, academic, business and media communities.

The debate opened with a discussion of Palestinian efforts, both past and present, to end the Israeli occupation. Barghouthi and Saidam agreed on the failure of peace negotiations and the role of popular non-violent resistance as a successful means of resisting the occupation, citing the protests at Bab al-Shams and recent hunger strikes as laudable examples. Barghouthi argued that the peace process had become a “substitute” for peace and a “cover” for Israeli settlement building in the West Bank, which, he said, was giving way to a “new system of Apartheid.” In order to end the occupation, he explained, Palestinians will need a new strategy that focuses on popular non-violent resistance, Palestinian unity, and a strong international solidarity campaign, as well as new economic policies to tackle high unemployment. Elgindy said there was growing consensus amongst the Palestinian people and leadership that “old ways” – namely, only negotiations or only armed struggle – had failed and that Palestinians “need to be much more creative on tactics to end the occupation.” He pointed out that popular resistance is consonant to what is happening around the region. Yousef, however, argued that Palestinians could not surrender the “military option” entirely and would therefore need to pursue a combination of violent and non-violent struggle in order to counter Israeli aggressions.

When challenged about the two-state solution, participants proved highly skeptical regarding its future prospects. Saidam argued that Israel was rendering this formula impossible “by etching a way through Palestinian geography.” Barghouthi warned that if Israelis intended to “kill” the two-state solution, Palestinians would fight for a pre-Oslo single democratic state. Yousef, meanwhile, expressed a personal preference for a “bi-national” state, but also blamed “Zionists” for the collapse of this project. When asked to reflect Hamas’s stance, he said the party recognized Palestinian unity, pre-1967 borders with Jerusalem as capital, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees.

As the conversation turned to the issue of national reconciliation, the general consensus was that Palestinian unity was a vital driving force of the Palestinian national agenda. Saidam, for instance, said he was “proud” to reach out to Hamas and “heal the wound” of the last six to seven years. He stressed the importance of “putting the Palestinian house in order” and accomplishing national reconciliation “in deeds, not words,” stressing the need to revive and reform the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Barghouthi added that, in order to succeed, national reconciliation would require the establishment of a unity government headed by Mahmoud Abbas, followed by elections. Yousef agreed that Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian National Initiative, and others should join the PLO in order for the organization to become a representative structure for Palestinian people “inside and outside.” He stressed the importance of ending divisions between factions; otherwise, he warned, “the street will revolt against the leadership.”

Discussing President Obama’s forthcoming visit to Israel and the West Bank, participants expressed disillusionment with U.S. policy on the Palestinian issue. Elgindy argued that, throughout recent history, Americans have sought to “depoliticize” Palestinian politics. He said Obama and his administration should recognize Palestinian politics as a reality that should be accommodated “on some level,” including recognition of the outcome of elections. He emphasized, however, that the United States would never “deliver” Israel and that Palestinians should not await any major American initiative to end the conflict. Barghouthi said that President Obama should stop ignoring the Palestinian issue while supporting Israel “unconditionally.” Saidam stressed that the “rules of the game had changed” and that America must come to terms with the fact that Hamas is now “part and parcel of the Palestinian political fabric.”

When asked to assess the impact of the Arab Awakening on the Palestinian issue, Barghouthi expressed great optimism. He described it as a positive development for democracy and freedom of expression that worked in favor of the Palestinian cause, rather than overshadowing it. Saidam also expressed admiration for the changes across the Arab world, describing them as a source of inspiration for the Palestinian people. “We want to see democracy on the Arab streets,” he added, “but don’t forget us.”

Elaborating on Hamas’s response to the uprisings, Yousef said the party was learning to benefit from the examples set by Islamists across the region. As newly-formed governments across the region struggle, he said, Hamas understands that the “only option to succeed and survive is to form coalitions with liberals and seculars.” Power-sharing with Fatah and other factions is the only way forward, he said, adding that Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt were supporting this choice and pushing Hamas to embrace reconciliation. When challenged on Hamas’s relationship with Iran, Yousef explained that – though the party prefers to be independent – Iran had been the only country to provide them with support and funds for survival. Other Arab countries, he said, had isolated and abandoned them.

The debate concluded with a discussion focusing on Israeli security in light of the changing regional environment. Elgindy stressed that only America had the power to reassure Israel, allowing it to make the kind of political concessions needed for a two-state solution without having to compromise Israel’s security needs. Barghouthi retorted that threats to Israeli security were a “myth.” With 400 nuclear warheads and the fifth largest army in the world, Israel is not a victim in the conflict, he said. He added that suicide, not combat, was the leading cause of death in the Israeli military. Saidam said Israel had to understand “that trouble in their backyard is trouble at home” and that “security without justice is nonsense.” Barghouthi, finally, concluded that “the best guarantee for security is peace” and that “peace can only be achieved if the Palestinians are free.”

When the floor was opened for questions, a member of the audience raised the issue of how to garner support from the Palestinian Diaspora for a two-state solution that “clearly isn’t working.” Elgindy agreed on the need to invest in a new effort to create a Palestinian body that is fully representative – this will involve reincorporating the Palestinian Diaspora in the process, he said. Presenting the Palestinian people with a fait accompli would not be constructive, he argued, saying that “you need to have buy-in from all Palestinian constituencies.”

Participants

Moderator

Salman Shaikh

Director, Brookings Doha Center
Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Panelists

Mustafa Barghouthi

Secretary General

Sabri Saidam

Deputy Secretary General

Khaled Elgindy

Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy

Ahmed Yousef

Secretary General

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